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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man ) 
dealing with his sole and separate property ) 
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man ) 
dealing with his sole and separate property, ) 
and REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING) 
LLC, an Idaho limited liability company, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTIMANETS, LLC, ) 
) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
) 
) 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTIMANETS, LLC, ) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
) 
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man ) 
dealing with his sole and separate property ) 
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man ) 
dealing with his sole and separate property, ) 
and REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING ) 
LLC, an Idaho limited liability company, ) 
Defendants. ) 
) 
l~ D n IS 
MADISON COUNTY 
ORDER OF ASSIGNMENT 
Case No. CV-2010-115 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above-entitled case is referred to the Honorable 
Gregory S. Anderson, District Judge for further proceedings. 
DONE AND DATED December 2, 2010. 
ORDER OF ASSIGNMENT 
PAGE 215 
Burton W. Butler I 
Trial Court Administrator 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a full, true and correct copy of the foregoing Order of 
Assignment was personally delivered, by hand delivery to the Bonneville County Courthouse 
Box, sent by facsimile or mailed by first class mail with prepaid postage as indicated below on 
December 2,2010: 
Clerk of Court, Jefferson County Courthouse - mailed 
Hon. Gregory S. Anderson, District Judge, Bonneville County Courthouse Box 
Bryan D. Smith, Esq., Bonneville County Courthouse box 
Hyrum Erickson, Esq., P.O. Box 250, Rexburg, Idaho 83440 
Jefferson County deputy clerks to distribute copies to all parties or attorneys of record and/or 
parties at issue that are not listed on the Certificate of Service. 
ORDER OF ASSIGNMENT 
PAGE 216 
A~ mlllistrative SSlstant 
, 
Bryan D. Smith, Esq. -ISB #4411 
B. J. Driscoll, Esq. - ISB # 7010 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
414 Shoup Ave. 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Telephone: (208) 524-0731 
Facsimile: (208) 529-4166 
Attorneys for Defendant and Counterclaimant 
Highway 101 Investments, LLC 
~M~AD~IS~ON~C~OU~NTI~======~~ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man 
dealing with his sole and separate property 
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man dealing 
with his sole and separate property, and 
REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Defendant 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Counterclaim ant, 
v. 
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man 
dealing with his sole and separate property 
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man dealing 
with his sole and separate property, and 
REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, 
RULE 56(f) MOTION 
PAGE 217 
Counterdefendants. 
Case No. CV-10-115 
RULE 56(f) MOTION 
COMES NOW the defendant and counterclaimant, Highway 101 Investments, 
LLC, by and through its counsel of record, Bryan D. Smith, Esq., of the firm Smith, 
Driscoll & Associates, PLLC, and pursuant Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56{f) moves this 
Court or an order continuing the hearing on plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment 
which is currently scheduled for hearing on February 3,2011. 
This motion is made on the grounds and for the reasons that the defendant has 
been trying to get the depositions of the plaintiffs scheduled since November 19, 2010 
but the plaintiffs have avoided these depositions that are necessary to respond to the 
plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. 
This motion is based on this Motion, the Brief in Support of Rule 56{f) Motion, 
the Notice of Hearing filed concurrently herewith, and the Court's records and files 
herein. 
RULE 56(f) MOTION 
PAGE 218 
The defendant requests oral argument. 
-rfo--
DATED this 'L./ day of December, 2010. 
Bryan D. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Highway 101 Investments, LLC 
CERTIFICATlJF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this l..!!'fa~ecember, 2010, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing RULE 56(f) MOTION to be served, by placing the same in a 
sealed envelope and depositing in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, or hand 
delivery, facsimile transmission or overnight delivery, addressed to the following: 
Hyrum D. Erickson, Esq. 
RIGBY, ANDRUS & RIGBY, 
Chartered 
Attorneys at Law 
25 North Second East 
Rexburg, Idaho 8340 
RULE 56(f) MOTION 
PAGE 219 
-
.S. Mail 
Fax 
1 Overnight Delivery 
1 Hand Delivery 
Bryan D. Smith, Esq. - ISB #4411 
B. J. Driscoll, Esq. - ISB # 7010 
SMITH, DRISCOll & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
414 Shoup Ave. 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Telephone: (208) 524-0731 
Facsimile: (208) 529-4166 
Attorneys for Defendant and Counterclaimant 
Highway 101 Investments, LLC 
16 2010J~ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man 
dealing with his sole and separate property 
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man dealing 
with his sole and separate property, and 
REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Defendant, 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Counterclaim ant, 
v. 
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man 
dealing with his sole and separate property 
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man dealing 
with his sole and separate property, and 
REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF RULE 56(f) MOTION 
PAGE 220 
Case No. CV-10-115 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF RULE 56(f) 
MOTION 
.doc 
Counterdefendants. 
I. INTRODUCTION. 
This case arises out of a dispute over a sign placed on road the defendant owns 
and the plaintiffs use. The plaintiffs have moved for summary judgment. The defendant 
moves this court for an order continuing the hearing to allow the defendant time to 
complete discovery that the plaintiffs have avoided. Moreover, the hearing needs to be 
continued to allow the defendant to file its own motion for summary judgment so that 
the court can hear all matters on cross-motions for summary judgment. 
II. THE COURT SHOULD GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT HAS PRESENTED AN AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL SETTING 
FORTH SPECIFIC FACTS JUSTIFYING THE CONTINUANCE. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f), the rule Defendant relies on in support of its 
motion, reads as follows: 
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the 
motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit 
facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make 
such other order as is just. 
I.R.C.P. 56(f) (emphasis added). In discussing the requirements of Rule 56(f), the Idaho 
Supreme Court recently explained as follows: 
It has been noted that a party who invokes the protection of Rule 
56(f) must "do so in good faith by affirmatively demonstrating why he 
cannot respond to a movant's affidavits ... and how postponement of a 
ruling on the motion will enable him, by discovery or other means, to 
rebut the movant's showing of the absence of a genuine issue of fact." 
Further, in order to grant a motion for additional discovery before 
hearing a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff has the burden of 
setting out "what further discovery would reveal that is essential to 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF RULE 56(f) MOTION 
PAGE 221 
on.doc 
justify their opposition," making clear "what information is sought and 
how it would preclude summary judgment." 
Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 141 Idaho 233, 239, 108 P.3d 380,386 (200S) (deletion in 
original; emphasis added) (quotations omitted). 
Here, the plaintiffs have sued the defendant for an injunction and damages 
arising from the defendant's placement of a sign. The defendant has raised multiple 
affirmative defenses including laches, estoppel, unclean hands, and no unreasonable 
interference with any easement the plaintiffs may have. These are all very fact intensive 
affirmative defenses. The defendant needs to take the depositions of the plaintiffs to 
develop all these affirmative defenses. Specifically, the defendant needs to develop 
with the plaintiffs when then knew the sign was going up, when they knew where the 
sign was going up, what they did in response to what they knew, and what steps they 
took to prevent the sign from going up. The defendant believes that a full development 
of the facts will show that the plaintiffs knew the sign was going up, they knew where 
the sign was going up, and they did nothing to prevent the sign from going up-all to 
the financial detriment of the defendant. Certain admissions from the plaintiffs on 
these facts will preclude summary judgment. 
In this regard, counsel for defendant received the summary judgment papers 
from the plaintiff on November 18, 2010. On November 19, 2010, counsel for the 
defendant called to speak with Mr. Erickson who represents the plaintiffs. Because Mr. 
Erickson was unavailable, counsel for the defendant spoke to Mr. Erickson's secretary 
telling her that he wanted to take the depositions of the plaintiff and confirming that 
the plaintiff had not yet noticed the summarv judgment for hearing. Mr. Erickson's 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF RULE 56(f) MOTION 
PAGE 222 
Ition.doc 
secretary said that she would speak with Mr. Erickson and get back with some available 
dates for deposition. Having heard nothing from Mr. Erickson on the depositions, 
counsel for the defendant sent a letter to Mr. Erickson on December 1, 2010 reminding 
Mr. Erickson of the phone call and asking for dates for depositions. Mr. Erickson did not 
respond to the letter. Instead, about one week later, Mr. Erickson set this matter for 
hearing. 
Mr. Erickson has not cooperated making his clients available for deposition 
probably because Mr. Erickson is fearful that the defendant will obtain facts sufficient to 
defeat the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. This is further evidence that the 
court should grant the defendant's Rule 56(f) motion. The defendants have served 
deposition notices setting the depositions of the plaintiff for January 28, 2011. The 
defendant requests that the court continue the hearing on the motion for summary 
judgment because the defendant's response is due January 20,2011. Unless the court 
continues the hearing, the defendant will not be able to have the transcript prepared 
and presented to the court. 
III. THE COURT SHOULD CONTINUE THE MATTER TO A DATE WHERE THE COURT 
CAN HEAR THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND THUS 
RULE ON CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AT THE SAME TIME. 
The defendant intends on filing its own motion for summary judgment. Thus, 
the parties will have cross motions for summary judgment on file. This court should 
continue the summary judgment hearing to a date that allows both parties to 
adequately brief all issues that this court can then rule on. 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF RULE 56(f) MOTION 
PAGE 223 
l.doe 
IV. CONCLUSION. 
For all the reasons set forth above, the defendant requests that this court grant 
its Rule 56(f) motion and continue the summary judgment set on February 3, 201l. 
DATED this 1'1~;;;;;; December, 2010. 
By __ ~ __ ~ __ -,~ __ ~ ________ ___ 
Bryan D. S i 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Counterclaim ant 
CERTIFICA~ERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this I '-tday of December, 2010, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF RULE 56 (f) MOTION to be served, 
by placing the same in a sealed envelope and depositing in the United States Mail, 
postage prepaid, or hand delivery, facsimile transmission or overnight delivery, 
addressed to the following: 
Hyrum D. Erickson, Esq. 
RIGBY, ANDRUS & RIGBY, 
Chartered 
Attorneys at Law 
25 North Second East 
Rexburg, Idaho 8340 
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1 Overnight Delivery 
1 Hand Delivery 
Bryan D. Smith, Esq. -ISB #4411 
B. J. Driscoll, Esq. - ISB # 7010 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PllC 
414 Shoup Ave. 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Telephone: (208) 524-0731 
Facsimile: (208) 529-4166 
Attorneys for Defendant and Counterclaimant 
Highway 101 Investments, LLC 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man 
dealing with his sole and separate property 
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man dealing 
with his sole and separate property, and 
REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Defendant, 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Counterclaim ant, 
v. 
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man 
dealing with his sole and separate property 
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man dealing 
with his sole and separate property, and 
REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, 
AFFIDAVIT OF BRYAN D SMITH 
PAGE 225 
Case No. CV-10-11S 
AFFIDAVIT OF BRYAN D. SMITH 
Counterdefendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
) ss. 
County of Bonneville ) 
Bryan D. Smith, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am one ofthe attorneys who represent the defendant in the above-
referenced case. 
2. I make this affidavit based on my own personal knowledge. 
3. On November 18, 2010, my office received the plaintiffs' motion for 
summary judgment. 
4. On November 19,2010, I called Mr. Erickson's office asking for him. He 
was unavailable. I spoke to his secretary and told her that I needed some dates when 
we could take the depositions of the plaintiffs. I told her that I needed these to respond 
to the summary judgment and confirmed that Mr. Erickson had not noticed the motion 
for summary judgment for hearing. She told me she would get some dates and get back 
to me. 
5. As of December 1,2010, I had not heard back from Mr. Erickson. I 
therefore sent him a letter following up on dates for the deposition of his clients. A true 
and correct copy ofthis letter is attached as Exhibit flA./I 
6. Mr. Erickson did not ever get back to me with any dates for depositions 
even though as a courtesy to him I had tried to get dates convenient to all parties. 
Instead, on December 8,2010, Mr. Erickson served his notice of hearing noticing this 
matter for February 3, 2011 that I received on December 9, 2010. 
AFFIDAVIT OF BRYAN D SMITH 
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7. On December 9,2010, I called Mr. Erickson to discuss this matter. He 
was not available in the morning. I called Mr. Erickson again in the afternoon. No 
response. I have therefore set the depositions of the plaintiffs on January 28, 2011. 
picked this date because I am unavailable during the holidays for depositions. 
Moreover, my clients are unavailable to attend the depositions until January 28, 2011. 
8. The plaintiffs have sued the defendant for an injunction and damages 
arising from the defendant's placement of a sign. The defendant has raised multiple 
affirmative defenses including laches, estoppel, unclean hands, and no unreasonable 
interference with any easement the plaintiffs may have. 
9. These are all very fact intensive affirmative defenses. The defendant 
needs to take the depositions of the plaintiffs to develop all these affirmative defenses. 
Specifically, the defendant needs to develop with the plaintiffs when they knew the sign 
was going up, when they knew where the sign was going up, what they did in response 
to what they knew, and what steps they took to prevent the sign from going up. 
10. The defendant believes that a full development of the facts will show that 
the plaintiffs knew the sign was going up, they knew where the sign was going up, and 
they did nothing to prevent the sign from going up-all to the financial detriment of the 
defendant. Certain admissions from the plaintiffs on these facts will preclude summary 
judgment. 
Further your affiant sayeth naught. 
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/Lff-1-DATED this ___ day of December, 2010. 
Bryan D. 
Attorneys for Defendants 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to~~y of Dec. mber, 2010. 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Idaho Falls, Idaho 
My Commission Expires: 04/11/11 
CERTIFICAT~VICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~ay of December, 2010, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF BRYAN D. SMITH to be served, by placing 
the same in a sealed envelope and depositing in the United States Mail, postage 
prepaid, or hand delivery, facsimile transmission or overnight delivery, addressed to the 
following: 
Hyrum D. Erickson, Esq. 
RIGBY, ANDRUS & RIGBY, 
Chartered 
Attorneys at Law 
25 North Second East 
Rexburg, Idaho 8340 
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] Overnight Delivery 
] Hand Delivery 
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Exhibit "A" 
LAW OFFICES OF 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
BRYAN D. SMITH' 
B. J. DRISCOLL" 
BRYAN N. ZOLLINGER 
·ALSO ADMITTED IN CALlF'ORNIA 
uAL.SO ADMITTED IN UTAH 
Hyrum D. Erickson, Esq. 
RIGBY, ANDRUS & RIGBY, Chartered 
Attorneys at law 
25 North Second East 
Rexburg, Idaho 83440 
414 SHOUP 
POST OFFICE BOX 50731 
IDAHO FALLS. IDAHO 6340S 
December 1, 2010 
Re: Kenton D. Johnson, et ai, vs. Highway 101 Investments, LLC 
Madison County Case No. CV-2010-11S 
Dear Hyrum: 
TELEPHONE (206) 524-0731 
FAX (208) 529-4166 
e-mail: info@eidaholaw.com 
About two weeks ago, I spoke with your secretary asking for dates when your clients could be 
available for deposition. I have not heard back. Please forward some dates in January when 
your clients would be available for deposition 
Sincerely, 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PlLC 
Bryan D. Smith 
BDSjdh 
cc: Highway 101 Investments, llC 
F:\CLlENTS\BDS\8223\Letters\015 hyrum letter.lDec201O.doc 
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Hyrum D. Erickson, ISBN 7688 
RIGBY, ANDRUS & RIGBY, Chartered 
Attorneys at Law 
25 North Second East 
Rexburg, Idaho 83440 
Telephone: 208-356-3633 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
JW -4 2011 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man ) 
dealing with his sole and separate ) 
property and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a ) 
married man dealing with his sole and ) 
separate property, and REXBURG ) 
PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an ) 
Idaho limited liability company, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
) 
) 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, ) 
) 
Counterclaimant, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
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Case No. CV-2010-115 
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KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man ) 
dealing with his sole and separate ) 
property and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a ) 
married man dealing with his sole and ) 
separate property, and REXBURG ) 
PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an ) 
Idaho limited liability company, ) 
) 
Counterdefendants. ) 
) 
COME NOW Plaintiffs, and through their attorney of record, Hyrum Erickson of Rigby, 
Andrus, & Rigby, Chtd. and submit the following brief in opposition to Defendant Highway 
101 's Rule 56(f) motion to continue the hearing of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiffs seek removal of a sign that Defendant Highway 101 Investments, LLC 
(hereinafter, Highway 101), has placed on property subj ect to an easement owned by the 
Plaintiffs. There is no dispute that the sign is located within the Plaintiffs easement. However, 
Highway 101 has alleged multiple affirmative defenses and a counterclaim for "right of way 
forfeiture", unjust enrichment, trespass, and "equitable recoupment/estoppel". The Complaint 
was filed February 19,2010. Highway 101 filed its answer April 1, 2010. The parties engaged 
in discovery. Highway 101 sent its discovery request, dated June 10,2010, to Plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs' filed their Notice of Service for their Response to Requests for Admissions on August 
18,2010. Plaintiffs responded to the remainder of Defendant's discovery request July 12,2010. 
Plaintiffs supplemented their Response to Request for Production of Documents on August 31. 
Highway 101 took no action in this case from June 11,2010, when it responded to Plaintiffs' 
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discovery request and served its own discovery on Plaintiffs, to November 17, 2010, when 
Plaintiffs filed for summary judgment. Highway 101 received Plaintiffs' response to discovery 
on or about July 12,2010. However, at no time prior to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment filed November 17,2010, did Highway 101 take any action toward taking any 
depositions or engaging in additional discovery. Highway 101 now alleges that deposing 
Plaintiffs is vital to its case and it cannot respond to the summary judgment motion without 
taking the depositions. It further alleges that Plaintiffs and their counsel have intentionally 
avoided being deposed and moves the court, pursuant to LR.C.P. 56(f) to postpone hearing 
Plaintiff s summary judgment motion. 
1. Highway 101 IS motion should be denied because Highway 101 has had adequate 
time for discovery. 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 56(f) reads as follows: 
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party 
cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's 
opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a 
continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or 
discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just. 
The decision to extend time to supplement an affidavit is within the sound discretion of the trial 
court. Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208, 213, 868 P.2d 1224, 1229 (1994). When analyzing a 
56(f) motion, The Idaho Supreme Court has summarized the interplay between 56( c) and 56(f) as 
follows: 
Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time/or 
discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient 
to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which 
that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 
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U.S. 317,322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548,2552,91 L.Ed.2d 265, 273 (1986) (emphasis 
added). 
Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 141 Idaho 233, 239, 108 P.3d 380,386 (2005). In this case, 
Highway 10 l's Answer was filed March 16, 2010 - eight months before Plaintiff filed for 
summary judgment. Highway 101 received Plaintiff's response to discovery on or about July 12, 
2010. If the Plaintiff's responses to interrogatory were not sufficiently detailed and Highway 101 
felt it needed to depose Plaintiffs, it had four months in which to schedule depositions. 
Even after the summary judgment motion was filed Highway 101 had time to schedule 
depositions for use in responding to the motion. After the case was assigned to Judge Anderson 
the hearing on the summary judgment motion was set for February 3,2010. Accordingly, 
Highway 10 l's answering brief was due January 20, 2010. On December 10, 2010 at 10:26 A.M. 
counsel for the Plaintiffs emailed counsel for Highway 101 and indicated that his clients "would 
make themselves available anytime over the next two months with the obvious exception of 
holidays and weekends." Affidavit of Hyrum Erickson in Opposition to Rule 56(f) Motion, Ex. B. 
He then recommended certain days based on his calendar. Id Even assuming that it takes the 
recorder a full week to provide a written transcript of the depositions and that Highway 101 
would need a full week to prepare the brief after receiving the written transcript, Highway 101 
could have deposed Plaintiffs on any day prior to January 6, 2010, and been able to use those 
deposition in opposition to the summary judgment motion. However, on December 14,2010, 
Highway 101 scheduled the depositions for January 28, 2010, thereby guaranteeing that the 
testimony offered will not be available to Highway 101 to use in defending against summary 
jUdgment and filed this motion to postpone the summary judgment hearing. 
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Additionally, depositions were not the only discovery tool available to Highway 101. At 
any time Highway 101 has been entitled to serve interrogatories on Plaintiffs. It has done so and 
received responses. If those responses were not satisfactory or if Highway 101 had additional 
questions, Highway 101 could have served additional interrogatories. Assuming Highway 101 
needed full week to draft a reply brief, it could have used any responses received by it prior to 
January 14th. Highway 101 could have served interrogatories on Plaintiffs anytime prior to 
December 13 th and the responses would have been due in more than enough time or Highway 
101 to use them in a reply to summary judgment. 
Highway 101 is not entitled to relief pursuant to LR.C.P. 56(f) as they have had adequate 
time for discovery both before and after the summary judgment motion was filed. 
2. Highway 101 's motion should be denied because Highway 101 has not shown what 
facts could be obtained by deposition that would be relevant to a summary 
judgment proceeding. 
A party requesting additional time pursuant to 56(f) must do more than simply assert that 
it wants or needs to engage in additional discovery. The Idaho Supreme Court has summarized 
the burden on a party making a 56(f) motion as follows: 
Pursuant to LR.C.P. 56(f), a party may request from the court more time to 
respond to a pending motion for summary judgment. However, that party must 
articulate what additional discovery is necessary and how it is relevant to 
responding to the pending motion. LR.C.P. 56(f). 
It has been noted that a party who invokes the protection of Rule 56(f) must "do 
so in good faith by affirmatively demonstrating why he cannot respond to a 
movant's affidavits ... and how postponement of a ruling on the motion will enable 
him, by discovery or other means, to rebut the movant's showing of the absence of 
a genuine issue of fact." Allen v. BridgestonelFirestone, Inc., 81 F.3d 793, 797 
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(8th Cir.1996). Further, in order to grant a motion for additional discovery before 
hearing a motion on summary judgment, the plaintiff has the burden of setting out 
"what further discovery would reveal that is essential to justifY their opposition," 
making clear "what information is sought and how it would preclude summary 
judgment." Nicholas v. Wallenstein, 266 F.3d 1083, 1088-89 (9th Cir.2001). 
Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 141 Idaho 233, 239, 108 P.3d 380,386 (2005). In this case, 
Highway 101 has not set out what additional information is sought and how it would preclude 
summary judgement. In his affidavit, Mr. Smith avers that "the defendant needs to develop with 
the plaintiffs when they knew the sign was going up, when they knew where the sign was going 
up, what they did in response to what they knew, and what steps they took to prevent the sign 
from going up." Affidavit of By ran D. Smith ~ 9. He then states that "[c]ertain admissions from 
the plaintiffs on these facts will preclude summary judgment". Id. ~ 10. However, Mr. Smith 
does not explain why facts related to the Plaintiffs knowledge of the signs construction would 
preclude summary judgment. 
Highway 101 fails to explain why the details of Kenton Johnson's and Nephi Allen's 
knowledge of the construction and location of the sign would preclude summary judgment. As 
laid out in Plaintiff s Brief in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, Highway 101 has 
raised a number of different affirmative defenses and counterclaims - by Plaintiffs count a total 
of 9 distinct claims or defenses. The information sought by Highway 101 would have no bearing 
on the following Highway 101 defenses/counterclaims: Merger, Right of Way Forfeiture, 
Forfeiture, interference as not unreasonable, Set Off, Unjust Enrichment, Trespass. The 
information sought would also be unnecessary for a defense based on the claims of laches, 
equitable estoppel, and unclean hands. The essence of each of these defenses is that Plaintiffs 
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took some action that makes it inequitable for them to now seek the removal of the sign. 
However, each of these defenses would require that the Plaintiff take some action that induced 
Highway 101 to put the sign in the easement or made some type of representation to Highway 
101 regarding the sign. However, Highway 101, by way of its principals or employees, is 
competent to testify by affidavit if Plaintiffs made representations to them regarding the 
placement of the sign. If the facts sufficient to support these defenses exist, Highway 101 IS 
principals or employees are competent to testify as to them - depositions of the Plaintiffs are not 
necessary. 
Because Highway 101 has failed to make clear what information is sought and how it 
would preclude summary judgment its motion to postpone the summary judgment hearing must 
be denied. 
3. Highway 101's motion should be denied because the information sought by Highway 
101 is already in the record. 
Mr. Smith has affirmed that the depositions are necessary to "develop with the plaintiffs 
when they knew the sign was going up, when they knew where the sign was going up, what they 
did in response to what they knew, and what steps they took to prevent the sign from going up." 
Affidavit of Bryan D. Smith ~ 9. However, the answers to these questions are already in the 
record in the form of Plaintiff's responses to requests for admissions and answers to 
interrogatories. Highway lOl's Response to Interrogatory 1 consists of a detailed three page 
narrative regarding the history of the sign and conversations between the parties regarding the 
sign. Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Plaintiff's Motionfor Summary Judgment, Ex. B. 
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Highway 101 IS Request for Admission No.1 requested that Plaintiffs admit that Highway 101 IS 
response to interrogatory no. 1 is true and correct. Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Plaintiff's 
Motionfor Summary Judgment, Ex. D. In response, Plaintiffs addressed each individual 
allegation in narrative - Plaintiffs admitted most, denied a few, and included substantial 
explanatory details. Id. The result is an additional three page narrative setting out the history of 
the sign from the point of view of the Plaintiffs. All of the information sought by Highway is 
included. Plaintiffs became aware the sign was going up and its location after Dean Moon 
inquired about markings on the ground during the paving of the road and informed Kent Johnson 
and Nephi Allen. Id. Ex. B. p. 3; Ex. D. p. 3. This is supported by the statements of both 
Highway 101 and Plaintiffs. The question of what Plaintiffs did to prevent the sign from going 
up is also addressed. Plaintiffs have affirmed that they objected the placement of the sign 
multiple times and that, prior to the placement of the sign, Nephi Allen actually showed Danny 
Miller the deeds with the easement. Id. Ex. D. The information sought by Highway 101 is in the 
record. If Highway 101 disputes the facts set out by Plaintiffs in their responses to discovery, 
they can make that dispute clear by way of affidavit. The Court can then rule as to whether or 
not there is a dispute as to a relevant fact. 
CONCLUSION 
Because Highway 101 has had ample time for discovery, has not articulated the relevancy 
ofthe sought after information, and because the information sought is already part of the record, 
the Court should deny Highway 10 1 IS rule 56( f) motion. 
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DATED this 4th day of January, 2011. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL, HAND DELIVERY 
OR FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was on this date 
served upon the persons named below, at the addresses set out below their name, either by mail-
ing, hand delivery or by telecopying to them a true and correct copy of said document in a 
properly addressed envelope in the United States mail, postage prepaid; by hand delivery to 
them; or by facsimile transmission. 
DATED this 4th day of January, 2011. 
Bryan D. Smith, Esq. 
B. 1. Driscoll, Esq. 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
P. O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
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RIGBY ANDRUS & RIGBY, Chartered 
[X] Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[)< ] Facsimile 
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Hyrum D. Erickson, ISBN 7688 
RIGBY, ANDRUS & RIGBY, Chartered 
Attorneys at Law 
25 North Second East 
Rexburg, Idaho 83440 
Telephone: 208-356-3633 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man ) 
dealing with his sole and separate ) 
property and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a ) 
married man dealing with his sole and ) 
separate property, and REXBURG ) 
PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an ) 
Idaho limited liability company, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
) 
) 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, ) 
) 
Counterclaimant, ) 
) 
v. ) 
Case No. CV-10-115 
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KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man ) 
dealing with his sole and separate ) 
property and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a ) 
married man dealing with his sole and ) 
separate property, and REXBURG ) 
PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an ) 
Idaho limited liability company, ) 
) 
Counterdefendants. ) 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
ss. 
County of Madison. ) 
HYRUM ERICKSON, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I am the attorney for Plaintiffs. 
2. I filed for summary judgment on November 17,2010. 
3. At that time I did not request a hearing date from the court because the case had been 
assigned to the Honorable Judge Greg Moeller and I felt that it would be inappropriate for 
Judge Moeller to preside in this matter. Although Judge Moeller had never worked on 
this matter, he had been a member of our firm when Jerry Rigby first addressed the issue 
in a letter to the Defendant. I did not want to schedule a hearing until the matter was 
reassigned as it would have to be rescheduled when the case was reassigned. 
4. On or about November 19,2010, DeAnn Chadwick, a secretary in our office relayed to 
me a telephone conversation she had had with Bryan Smith, opposing counsel in the 
above titled action. 
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5. My recollection is that she indicated that Mr. Smith had asked ifthere was a hearing 
scheduled on the summary judgment motion. She indicated to me that Mr. Smith was 
pleased when she indicated that there was not as he wanted to depose the plaintiffs prior 
to the hearing. She further indicated that Mr. Smith would be contacting me regarding 
the issue. 
6. DeAnn also sent me an email regarding the conversation, a copy of which is attached as 
Exhibit A. 
7. She made no mention of a request for available dates. 
8. In early December I received a letter from Mr. Smith dated December 1, 2010, indicating 
that he had requested available dates for a deposition during his conversation with my 
secretary and requesting that I forward dates to him. 
9. I contacted my clients and discussed dates with them. 
10. On December 2, 2010, the TeA assigned the case to Judge Anderson. When we received 
the notice of assignment I instructed my secretary to contact the court and set a hearing as 
soon as possible. She did so. On December 8, 2010, we noticed up a hearing for 
February 3,2010. 
11. On December 9, 2010, Mr. Smith attempted to reach me by phone. I was not in my office 
at the time of the call and he left a voice mail requesting I call him back. 
12. On December 10,2010, I attempted to contact Mr. Smith by phone but was informed he 
was not in the office. I asked about sending an email and was told that although he was 
not in the office that day, if I sent an him an email he might receive it that day. Because I 
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) 
was fairly certain I knew what Mr. Smith wanted to discuss and time was of the essence, I 
sent Mr. Smith the email attached as Exhibit B. 
13. I received no further communications from Mr. Smith prior to receiving Notices of 
Deposition for January 28, 2010, and the 56(t) motion. 
14. At no time have I attempted to avoid my clients being deposed. 
DATED this 4 th day of January, 2011 . /-71~f1£&u-
Hyru Enckson 
Subscribed and Sworn to me this 4th day of January, 2011. 
Notary for State Idaho 
Residing at: S1. Anthony 
My Commission expires: 6/24/2011 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL, HAND DELIVERY 
OR FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION 
I hereby certifY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was on this date 
served upon the persons named below, at the addresses set out below their name, either by mail-
ing, hand delivery or by telecopying to them a true and correct copy of said document in a 
properly addressed envelope in the United States mail, postage prepaid; by hand delivery to 
them; or by facsimile transmission. 
DATED this 4th day of January, 2011. 
Bryan D. Smith, Esq. 
B. J. Driscoll, Esq. 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
P. O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
RIGBY ANDRUS & RIGBY, Chartered 
/ 
/j/lt? ~-~ 
[X] Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[I'] Facsimile 
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Hyrum Erickson 
From: 
Sent: 
To: 
Subject: 
DeAnn Chadwick [dchadwick@rex-Iaw.comj 
Friday, November 19, 2010 11 :49 AM 
'Hyrum Erickson' 
Rexburg Plumbing & Heating 
Bryan Smith called regarding the Motion for SJ he received in the above case. He was wondering if a hearing had been 
set. I told him I did not think so. (Mandy did the paperwork) He would like to take the depositions of Johnson and 
Allen before a hearing on the motion for SJ. He has time in December. 
His phone number is 524-0731. 
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Hyrum Erickson 
From: 
Sent: 
To: 
Subject: 
Bryan, 
Hyrum Erickson [herickson@rex-Iaw.com] 
Friday, December 10, 2010 10:26 AM 
'bds@eidaholaw.com' 
Johnson. et al. v. Highway 101 
I'm sorry I missed your call yesterday. I called your office and they indicated that you were not in today but may receive 
an email. 
I have received your letter dated December 1, 2010. Your letter references a conversation you had with a secretary at 
our firm. I believe the conversation occurred on February 19, 2010. She spoke with me regarding the conversation that 
same day and I spoke with her again after receiving your letter. She does not recall a request for available dates in that 
conversation. She does recall a conversation regarding your desire to depose my clients prior to a hearing on my motion 
for summary judgment. She understood that you would be contacting me regarding the issue. She did not understand 
that you were requesting available dates. I state this because I do not want to give the impression that we have in any 
way attempted to avoid having my clients deposed or are trying to sneak the hearing in before you could get the 
depositions done. 
I have spoken with my clients and they can make themselves available anytime over the next two months with the 
obvious exceptions of holidays and weekends. I would recommend the following days based on my schedule -
December 15, 20, 27, 28, 29, 30; January 3-6,11-14,17-21,25,27,28. As you can see, there are many more available 
dates than unavailable ones. If it would be convenient, you are welcome to the use of our conference room to conduct 
the depositions. 
Regarding the date for the summary judgment hearing - we did not set it when we filed the motion because I felt that 
Judge Moeller should not hear the case -- although he did not work on the case, he was associated with our firm when 
Jerry Rigby first addressed the issue with a letter to your client. I filed a request for Judge Moeller to recuse himself and 
we set the hearing as soon as the case was assigned to another judge. My clients are frustrated with how long it has 
taken to resolve what they perceive to be a very straightforward issue and have requested that I not agree to postpone 
the summary judgment hearing date. 
Feel free to give me a call if there are other issues we need to discuss. 
Hyrum Erickson 
Rigby Andrus & Rigby Chtd. 
(208) 356-3633 
PO Box 250 
Rexburg Idaho 83440 
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Hyrum D. Erickson, ISBN 7688 
RIGBY, ANDRUS & RIGBY, Chartered 
Attorneys at Law 
25 North Second East 
Rexburg, Idaho 83440 
Telephone: 208-356-3633 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man ) 
dealing with his sole and separate ) 
property and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a ) 
married man dealing with his sole and ) 
separate property, and REXBURG ) 
PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an ) 
Idaho limited liability company, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
) 
) 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS,LLC, ) 
) 
Counterc1aimant, ) 
) 
~ ) 
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AFFIDAVIT OF DEANN CHADWICK 
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man ) 
dealing with his sole and separate ) 
property and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a ) 
married man dealing with his sole and ) 
separate property, and REXBURG ) 
PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an ) 
Idaho limited liability company, ) 
) 
Counterdefendants. ) 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
ss. 
County of Madison. ) 
DEANN CHADWICK, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I am currently employed as a legal secretary at Rigby, Andrus, & Rigby, Chtd. 
2. On or about November 19,2010, I received a telephone call from Mr. Bryan Smith. He 
indicated that he had received Mr. Erickson's motion for summary judgment and 
supporting documents, but he had not received a notice of hearing. He asked if a notice 
of hearing had been filed. I told him that a notice of hearing had not been prepared yet. 
3. Mr. Smith indicated that he wanted to take the depositions of the Plaintiffs prior to the 
hearing on the motion for summary judgment. Mr. Smith indicated that he had time in 
December. 
DATED this 4th day of January, 2011. 
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\ 
DeAnn Chadwick 
Subscribed and Sworn to me\_rt1~lclay of January, 2011. ~~w 1li~ vi 
# ~oy D... ~ .. /l~ j) ~ I +~., .......... ~,,\ 7 I,  ;U21Jf6T. ~ (+OTA~; ~ -------r-:: -e- is Notary for State f Idaho 
,.. At"BL\C) I Residing at: St. Anthony ~ ~~.. ..~O~ My Commission expires: 6/24/2011 
~~ ~OF\O &~ 
7"'1111111"\\\\\\' 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL, HAND DELIVERY 
OR FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION 
I hereby certifY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was on this date 
served upon the persons named below, at the addresses set out below their name, either by mail-
ing, hand delivery or by telecopying to them a true and correct copy of said document in a 
properly addressed envelope in the United States mail, postage prepaid; by hand delivery to 
them; or by facsimile transmission. 
DATED this 4th day of January, 2011. 
Bryan D. Smith, Esq. 
B. J. Driscoll, Esq. 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
P. O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
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RIGBY ANDRUS & RIGBY, Chartered 
[X] Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
'r ] Facsimile 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man ) 
dealing with his sole and separate ) 
property and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a ) 
married man dealing with his sole and ) 
separate property, and REXBURG ) 
PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an ) 
Idaho limited liability company, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
) 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, ) 
) 
Counterclaimant, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man ) 
dealing with his sole and separate ) 
property and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a ) 
married man dealing with his sole and ) 
separate property, and REXBURG ) 
PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an ) 
Idaho limited liability company, ) 
) 
Counterdefendants. ) 
Case No. CV-2010-115 
MINUTE ENTRY ON 
RULE 56(f) MOTION 
January 11,2011, at 8:30 A.M., Defendant's Rule 56(f) Motion came on for hearing 
before the Honorable Dane H. Watkins, Jr., District Judge, sitting in open court at Idaho Falls, 
MINUTE ENTRY 
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Ms. Lettie Messick, Deputy Court Clerk, was present. Counsel waived the presence of a 
Court Reporter. 
Mr. Hyrum Erickson appeared on behalf of the plaintiff. Mr. Bryan Smith appeared on 
behalf of the defendant. 
Mr. Smith updated the Court regarding the history of the case and presented argument 
supporting defendant's Rule 56(f) Motion. Mr. Smith anticipates filing a third-party complaint. 
Mr. Erickson argued in opposition to the motion and requested the motion for summary 
judgment proceed as scheduled. 
Mr. Smith presented additional argument supporting defendant's motion. 
The Court granted defendant's Rule 56(f) motion and continued plaintiffs motion for 
summary jUdgment until 9:00 a.m. April 14, 2011. 
Court was thus adjourned. 
c: Hyrum Erickson 
Bryan Smith 
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Bryan D. Smith, Esq. - ISB #4411 
B. J. Driscoll, Esq. - ISB # 7010 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
414 Shoup Ave. 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Telephone: (208) 524-0731 
Facsimile: (208) 529-4166 
Attorneys for Defendant and Counterclaimant 
Highway 101 Investments, LLC 
MAR - 9 201/ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man 
dealing with his sole and separate property 
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man dealing 
with his sole and separate property, and 
REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Defendant, 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Counterclaimant, 
v. 
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man 
dealing with his sole and separate property 
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man dealing 
with his sole and separate property, and 
REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, 
Counterdefendants. 
Case No. CV-10-115 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
-~--------~-----------------------------
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COMES NOW defendant and counterclaimant, Highway 101 Investments, LLC 
(hereinafter "Highway 101"), by and through counsel of record, Bryan D. Smith, Esq., of 
the firm Smith, Driscoll & Associates, PLLC, and move the court pursuant to Rule 56, Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure, for summary judgment against plaintiffs, Kenton D. Johnson, 
Nephi H. Allen, and Rexburg Plumbing & Heating, LLC, and in favor of Highway 101 
Investments, LLC. 
This motion is made on the grounds and for the reasons that there is no genuine 
issue of material fact and the court should rule as a matter of law that Highway 101 has not 
unreasonably interfered with the Plaintiffs' right of way easement and that the doctrines of 
laches and estoppel bar the Plaintiffs' case. 
The motion is based upon this Motion, the Notice of Hearing, the Brief in Support 
of Motion for Summary Judgment, the Affidavit of Bryan D. Smith dated March 8, 2011, the 
Affidavit of Danny Miller dated March 8, 2011, and on the court's records and files. 
Highway 101 requests oral argument. 
DATED this ~..b;;;of March, 2011. 
SMITH, DRISCOlL & A§O~~~ES~ 
BY:~~ 
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oc 
Bryan D. S~ 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Highway 101 Investments, LLC 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
<:'"A1::-
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _0_ day of March, 2011, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be served, by 
placing the same in a sealed envelope and depositing in the United States Mail, postage 
prepaid, or hand delivery, facsimile transmission or overnight delivery, addressed to the 
following: 
Hyrum D. Erickson, Esq. 
RIGBY, ANDRUS & RIGBY, 
Chartered 
Attorneys at Law 
25 North Second East 
Rexburg, Idaho 8340 
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[vru. S. Mail 
[ 1 Fax 
[ 1 Overnight Delivery 
[ 1 Hand Delivery 
Bryan D. Smith, Esq. -ISB #4411 
B. J. Driscoll, Esq. - ISB # 7010 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
414 Shoup Ave. 
P.O. Box 50731 
------ -
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Telephone: (208) 524-0731 
Facsimile: (208) 529-4166 
-~-=~---~~~---~-- -_. 
Attorneys for Defendant and Counterclaimant 
Highway 101 Investments, LLC 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man 
dealing with his sole and separate property Case No. CV-I0-115 
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man dealing 
with his sole and separate property, and SEPARATE STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED 
REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an FACTS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
Idaho limited liability company, SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Defendant, 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Counterclaimant, 
v. 
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man 
dealing with his sole and separate property 
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man dealing 
with his sole and separate property, and 
REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, 
Counterdefendants. 
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.' 
COMES NOW defendant and counterclaimant, Highway 101 Investments, LLC, 
(hereinafter "Highway 101"), by and through counsel of record, Bryan D. Smith, Esq., of 
the firm Smith, Driscoll & Associates, and submits this Separate Statement of Undisputed 
Material Facts in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment. 
1 On October 23, 2000 Plaintiffs Kenton D. Jonson See page 16 of Exhibits attached 
("Johnson") and Nephi N. Allen ("Allen") and Dean to Plaintiffs' Brief in Support of 
Moon (the principals of Rexburg Plumbing & Heating, Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
LLC) acquired real property in the City of Rexburg, Judgment. 
2 
3 
County of Madison, State of Idaho together with an 
easement (the easement at issue) over the property 
abutting theirs, reading as follows: 
"ALSO, A right-of-way to be used in 
common with others described as 
follows: 
Beginning at the Southwest corner of 
Section 17, township 6 North, Range 40 
East, Boise Meridian, Madison County, 
Idaho; thence East 140.90 feet; thence 
North 565.74 feet to the true point of 
beginning; and running thence North 
89°49' 50" East 378.37 feet; thence 
South 25.00 feet; thence South 89°49' 
50" West 394.40 feet; thence North 
32°37' 44 East 29.74 feet to the point of 
beginning." 
Since 1999, Johnson, Allen and Moon have run a 
business called Rexburg Plumbing & Heating on the 
aforementioned property. Until retiring in November 
of 2008, Dean Moon was a member of Rexburg 
Plumbing & Heating, LLC and its president. 
Rexburg Plumbing & Heating is plumbing and heating 
outlet doing primarily construction plumbing and 
heating installation jobs. 
See Allen Depo., 14:1-7; 15:7-
17:2 attached as Exhibit "A" to 
the Affidavit of Bryan D. Smith 
dated March 8, 2011. 
See Johnson Depo., 
46:22-47:5 attached as 
Exhibit "B" to the 
Affidavit of Bryan D. 
Smith dated March 8, 
2011. 
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4 On February 20, 2007, Highway 101 acquired real See pages 21-22 of Exhibits 
property in the City of Rexburg, County of Madison, attached to Brief in Support of 
State of Idaho, abutting Johnson and Allen's property, Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
together with an easement (the easement at issue) Judgment. 
5 
6 
7 
8 
over the property abutting theirs, reading as follows: 
"Together with: a right-of-way to be 
used in common with others described 
as follows: 
Parcel 2: beginning at a point that is 
North 00°11'06" East 539.56 feet along 
the section line and South 89°48'54" 
East 142.21 feet from the Southwest 
corner of Section 17, Township 6 North, 
Range 40 East of the Boise Meridian, 
Madison County, Idaho; and running 
thence North 32°08'41" East 29.72 feet; 
thence North 89°21'24" East 378.37 
feet; thence South 00°28'26" East 25.00 
feet; thence South 89°21'24" West 
394.40 feet to the point of beginning. 
Highway 101 mistakenly believed that it had acquired 
fee simple title to the strip of land over which the 
easement runs; however, on July 28, 2009, Highway 
101 acquired fee simple title to the strip of land over 
which the aforementioned easements run. 
In the latter part of 2007, Highway 101 sought and 
obtained a conditional use permit for an expansion of 
the storage units on their property. As part of the 
expansion, the City of Rexburg required that Highway 
101 run water, sewer, electricity and gas through the 
easement at issue. 
In 2008, Highway 101 decided to have VESCO erect a 
sign on the northwest corner of the strip of land over 
which the easement at issue runs. The sign is a 20' by 
10' sign sitting on top of an approximately 16" 
diameter post approximately 14' above the ground. 
The cost of the sign to Highway 101 was $27,234.00. 
In May/June of 2008 Highway 101 sought and 
obtained a sign permit from the City of Rexburg to 
place the sign on the northwest corner of the strip of 
land over the easement. 
See affidavit of Danny Miller 
dated March 8, 2011 and 
attached Warranty Deed. 
See pages 81-89 of Exhibits 
attached to Brief in Support of 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
See Affidavit of Danny Miller 
dated March 8, 2011. See Allen 
Depo., 25:20-21 attached as 
Exhibit flAil to the Affidavit of 
Bryan D. Smith dated March 8, 
2011. 
See pages 90-93 and 112-114 of 
Exhibits attached to Brief in 
Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
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9 Sometime before August 2, 2008, the plaintiffs saw 
paint markings on the pavement and first knew that a 
sign was to be installed. 
10 On August 2, 2008, after plaintiffs saw the markings 
on the pavement for the sign placement, they advised 
Danny Miller of Highway 101 that they did not want 
the sign to be placed in that location. 
11 On August 4, 2008, Allen contacted the City of 
Rexburg and was advised that the sign and sign 
placement had been approved and if Plaintiffs' had a 
problem with it that it was a civil matter. 
12 On August 6, 2008, VESCO commenced digging the 
hole for the sign post and struck and ruptured the 
sewer pipe necessitating that it be fixed. This repair 
process took about two weeks, during which time the 
hole was open existing, notorious and posted with 
caution cones and tape. VESCO's striking the sewer 
pipe gave the plaintiffs "time ... to figure out what we 
[they] should do." 
13 On or about August 6, 2008, Dean Moon, the 
"president" of plaintiff Rexburg Plumbing & Heating, 
LLC told Danny Miller of Highway 101 that if Highway 
101 owned the property over which the easement at 
issue runs and the City had approved the sign that 
there was "no problem" with the sign or its proposed 
placement. 
14 Highway 101 relied on Dean Moon's representation 
that there was "no problem" with the sign or its 
proposed placement in moving forward with the 
installation. 
15 Dean Moon told Nephi Allen and Kenton Johnson 
about his representation to Highway 101, and neither 
Nephi Allen nor Kenton Johnson ever advised Highway 
101 that it could not rely upon the assurance Dean 
Moon gave Danny Miller. 
16 On or about August 19, 2008 VESCO erected the sign 
post and two 5" diameter bollards on each side ofthe 
sign post. 
17 On or about August 26, 2008, VESCO placed the sign 
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See Allen Depo., 80:22-83:13 
attached as Exhibit "A" to the 
Affidavit of Bryan D. Smith dated 
March 8, 2011. 
See Allen Depo., 148:1-14 
attached as Exhibit "A" to the 
Affidavit of Bryan D. Smith dated 
March 8, 2011. 
See Allen Depo., 149:15-22; 
attached as Exhibit "A" to the 
Affidavit of Bryan D. Smith dated 
March 8, 2011. 
See Affidavit of Danny Miller 
dated March 8, 2011. See Allen 
Depo., 76:1-4. 
See Allen Depo., 133:9-134:8; 
139:20-139:15 attached as 
Exhibit "A" to the Affidavit of 
Bryan D. Smith dated March 8, 
2011. See Johnson Depo., 57:4-
16 attached as Exhibit "B" to the 
Affidavit of Bryan D. Smith dated 
March 8, 2011. See Affidavit of 
Danny Miller dated March 8, 
2011. 
See Affidavit of Danny Miller 
dated March 8, 2011. 
See Johnson Depo., 61:13-20; 
65:7-66:3 attached as Exhibit 
"B" to the Affidavit of Bryan D. 
Smith dated March 8, 201l. 
See Affidavit of Danny Miller 
dated March 8, 2011. 
See Affidavit of Danny Miller 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
at issue on the post. 
Highway 101 could have avoided the expense of the 
sign post, bollards, and sign installation if the 
plaintiffs had filed this lawsuit no later than August 5, 
2008. 
If the sign must be moved, Highway 101 will incur 
substantial expense to move it. 
If the sign must be moved, Highway 101 will not be 
able to relocate the sign near the main roadway 
(Highway 20) resulting in Highway 101's customers 
being less likely to find Highway 101's business 
resulting further in loss of business to Highway 101. 
On February 19, 2010, Plaintiffs filed the instant action 
requesting: 
"1. An order enjoining and restraining 
Defendants, their agents, and 
employees, and each of them, from 
erecting or using in any manner or form 
any obstruction on the above roadway 
and requiring Defendants to promptly 
remove the sign now placed on the 
common road, 
2. An award of damages ... " 
and claiming that: 
"11. The sign is located near the center 
of the roadway and near Defendant's 
business thereby limiting use of the 
roadway by Plaintiff, Plaintiff's 
customers, and others such as suppliers 
coming to and from Plaintiff's business. 
12. The Plaintiffs are currently being 
damaged by the presence of the sign. 
13. If allowed to remain, the sign will 
result in loss of property to Plaintiff, 
and will injure Plaintiff's business. 
14. If allowed to remain, Plaintiff will 
be irreparably harmed." 
The plaintiffs admit that they should have sought 
legal redress "more quicker," meaning immediately 
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dated March 8, 2011. 
See Affidavit of Danny Miller 
dated March 8, 2011. 
See Affidavit of Danny Miller 
dated March 8, 2011. 
See Affidavit of Danny Miller 
dated March 8, 2011. 
See Complaint. 
See Allen Depo., 101:20-
102:8; 104:16-23 
after they saw the word "sign" marked on the ground 
or immediately after he knew the City of Rexburg 
would offer no help. 
23 The plaintiffs acknowledge they should have 
contacted a lawyer a long time before August 5, 2008 
to file this lawsuit. 
24 The plaintiffs did not seek legal redress before the 
sign went in because they did not want to incur the 
costs of litigation. The Plaintiffs acknowledge that if 
they had done so, this court could have ruled on the 
issues before the court now and before Highway 101 
incurred substantial expense 
25 The plaintiffs admit that they did not file suit 
before the sign was installed because they did 
not know whether they could prevail in such a 
lawsuit and they were busy doing day to day 
things. 
26 At no time before August 26, 2008 (when the sign and 
bollards were installed) did the plaintiffs ever give 
notice to Highway 101 that the plaintiffs would assert 
the claims in this lawsuit. 
27 The easement is 25 feet wide, and the sign post and 
bollards are within five feet of the northern boundary 
line leaving 19 feet of space for use of the easement. 
Highway 101 had an engineering plat prepared to 
identify the location of the sign on the right-of-way 
easement. 
28 The plaintiffs' property that abuts the easement gives 
the plaintiffs another 40 feet of space to access their 
property. 
29 There is about 50 to 59 feet between the sign post 
and bollards and Plaintiffs' building. 
30 Just the 19 feet of the easement for plaintiffs to use 
for ingress and egress is wide enough for two trucks 
to easily pass by each other. 
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attached as Exhibit "A" 
to the Affidavit of Bryan 
D. Smith dated March 8, 
201l. 
See Allen Depo., 148:1-
150:21 attached as 
Exhibit "A" to the 
Affidavit of Bryan D. 
Smith dated March 8, 
2011. 
See Johnson Depo., 
12:25-13:5; 13:17-22 
attached as Exhibit "B" 
to the Affidavit of Bryan 
D. Smith dated March 8, 
201l. 
See Johnson Depo., 16:7-
17:6; attached as Exhibit 
"B" to the Affidavit of 
Bryan D. Smith dated 
March 8, 2011. 
See Affidavit of Danny 
Miller dated March 8, 
2011. 
See Allen Depo., 38:1-7 attached 
as Exhibit "A" to the Affidavit of 
Bryan D. Smith dated March 8, 
2011. See Affidavit of Danny 
Miller dated March 8, 2011 and 
attached engineering plat 
See Allen Depo., 38:1:-39:4 
attached as Exhibit "A" to the 
Affidavit of Bryan D. Smith dated 
March 8, 2011. 
See Allen Depo., 39:9-41:7 
attached as Exhibit "A" to the 
Affidavit of Bryan D. Smith dated 
March 8, 2011. 
See Allen Depo., 38:1:16 
attached as Exhibit "A" 
to the Affidavit of Bryan 
31 Thus, there is sufficient room for Plaintiffs' service 
trucks, vehicles, UPS vehicles, and Federal Express 
vehicles to access Plaintiffs' property. 
32 The plaintiffs have admitted that the sign post and 
bollards do not unreasonably interfere with their 
access to their property; nor do they unreasonably 
interfere with the access of the plaintiffs' customers, 
suppliers, or delivery companies. 
33 The Plaintiffs have sustained no damages by virtue of 
the placement ofthe sign post and bollards. 
34 Nephi Allen testified in his own behalf and as the 
30(b)(6) designee for Rexburg Plumbing & Heating, 
LLC. 
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D. Smith dated March 8, 
2011. 
See Allen Depo., 31:25-
33:7 attached as Exhibit 
"A" to the Affidavit of 
Bryan D. Smith dated 
March 8, 2011. See 
Johnson Depo., 19:4-19; 
25:2-26:1 attached as 
Exhibit "B" to the 
Affidavit of Bryan D. 
Smith dated March 8, 
2011. 
See Allen Depo., 31:25-33-7; 
34:18-36:12 attached as Exhibit 
"A" to the Affidavit of Bryan D. 
Smith dated March 8, 2011. See 
Johnson Depo., 19:4-19; 25:2-
26:1 attached as Exhibit "B" to 
the Affidavit of Bryan D. Smith 
dated March 8, 2011. See 
Deposition Exhibit 6 
(photographs) attached as 
Exhibit "C" to the Affidavit of 
Bryan D. Smith dated March 8, 
2011. 
See Allen Depo., 64:14-18; 68:9-
19 attached as Exhibit "A" to the 
Affidavit of Bryan D. Smith dated 
March 8, 2011. See Johnson, 
Depo., 42:6-16; 43:7-44:7; 46:2-
21 attached as Exhibit liB" to the 
Affidavit of Bryan D. Smith dated 
March 8, 2011. 
See Allen Depo., 4:21-5:1 
attached as Exhibit "A" to the 
Affidavit of Bryan D. Smith dated 
March 8, 2011. 
DATED this _--'=~~ d~ March, 2011. 
Bryan D. Smit 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Highway 101 Investments, LLC 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
<:2'1'>-
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _l)_ day of March, 2011, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing SEPARATE STATEMENT OF FACTS to be served, by placing 
the same in a sealed envelope and depositing in the United States Mail, postage 
prepaid, or hand delivery, facsimile transmission or overnight delivery, addressed to the 
following: 
Hyrum D. Erickson, Esq. 
RIGBY, ANDRUS & RIGBY, 
Chartered 
Attorneys at Law 
25 North Second East 
Rexburg, Idaho 8340 
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[ ] Overnight Delivery 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
Bryan D. Smith, Esq. - ISB #4411 
B. J. Driscoll, Esq. -ISB # 7010 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
414 Shoup Ave. 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Telephone: (208) 524-0731 
Facsimile: (208) 529-4166 
Attorneys for Defendant and Counterclaimant 
Highway 101 Investments, LLC 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man 
dealing with his sole and separate property Case No. CV-10-115 
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man dealing 
with his sole and separate property, and BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S 
REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Idaho limited liability company, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Defendant, 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Counterclaimant, 
v. 
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man 
dealing with his sole and separate property 
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man dealing 
with his sole and separate property, and 
REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, 
Counterdefendants. 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
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I. INTRODUCTION. 
Defendant, Highway 101 Investments, LLC {"Highway 101"L files this brief in 
support of its motion for summary judgment against the Plaintiffs and 
Counterdefendants, Kenton D. Johnson, Nephi H. Allen, and Rexburg Plumbing & 
Heating, LLC, (collectively, "the Plaintiffs"). 
The central issue is whether a sign post (measuring approximately 16 inches in 
diameter) and two bollards (measuring approximately 5 inches in diameter) erected by 
Defendant Highway 101 unreasonably interfere with the Plaintiffs' ingress and egress to 
their property over an easement approximately 25 feet wide and 378 feet long. 
II. STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS. 
Highway 101 has submitted a Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts in 
Support of Motion For Summary Judgment. Rather than repeat these facts again here, 
Highway 101 incorporates in full by this reference this Separate Statement of 
Undisputed Facts in Support of Motion For Summary Judgment. 
III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS APPROPRIATE IN THIS CASE. 
In State v. Shama Resources Ltd. Partnership, 127 Idaho 267, 270 (1995L the 
Idaho Supreme Court explained when the court should grant summary judgment: 
Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving part is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P.56{c). The party moving 
for summary judgment bears the burden of establishing the absence of a 
genuine issue of material fact. Tingley v. Harrison, 125 Idaho 86,89,867 
P.2d 960, 963 (1994); Harris v. Department of Health & Welfare, 123 
Idaho 295,298,847 P.2d 1156, 1159 (1992). Once the moving party 
establishes the absence of a genuine issue, the burden shifts to the 
1 SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 2 
)rt of Motion for Summary Judgment.doc 
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nonmoving party to make a showing ofthe existence of a genuine issue 
of material fact on the elements challenged by the moving party. 
Thomson v. Idoho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527,530-31,887 P.2d 
1034,1037-38 {1994}. I.R.C.P. 56{c} requires the entry of summary 
judgment against a nonmoving party who "fails to make a showing 
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that 
party's case and in which that party will bear the burden of proof at triaL" 
Olsen v. J. A. Freeman, 117 Idaho 706, 720-21, 791 P.2d 1285, 1299-1300 
{1990} {citing Celatex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 
2552,91 L.Ed.2d 265 {1986}. See Hecla Mining Ca. v. Star-Morning Mining 
Co., 122 Idaho 778, 784,839 P.2d 1192, 1198 {1992}. 
In a case to be tried by a jury, the existence of conflicting inferences from 
undisputed facts typically results in denial ofthe motion for summary judgment. 
Riverside Development Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515 {1982}. However, in a case to be 
tried by the court, the existence of conflicting inferences from undisputed facts does not 
require denial of the motion. The Idaho Supreme Court has explained that "where the 
evidentiary facts are not disputed and the trial court rather than a jury will be the trier 
of fact, summary judgment is appropriate, despite the possibility of conflicting 
inferences because the court alone will be responsible for resolving the conflict between 
those inferences." Id. at 519 {1982} {citing Pierson v. Janes, 102 Idaho 82, 85 {1981}; 
Hollandsworth v. Cottonwood Elevator Co., 95 Idaho 468, 471 {1973}; Angleton v. 
Angleton, 84 Idaho 184, 198 {1962}}. 
Here, the Plaintiffs' complaint seeks an injunction for removal of the sign. 
Importantly, the injunction issue is not a legal theory but an equitable theory. Equitable 
theories are tried to the court and not the jury. Dollar Systems, Inc. v. Avcar Leasing 
Systems, Inc., 890 F.2d 165 {9th Cir. 1989} {holding that the Seventh Amendment to the 
United States Constitution preserves the right to trial by jury of all legal claims, but does 
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not preserve the right to trial by jury of equitable claims}. Thus, this court may properly 
grant summary judgment to Highway 101 despite the Plaintiffs' arguments about the 
inferences the court could draw from the undisputed facts. 
IV. THE SIGN POST AND BOLLARDS DO NOT UNREASONABLY INTERFERE WITH 
PLAINTIFFS' USE OF THE RIGHT-OF-WAY EASEMENT. 
A. The Law Allows Highway 101 To Use Its Servient Estate In Any Way As 
Long As It Does Not Unreasonably Interfere With The Right Of Way 
Easement. 
"'[A]n easement is the right to use the land of another for a specific purpose that 
is not inconsistent with the general use of the property by the owner."' Drew v. 
Sorensen, 133 Idaho 534, 540 {1999} {quoting Abbott v. Nampa Sch. Dist. No. 131, 119 
Idaho 544, 548{1991}}. "The law is well settled with respect to the correlative rights of 
dominant and servient owners of easements. The owner of the servient estate is 
entitled to use the estate in any manner not inconsistent with, or which does not 
materially interfere with, the use of the easement by the owner of the dominant 
estate." Nampa & Meridian Irr. Dist. v. Washington FederaISav., 135 Idaho 518, 522 
{2001}. /liThe possessor of land subject to an easement created by conveyance is 
privileged to make such uses of the servient tenement as are not inconsistent with the 
provisions of the creating conveyance."' Carson v. Elliott, 111 Idaho 889, 779 
{Ct.Ap.1986} quoting from the Restatement of Property §486 {1944}. 
Stated differently, "[t]he owner of the servient estate is entitled to make uses of 
the property that do not unreasonably interfere with the dominant estate owner's 
enjoyment of the easement." Nampa & Meridian Irr. Dist. v. Washington FederaISav., 
supra, 135 Idaho at 522; emphasis added. See also Carson v. Elliott, supra, 111 Idaho 
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890 ('lithe landowner is entitled to make other uses of the property that do not 
unreasonably interfere with enjoyment of the easement'" (citing R. CUNNINGHAM, W. 
STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.9 (1984}). The Restatement 
(Third) of Property, Servitudes § 4.9 (2000) is in line with these authorities. It states that 
"[elxcept as limited by the terms ofthe servitude ... the holder of the servient estate is 
entitled to make any use of the servient estate that does not unreasonably interfere 
with enjoyment ofthe servitude." As long as the easement holder is able to use the 
easement for access to his land for the specific purpose for which the easement was 
granted, without unreasonable interference, he has received everything to which he is 
legally entitled. Drew v. Sorensen, supra, 133 Idaho at 540. 
This law is consistent with common sense and property rights. An easement 
holder does not own the property underlying the easement (i.e., the servient estate)-
he simply has a right to use the property he does not own for a limited and specific 
purpose. By giving the easement holder a right to use the property for a limited and 
specific purpose, the owner of the underlying property of the servient estate does not 
give up his right to use his property for any purpose as long as the owner's use does not 
unreasonably interfere with the limited and specific purpose of the easement. 
Otherwise, the easement holder (who has a limited right to use the property) could 
prevent the property owner from using his property thereby gaining an equal right to 
the servient estate in which the easement holder has no ownership interest but an 
interest only for a limited and specific purpose. 
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B. The Plaintiffs Admit That Highway 101's Sign Post And Bollards Do Not 
Unreasanably Interfere With The Plaintiffs' Right Of Way Easement. 
The plaintiffs were given {fa right-of-way" easement that obviously allows them 
to cross over the servient estate for access to their property.l This means that as long 
as the Plaintiffs are able to use the servient estate for access to their land without 
unreasonable interference, they have received everything to which they are legally 
entitled. In other words, as the owner of the servient estate,2 Highway 101 has the right 
to use the property underlying the right of way easement in any manner it sees fit so 
long as it does not unreasonably interfere with the Plaintiffs' use of the right of way 
easement over the property. 
Here, both Nephi Allen (Allen)3 and Kenton Johnson (Johnson) testified that the 
sign post and bollards do not unreasanably interfere with their use of the right-of-way 
easement: 
Q. The poles or those bollards, do they prevent you from accessing your 
property? 
A. No. 
Q. So you can still access the property where the Rexburg Plumbing and 
Heating is located? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Let's just talk generally about that. In terms of accessing your 
property, what kind of vehicles do you use to access your property? In 
other words, I'm assuming that you've got plumbing trucks, and HVAC 
trucks, and maybe a boom truck -- I don't know what you've got. So just 
tell me what do you use to access the property? 
A. We have service trucks, we have a forklift, we have delivery trucks, 
various UPS, Federal Express. 
Q. What was that last one? 
1 See Separate Statement of Undisputed fact No.1. 
2 See Separate Statement of Undisputed fact No.5. 
3 Nephi Allen testified in his own behalf and as the 30(b)(6) designee for Rexburg Plumbing & Heating, LLC. 
See Separate Statement of Undisputed fact No. 34. 
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A. Federal Express. Just normal everyday usage. 
Q. And is there anything about the location of the pole and these 
bollards that prevent any of these service trucks, delivery trucks, forklifts, 
or any UPS or Federal Express vehicles from accessing your property? 
A. No. 
Q. Over the easement? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. Would you then agree that notwithstanding the fact that 
there's a pole and two bollards, your equipment, your service vehicles 
can still access your property on the easement using the easement? 
A. Yeah.4 
* * * 
Q. Let's talk about how this placement the pole and the two bollards 
interfere with your ability to use the easement to access your property. 
Can we do that? 
A. It doesn't interfere with it. 
Q. It doesn't interfere, does it? 
A. Huh-uh. 
Q. Is that a --
A. No, sir. 
Q. No interference, does it? 
A. No interference. 
Q. The fact is that --
A. It doesn't interfere with ability to get in and out of there. It doesn't 
interfere with the professional truck driver's ability to get in and out of 
there .... 5 
* * * 
Q. Well, can you tell me when it was you tried driving a piece of 
equipment over the easement and didn't have enough room, 19.34 feet 
was not enough room to cross the easement --
A. No. 
Q. Let me finish. To cross the easement to access your property? 
A. No. I can't tell you when. 
Q. It's never happened, has it? 
A. No. 
4 See Allen Depo., 31:25-33:-7. 
5 C"~ __ 1_'- _____ ,",___ _ .. ,... ..... "... 
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Q. In fact, given the Department of Transportation specifications on how 
wide vehicles can be, cars are really not much wider than our trucks. 
They're approximately eight, eight and a half feet, correct? 
A. True. 
Q. And so you could actually have two trucks passing in the 19.34 foot 
space and still be totally on the easement, correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And so there is sufficient room for you, and your service people, and 
delivery people, and customers to use the easement to access your 
property? 
A. Yes, sir. There is today.6 
In short, the Plaintiffs have admitted that the sign post and bollards do not 
unreasonably interfere with their access to their property; nor do they unreasonably 
interfere with the access of the Plaintiffs' customers, suppliers, or delivery companies.7 
C. The Dimensions Of The Right Of Way Easement And Placement Of 
The Sign Post And Bollards Prove That Highway lOlls Not 
Unreasonably Interfering With The Right Of Way Easement. 
The right of way easement is 25 feet wide.8 The sign post and bollards are within 
five feet of the northern boundary line leaving 19 feet of space for use of the right of 
wayeasement.9 The Plaintiffs' property that abuts the right of way easement gives the 
Plaintiffs another 40 feet of space to access their property.lO Thus, there is about 50 to 
59 feet between the sign post and bollards and the Plaintiffs' building.ll Just the 19 feet 
ofthe right of way easement for plaintiffs to use for ingress and egress is wide enough 
6 See Johnson Depo., 25:2-26:1. 
7 See Separate Statement of Undisputed fact No. 32. 
8 See Separate Statement of Undisputed fact No. 27. 
9 See Separate Statement of Undisputed fact No. 27. 
10 See Separate Statement of Undisputed fact No. 28. 
n - ~ -----__ Ch+a""ont nf IlndisDuted fact No. 29. 
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for two trucks to pass by each other.12 Thus, there is sufficient room for the Plaintiffs' 
vehicles, trailers, customers and delivery vehicles to access Plaintiffs' property.13 
D. No Evidence Exists That Highway 101's Use Of Its Property Unreasonablv 
Interferes With The Plaintiffs' Right Of Way Easement. 
Under Idaho law that reflects the common law rule, Highway 101 can use its 
property for any purpose so long as its use does not unreasonably interfere with the 
Plaintiffs' easement for a right of way to access its own property. This means that 
Highway 101 has the right to interfere with the Plaintiffs' right of way easement so long 
as that interference is reasonable. Here, the Plaintiffs admit that the sign post and the 
bollards do not unreasonably interfere with their easement for a right of way to access 
their property. Moreover, the actual dimensions of the easement and the location of 
the sign post and bollards further prove that Highway 101's use of its own property does 
not unreasonably interfere with the Plaintiffs' right of way easement to access their 
property. Accordingly, this court should grant Highway 101 summary judgment. 
At least one other jurisdiction has faced similar facts and ruled that a right of 
way easement is lilimited to the right to travel, and does not include an absolute right to 
an object-free zone." Burleigh County Water Res. Dist. V. Burleigh County, 510 N.W.2d 
624,628 (N.D. 1994); see also Hje/le v. J.e. Snyder & Sons, 133 N.W.2d 625, 630 
(N.D.1965) (liThe mere showing that the light post and fence were situated on the 
highway right of way is not proof that they obstructed or injured the highway right of 
way.") Central to both of these cases is the underlying Idaho rule that the obstructions 
~~ See Separate Statement of Undisputed fact No. 30. 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
IMARY JUDGMENT - Page 9 
Motion for Summary Judgment.doc 
PAGE 271 
did not unreasonably interfere with the right of way easement just as the sign post and 
bollards here do not unreasonably interfere with the Plaintiffs' right of way easement. 
V. PLAINTIFFS' HAVE SUSTAINED NO DAMAGES BY VIRTUE OF THE PLACEMENT OF 
THE SIGN POST AND BOLLARDS. 
As further evidence that the sign post and bollards do not unreasonably interfere 
with the Plaintiffs' right of way easement, neither Allen nor Johnson were able to 
identify a single customer or sale that they have lost due to the existence of the sign 
post and bollards. Thus, not only has Highway 101 not unreasonably interfered with the 
Plaintiffs' right of way easement, there is no evidence to support the Plaintiffs' claim of 
damages.14 Allen and Johnson testified as follows: 
Q. All right. Can you identify one customer who has not engaged in a 
purchase or has not done business with Rexburg Plumbing because the 
sign and the bollards are located where they are? 
A. I cannot.1S 
* * * 
Q. And then it [the complaint] says, "If allowed to remain, the sign will 
injure plaintiff's business." What injury will the business suffer if the sign 
is allowed to remain? 
A. Well, we believe that those customers that you alluded to earlier that 
we can't name, we believe that they don't come back and visit us ever 
again. 
Q. Okay. Now, wouldn't you agree that that's based on speculation? 
A. Sure. Certainly.16 
* * * 
Q. (By Mr. Smith) Okay. Well, are you claiming that the business in this 
case has been damaged because of the sign? Have you lost any sales? 
A. I am not claiming that. I have no knowledge of that. 
14 See Separate Statement of Undisputed fact No. 33. 
15 
,e See Allen Depo., 64:14-18. 
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Q. What about you personally, are you claiming you have suffered any 
money damages as a resu It of the sign being placed on my client's 
property. 
A N . 17 . 0, SIr. 
* * * 
Q. In your complaint, you say that "If allowed to remain, the sign will 
result in loss of property to the Plaintiff." Can you identify what the loss 
of property is that you will lose if the sign is allowed to remain? 
A. For sure the spot the sign is on. 
Q. All right. Anything else? 
A. I feel at jeopardy. 
Q. Okay. And let's go back to the spot the sign is on, okay? 
A. Okay. 
Q. You don't actually own that property, do you? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You just have an easement to be able to use it to access your 
property, correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And you've already admitted that you don't have to drive over that 
spot to access your property, do you? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. So you really don't lose your right to access your property if the sign 
is allowed to remain, do you? 
A. Not today.18 
* * * 
Q. Okay. What facts did they give you, besides their opinion, that you 
need to sue in this case to protect that 16 inches where the pipe is and 
the five inches each for the bollards or you will, on a more probable than 
not basis, suffer some property damage? What facts do you have? 
A. I don't have any facts to that they didn't say you will, they said you 
could. 
Q. Okay. So again, they're speculating, too, because they don't know. 
A. That's probably true. 
Q. So when it boils down to it, your biggest concern in this case is really 
based on the absence of facts, but on speculation. 
A. Yeah. 
17 See Johnson Oepo., 42:6-16. 
18 Cn.f"l. 1 ..... 1-.. ............. .- n.-__ .1,",\.-. A A .... 
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Q. And as you sit here, you can't identify one customer who has not 
done business with your business, this Rexburg Plumbing, because of the 
location of the sign? 
A N . 19 . 0, sir. 
In short, the Plaintiffs have failed to identify any damages resulting from 
the placement of the sign post and bollards. The only "damage" they could 
identifed is that they cannot use the space occupied by the 16 inch sign post and 
the five inches for each of the bollards. However, the Plaintiffs do not own this 
property and have no right to occupy it because the space occupied by the 16 
inch sign post and the five inches for each of the bollards does not unreasonably 
interfere with the Plaintiffs' right of way easement. Thus, the court should grant 
Highway 101 summary judgment on the issue that the Plaintiffs have no 
damages. 
VI. THE DOCTRINE OF LACHES BARS THE PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS. 
"The necessary elements to maintain a defense of laches are: 
(1) defendant's invasion of plaintiff's rights; (2) delay in asserting 
plaintiff's rights, the plaintiff having had notice and an opportunity to 
institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge by the defendant that plaintiff 
would assert his rights; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the 
event relief is accorded to plaintiff or the suit is not held to be barred." 
Thomas v. Arkoosh Produce, Inc., 137 Idaho 352, 359 (2002) (citing Henderson v. 
Smith, 128 Idaho 444, 449 (1996)). 
19 See Johnson Deco .. 46:2-21 
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A. For Purposes Of The Laches Argument Only Highway 101 Assumes 
It Has Invaded The Plaintiff's Rights. 
The Plaintiffs' assert that Highway 101 has invaded the Plaintiffs' rights 
with respect to the Plaintiffs' use of the right of way easement at issue. Highway 
101 disputes this assertion because Highway 101 has not legally invaded the 
Plaintiff's rights because Highway 101 has not unreasonably interfered with the 
Plaintiffs' use of their right of way easement. However, in the event the court 
were to rule otherwise, then the court should find that Highway 101 has satisfied 
the first element of a laches defense. 
B. The Plaintiffs Have Delayed Asserting Their Rights In This Lawsuit 
Having Had Notice And An Opportunity To Instigate This Lawsuit. 
The Plaintiffs' delayed in asserting any rights that they may have until 
after the sign post, bollards and sign were installed. In fact, the Plaintiffs waited 
11/2 years to file the instant complaint. If the Plaintiffs' requested relief were to 
be granted now, Highway 101 will have incurred not only the cost of the sign, the 
sign post, the bollards, and their installation, but also their removal. The 
Plaintiffs' easily could have avoided having Highway 101 incur these costs by 
simply instituting the instant action prior to the installation of the sign post, 
bollards and sign. 
For the reasons set forth below, the Plaintiffs were on notice that 
Highway 101 had every intention of installing the sign at its current location, 
including advice from the City of Rexburg that any resolution would require a 
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civil matter. The Plaintiffs were first put on notice when the location of the sign 
post was painted on the pavement sometime before August 2, 2008: 
Q. Do you ever recall seeing any stripes where the sign was going to be 
located? 
A. I'm sure I did, yes. 
Q. Okay. Now, when you say you're sure you did, what do you mean by 
that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. SO you saw some stripes. What did those stripes look like? 
A. What you just described, red, blue, orange, you know. 
Q. Okay. Did you ever see any stripes in the location where the sign was 
installed identifying the sign was going to go there. 
A. We first saw the sign, like I said, before that excavator, but it was 
farther up to the road. It was not in the location of the sign. 
Q. Okay. Well, I didn't understand what you just said. 
A. Okay. Well, let me do it again. We first saw the painting for a sign on 
the pavement, or on the dirt, whatever it was at the time, west of 
where the sign location is now. 
Q. And--
A. I don't believe I ever saw any sign painting where the sign is located, 
no. 
Q. What did you see further west? 
A. I probably saw some orange paint. 
Q. And in what configuration was it placed on the ground? 
A. Square. 
Q. And did you recognize that as a configuration identifying where a 
sign would be located? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. And whose sign did you think that was going to be? 
A. I would assume it was Danny's from the information I had just 
received. 
Q. And what information had you just received? 
A. Like I said earlier, before that excavator came, we were notified a 
short time before that that there was going to be a sign going in. That's 
when we were alerted to a sign going in the easement. 
Q. Is that when you saw the striping on the ground? 
A. Are you referring to the sign striping or the excavating striping? 
Q. The square striping you saw on the ground that you referred to on 
the west. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, what color was striping? 
A. I would say orange. 
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Q. And what made you believe that was for a sign? 
A. It said "sign." 
Q. Somebody had written "sign" on it? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. Is that a yes? 
A. Ves. 
Q. And when you saw that, is that the first time that you knew that a sign 
was going to go in somewhere for a Highway 101? 
A. Ves. 20 
On August 2, 2008, after the Plaintiffs saw the markings on the pavement for the 
sign placement, they advised Danny Miller of Highway 101 that they did not want the 
sign to be placed in that location.21 On August 4,2008, Allen contacted the City of 
Rexburg and was advised that the sign and sign placement had been approved and if 
Plaintiffs' had a problem with it that it was a civil matter.22 On or about August 6,2008, 
VESCO commenced digging the hole for the sign post and struck and ruptured the sewer 
pipe necessitating that it be fixed.23 This repair process took about two weeks, during 
which time the hole was open existing, notorious and posted with caution cones and 
tape. VESCO's striking the sewer pipe gave the plaintiffs "time ... to figure out what we 
[they] should do."24 
On or about August 19, 2008, VESCO erected the sign post and two 5" diameter 
bollards on each side of the sign post.25 On or about August 26, 2008, VESCO placed the 
sign at issue on the post.26 
20 See Allen Oepo., 80:22-83:11; emphasis added. 
21 See Separate Statement of Undisputed fact No. 10. 
22 See Separate Statement of Undisputed fact No. 11. 
23 See Separate Statement of Undisputed fact No. 12. 
24 See Separate Statement of Undisputed fact No. 12. 
25 See Separate Statement of Undisputed fact No. 16. 
26 c .......... CI"'\~""I<"'~"'n. C+"":'l+,oVY\on+ nf Ilnrlic:r\lli-oN f.:lrt fl.ln 17. 
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The Plaintiffs admit that they should have sought legal redress "more 
quicker" as in right after they saw the word "sign" marked on the ground or after 
the City of Rexburg offered no help: 
Q. Would you agree that you had time during that three-week period, 
from when you first learned about the sign going in to the time it went 
up, to contact a lawyer and seek legal redress, but you just didn't know 
that was an option to you? 
A. You know, if a similar situation ever happens again --
Q. Yes. 
A. -- we will be very -- more quicker. 
Q. All right. So if you could do this all over again, how much time would 
you let run from the time that you saw the "sign" written on the ground 
to the time you contacted the lawyer? 
A. Zero.27 
* * * 
Q. So what you're saying is this, okay, you're saying as soon as you knew 
that the city wasn't going to help you, you would have contacted the 
lawyer immediately? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. If you could do it over again, that's what you would do? 
A. That's what I would do. 28 
The plaintiffs acknowledge they should have contacted a lawyer a long 
time before August 5, 2008 to file this lawsuit: 
Q. All right. "Nephi Allen showed Danny Miller the deeds including the 
right-of-way and stated 'that sign cannot go there."' Now, that happened 
on August 2nd, correct? 
A. Yes. I believe it was a Friday. 
Q. All right. And you're saying you showed them the deeds, and you 
said, "That sign cannot go there." 
A. Yes. 
Q. "Danny Miller indicated that Mr. Miller had ok'd the sign and that 
they were putting it in." Now, that happened on August 2nd, right? 
27 See Allen Depo., 101:20-23. 
28 See Allen Depo., 104:16-23. 
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A. Yep. 
Q. "He indicated that he would not have bought Highway 101's property 
if he couldn't put the sign in and it was paid for and permitted. The 
conversation was lengthy and Nephi Allen's} and by extension} Rexburg 
Plumbing and Heating's position that the sign could not be placed in 
proposed location was made very clear." Correct? 
A. Very. 
Q. And did Danny make his position clear that he was going to put the 
sign there? 
A. I believe so. 
Q. And that would have been on August 2nd? 
A. I think so. 
Q. Well} that's what your response says right here. Look at page 4. 
A. That's what it says. August 2nd. 
Q. So on August 2nd} you had made your position clear that the sign 
couldn't go there} correct? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. Is that a yes? 
A. Yes} sir. 
Q. And Danny had made his position clear that he was putting the sign 
in? 
A. I believe that's clear. 
Q. "On the next Monday} Nephi Allen called the city and objected to the 
placement of the sign. After being placed on hold so that Natalie Powell 
could consult with the city attorney} he was told that Steve Zollinger had 
stated "It is a civil matter now} we have issued the permit and there was 
nothing more we can do." Correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. So what that means is that that would have been on August 4th -- or 
that's August 5th. Okay. Because the 2nd is a Friday. So that means that 
on the 5th you knew that Danny was going to put sign in for Highway 
101} correct? 
A. (Nodding head up and down). 
Q. Is that a yes? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And the city had told you that it was a civil matter} and there was 
nothing the city was going to do about it? 
A. Yep. 
Q. Okay. At that point} why didn't you go contact a lawyer and sue 
Highway 101 to prevent the sign from being installed? 
A. We're going to do this again} hey? 
Q. Well} now we know what dates we've got} why didn't you go do it at 
that point? 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT 0 
SUMMARY JUDGME~:EFENDANrs MOTION FOR lMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 17 
PAGE 279 
of Motion for Summary Judgment.doc 
'" I 
Q. Let me say it differently. At that point, could you have gone to a 
lawyer and filed this suit. 
A. We should have a long time before that, I suppose. 29 
The plaintiffs did not seek legal redress before the sign went in because 
they did not want to incur the costs of litigation. Importantly, the Plaintiffs 
acknowledge that if they had done so, this court could have ruled on the issues 
before the court now and before Highway 101 incurred substantial expense: 
Q. All right. So you're saying you thought about suing earlier before the 
sign went in? 
A. Right. 
Q. But you didn't do it because you didn't want to spend the money; is 
that correct? 
A. Correct.3D 
* * * 
Q. The reason I'm asking you those questions is that if you would have 
brought the lawsuit before they installed the sign, then we could have 
had the court make a determination of whether it could go there before 
he paid for it? 
A. Well, and that's true .... 31 
The plaintiffs admit that they did not file suit before the sign was installed 
because they did not know whether they could prevail in such a lawsuit and they 
were busy doing day to day things: 
Q. Okay. You didn't know that when Danny was telling you "I've got no 
choice, I've got to put this sign in," you didn't know that you could sue 
him by contacting a lawyer? 
A. Nope. I didn't have enough facts to know that I could do that with any 
surety and come out on top.32 
* * * 
29 See Allen Depo., 148:1-150:21. 
30 See Johnson Depo., 12:25-13:5. 
31 See Johnson Depo., 13:17-22. 
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Q. Okay. So what you're telling me then is in addition to Danny being a 
nice guy, brought you donuts, in addition to you not wanting to spend 
your life savings, one of the reasons that you didn't sue before the sign 
went in is because you were busy doing day-to-day things. Isn't that 
what you're saying? 
A. Yeah. That's part of it.33 
The plaintiffs admit that sometime before August 2, 2008 they first knew 
Highway 101 intended to install a sign.34 They further admit that they should 
have filed this suit a long time before August 5,2008.35 However, the Plaintiffs 
did not file this suit until February 19, 2010.36 This is a delay of over 16 months. 
These facts satisfy the second requirement that "delay in asserting plaintiff's 
rights, the plaintiff having had notice and an opportunity to institute a suit./I 
Thomas v. Arkoosh Produce, Inc., supra, 137 Idaho at 359. 
C. Highway 101 Installed The Sign Without Knowing That The 
Plaintiffs Would Assert The Claims In This Lawsuit. 
At no time before August 26, 2008 (when the sign was installed) did the 
Plaintiffs ever give notice to Highway 101 that the Plaintiffs would assert the 
claims in this lawsuit.37 This undisputed fact satisfies the third requirement of 
"lack of knowledge by the defendant that plaintiff would assert his rights./I 
Thomas v. Arkoosh Produce, Inc., supra, 137 Idaho at 359. 
33 See Johnson Depo., 16:24-17:6; emphasis added. 
34 See Separate Statement of Undisputed fact NO.9. 
35 See Separate Statement of Undisputed fact No. 23. 
36 See Separate Statement of Undisputed fact No. 21 
37 f'" __ r ____ ~_ .... _ r .... _ .... ____ .... _I: II_-': ... _ .......... ..J & ........... "', ..... '6. 
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D. Highway 101 Will Suffer Injury And Prejudice If This Court Does Not Apply 
The Doctrine Of Laches To Bar This Lawsuit. 
If Highway 101 is now required to remove the sign post and bollards, 
Highway 101 will suffer injury and prejudice. First, if the Plaintiffs would have 
filed suit before August 5, 2008, Highway 101 could have avoided the expense of 
paying for the sign post, bollards, and the sign in the first place.38 Second, if the 
sign must be moved, Highway 101 will incur substantial expense to move it.39 
Third, if the sign must be moved, Highway 101 will not be able to relocate the 
sign near the main roadway (Highway 20) resulting in Highway 101's customers 
being less likely to find Highway 101's business resulting further in loss of 
business to Highway 101.40 Therefore, plaintiffs should be barred by the 
doctrine of laches from now requesting removal of the sign. 
VII. THE DOCTRINE OF QUASI-ESTOPPEL BARS THE PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has explained the doctrine of "quasi-estoppel" 
as follows: 
The doctrine of quasi-estoppel "prevents a party from asserting a 
right, to the detriment of another party, which is inconsistent with a 
position previously taken./I C & G, Inc. v. Canyon Highway Dist. No.4, 139 
Idaho 140, 144, 75 P.3d 194, 198 (2003). This doctrine applies when: (1) 
the offending party took a different position than his or her original 
position and (2) either (a) the offending party gained an advantage or 
caused a disadvantage to the other party; (b) the other party was induced 
to change positions; or (c) it would be unconscionable to permit the 
offending party to maintain an inconsistent position from one he or she 
has already derived a benefit or acquiesced in. Id. at 145, 75 P.3d at 199; 
Thomas v. Arkoosh Produce, Inc., 137 Idaho 352, 357, 48 P.3d 1241, 1246 
38 See Separate Statement of Undisputed fact Nos. 7 and 27. 
39 See Separate Statement of Undisputed fact No. 21. 
40 <:.0.0 <:'O.l"\~I'""::)t-.n ct-.-,,+.n.I"\"\ .......... +,..+ 11 ... ..J: ................. -1 + __ .... "'1_ ..,,"'" 
UMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 20 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
of Motion for Summary Judgment.doc 
PAGE 282 
(2002). To prove quasi-estoppel, it is not necessary to show detrimental 
reliance; instead, there must be evidence that it would be 
unconscionable to permit the offending party to assert allegedly contrary 
positions. Thomas, 137 at 357, 48 P.3d at 1246. 
Atwood v. Smith, 143 Idaho 110, 114 (Idaho 2006). 
Here, on or about August 6, 2008, Dean Moon, the "president" of plaintiff 
Rexburg Plumbing & Heating, lLC told Danny Miller of Highway 101 that if Highway 101 
owned the property over which the easement at issue runs and the City had approved 
the sign that there was "no problem" with the sign or its proposed placement.41 
The assertion made by Dean Moon is a position clearly contrary to the position the 
Plaintiffs now take. Moreover, Dean Moon told Nephi Allen and Kenton Johnson about 
his representation to Highway 101, and neither Nephi Allen nor Kenton Johnson ever 
advised Highway 101 that it could not rely upon the assurance Dean Moon gave Danny 
Miller.42 Highway 101 relied on Dean Moon's representation that there was "no 
problem" with the sign or its proposed placement in moving forward with the 
installation.43 Therefore, the Plaintiffs should now be estopped from asserting removal 
of Highway 101's sign post, bollards, or sign. 
VIII. CONCLUSION. 
For all the reasons stated in this brief, Highway 101 respectfully requests that 
the court grant its motion for summary judgment against the Plaintiffs. 
41 See Separate Statement of Undisputed fact No. 13. 
42 See Separate Statement of Undisputed fact No. 14. 
43 ,,-- ,, ___ ._~_ C:~~''''''''O''''T r'lf IlnrlknlJtpr1 f;lr.t No. 14. 
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DATED this __ ~_._ ~ day of March, 2011. 
CERTIFIC~;:ERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this <E: day of March, 2011, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT to be served, by placing the same in a sealed envelope and depositing in the 
United States Mail, postage prepaid, or hand delivery, facsimile transmission or 
overnight delivery, addressed to the following: 
Hyrum D. Erickson, Esq. 
RIGBY, ANDRUS & RIGBY, 
Chartered 
Attorneys at Law 
25 North Second East 
Rexburg, Idaho 83440 
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Overnight Delivery 
Hand Delivery 
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Bryan D. Smith, Esq. -ISB #4411 
B. J. Driscoll, Esq. -ISB # 7010 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PlLC 
414 Shoup Ave. 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Telephone: (208) 524-0731 
Facsimile: (208) 529-4166 
Attorneys for Defendant and Counterclaimant 
Highway 101 Investments, LLC 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man 
dealing with his sole and separate property 
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man dealing 
with his sole and separate property, and 
REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Defendant, 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Counterclaimant, 
v. 
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man 
dealing with his sole and separate property 
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man dealing 
with his sole and separate property, and 
REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, 
Counterdefendants. 
Case No. CV-l0-115 
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STATE OF IDAHO 
ss. 
County of Bonneville 
DANNY MILLER, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
(1) I am one of the members ofthe defendant, Highway 101 Investments in 
the above-referenced matter. 
(2) I make this affidavit based on my own personal knowledge. 
(3) Highway 101 mistakenly believed that it had acquired fee simple title to 
the strip of land over which the easement runs; however, on July 28, 2009, Highway 101 
acquired fee simple title to the strip of land over which the aforementioned easements 
run. Attached hereto and marked as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy of the 
warranty Deed dated July 28, 2009. 
(4) In 2008, Highway 101 decided to have YESCO erect a sign on the 
northwest corner of the strip of land over which the easement at issue runs. The sign is 
a 20' by 10' sign sitting on top of an approximately 16" diameter post approximately 14' 
above the ground. The cost of the sign to Highway 101 was $27,234.00. 
(5) On August 6, 2008, YESCO commenced digging the hole for the sign post 
and struck and ruptured the sewer pipe necessitating that it be fixed. This repair 
process took about two weeks, during which time the hole was open existing, notorious 
and posted with caution cones and tape. 
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(6) Highway 101 relied on Dean Moon's representation that there was "no 
problem" with the sign or its proposed placement in moving forward with the 
installation. 
(7) On or about August 19, 2008 VESCO erected the sign post and two 5" 
diameter bollards on each side of the sign post. 
(8) On or about August 26, 2008, VESCO placed the sign at issue on the post. 
(9) Highway 101 could have avoided the expense of the sign post, bollards, 
and sign installation if the plaintiffs had filed this lawsuit no later than August 5, 2008. 
(10) If the sign must be moved, Highway 101 will incur substantial expense to 
move it. 
(11) If the sign must be moved, Highway 101 will not be able to relocate the 
sign near the main roadway (Highway 20) resulting in Highway 101's customers being 
less likely to find Highway 101's business resulting further in loss of business to Highway 
101. 
(12) At no time before August 26, 2008 (when the sign and bollards were 
installed) did the plaintiffs ever give notice to Highway 101 that the plaintiffs would 
assert the claims in this lawsuit. 
(13) The easement is 25 feet wide, and the sign post and bollards are within 
five feet of the northern boundary line leaving 19 feet of space for use of the easement. 
Attached hereto and marked as Exhibit liB" is a true and correct copy of an engineering 
plat Highway 101 had prepared to identify the location of the sign on the right-of-way 
easement. 
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Further your affiant sayeth naught. 
DATED this £ day of March, 2011. 
£~X 
Danny Miller 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this -"----;1-
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DC 
Notary Public for Idah 
Residing at Idaho Falls, Idaho 
My Commission Expires: 04/11/11 
CERTIFICAT~ERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~y of March, 2011, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF DANNY MILLER IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be served, by placing the same 
in a sealed envelope and depositing in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, or hand 
delivery, facsimile transmission or overnight delivery, addressed to the following: 
Hyrum D. Erickson, Esq. 
RIGBY, ANDRUS & RIGBY, 
Chartered 
Attorneys at Law 
25 North Second East 
Rexburg, Idaho 8340 
. S. Mail 
Fax 
1 Overnight Delivery 
1 Hand Delivery 
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WARRANTY DEED 
THIS INDENTURE, Made this 2~+~day of July, 2009, between Leishman Electric, an 
Idaho Corporation, whose current address is 422 South 400 East, Rexburg ID, 83440, the 
Grantor, and Highway 101 Investments, LLC, whose current address is 120 Lost Trail Place, 
Idaho Falls, ID, 83404, the Grantee, 
\VITNESSETH, That the Grantor, does hereby grant, bargain, sell, convey and confirm 
unto the Grantee, with the rents, and profits thereof and its assigns forever, all of its right, title 
and interest in and to the following described real estate, situated in the County of Madison, State 
ofIdaho, to-wit: ' 
Beginning at a point that is North 00°11'06" East 539.56 feet along the 
section line and South 89°48'54" East 142.21 feet from the Southwest corner 
of Section 17, Township 6 North, Range 40 East of the Boise Meridian, 
Madison County, Idaho; and running thence North 32°08'41" East 29.74 
feet; thence North 89°21'24" East 378.37 feet; thence South 00°28'26" East 
25.00 feet; thence South 89°21 '24" West 394.40 feet to the point of beginning. 
Together with all and singular the tenements, hereditaments, and appurtenances thereunto 
belonging or in any wise appertaining. 
SUBJECT TO easements, if any, of record, or in existence, for roads streets, ditches, 
canals, pipelines and utilities. 
And the Grantor, and its assigns, hereby warrant and agree to·forever defend the Grantee, 
its assigns, in the quiet and peaceable possession of said premises against all and every person 
lawfully claiming an interest therein. 
WARRANTY DEED - P8o-~ 1 
Instrument # 356614 
REXBURG, MADISON, IO'AHO 
9.22-201)9 02:18:26 No. of Pages: 2 
Recorded for: HIGHW,AY 101\ mv STMENTS, LLC 
M1XRIL YN R. RASMUSSEN I! ~'lJ~Fe~~~' 6~.O:O~---iP_~~:!~_' 
)ffiCio Recorder Deput)! EXHIBIT 
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IN \VITNESS WHEREOF, the Grantor has hereunto set its hand the day and year first 
above written. 
LEISHMAN ELECTRIC, INC. 
BY:~<'.~~ 
ron Leis11.J::if 
Acknowledgment 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
ss. 
County of Madison. ) 
A. 
On this 2 g-+ day of July, 2009, before me, the undersigned, aN otary Public in and for 
said State, personally appeared Bron Leishman, knOVi1l1 to me to be the President of Leishman 
Electric, an Idaho Corporation, the corporation that executed the foregoing document, and 
acknowledged to me that such corporation executed the same. 
Notary Public fo~ Idaho 
Residing at: i6'1J.z1- . 
My Commission'expues: ~ - q - d-uf;J...::, 
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Bryan D. Smith, Esq. -ISB #4411 
B. J. Driscoll, Esq. - ISB # 7010 
SMITH, DRISCOlL & ASSOCIATES, PllC 
414 Shoup Ave. 
P.O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
Telephone: (208) 524-0731 
Facsimile: (208) 529-4166 
Attorneys for Defendant and Counterclaimant 
Highway 101 Investments, LLC 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man 
dealing with his sole and separate property 
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man dealing 
with his sole and separate property, and 
REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Defendant, 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Counterclaimant, 
v. 
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man 
dealing with his sole and separate property 
and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a married man dealing 
with his sole and separate property, and 
REXBURG PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability company, 
Case No. CV-l0-115 
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STATE OF IDAHO 
) ss. 
County of Bonneville ) 
BRYAN D. SMITH, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
(1) I am one of the attorneys for the defendant, Highway 101 Investments in 
the above-referenced matter. 
(2) I make this affidavit based on my own personal knowledge. 
(3) Attached hereto and marked as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy of 
the cover page and pages 4-5,14-17,25,31-36,38-41,64,68,80-83, 101-102, 104, 133-
134, 139, and 148-150, of the deposition transcript of Plaintiff Nephi Allen, on his own 
behalf and as the 30(b)(6) designee for Plaintiff Rexburg Plumbing & Heating, LLC, taken 
on January 28, 2011, together with Exhibits 1 through 12 attached thereto. 
(4) Attached hereto and marked as Exhibit liB" is a true and correct copy of 
the cover page and pages 12-13, 16-17,19,25-26,42-44,46-47,57,61, and 65 of the 
deposition transcript of Plaintiff Kenton Johnson taken on January 28, 2011. 
(5) Attached hereto and marked as Exhibit "C" is a true and correct copy of 
Deposition Exhibit 6 (photographs) produced during the deposition of Plaintiff Nephi 
Allen on January 28, 2011. 
Further your aff~yeth naught. 
DATED this ~ day of March, 2011. 
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this~-.:;:--f 
Notary Public for Idati 
Residing at Idaho Falls, aaho 
My Commission Expires: 04/11/11 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
at:f:::::--
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this"'l:L day of March, 2011, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF BRYAN D. SMITH IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be served, by placing the same 
in a sealed envelope and depositing in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, or hand 
delivery, facsimile transmission or overnight delivery, addressed to the following: 
Hyrum D. Erickson, Esq. 
RIGBY, ANDRUS & RIGBY, 
Chartered 
Attorneys at Law 
25 North Second East 
Rexbur&ldaho 8340 
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Transcript of the Testimony of Nephi H. Allen 
Date: January 28, 2011 
Volume: I 
Case: JOHNSON, et al. VS. HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, INC. 
Printed On: March 7, 2011 
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T& T Reporti ng 
Phone:208.529.5291 
Fax:208.529.5496 
Email:tntreport@ida.net 
Internet: TandTReport@ida.net 
(The deposition proceeded at 9:05 a.m. as follows:) 
NEPHI ALLEN, 
produced as a witness at the instance of the 
MR. SMITH: Okay. 
MR. ERICKSON: I did bring copies if we neec[' 
end up needing them. 
MR. SMITH: I want to give these to you 
5 defendant, having been first duly sworn, was examined before I lose them. Because I will. 
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and testified as follows: 
EXAMINATION 
BY MR. SMITH: 
Q. Would you please state your name? 
A. Nephi Allen. 
Q. And where do you live, Nephi? 
A. 253 East 1st North Rexburg. 
Q. Nephi, would you rather have me refer to 
you as Nephi or Mr. Allen? Or how would you prefer 
today? 
A. You can call me mud. I don't care. 
Q. Mr. Mud. 
Okay. Well, let me see. We'll just 
call you Mr. Allen. Can we do that? 
A. Fair enough. 
MR. SMITH: Counsel, can we stipulate that 
Mr. Allen is testifying in this deposition in his own 
behalf personally. And apparently you've also 
designated him as the 30(b) (6) designee; is that 
correct? 
Page 4 
MR. ERICKSON: That's correct. 
MR. SMITH: And instead of taking his 
deposition twice, we'll take it one time for both 
purposes, specifically him and his individual 
capacity, and him as a 30(b) (6) representative of 
Rexburg Pluming and Heating. 
MR. ERICKSON: That's fine. 
MR. SMITH: Okay. Let's go ahead and 
attach -- these are just the deposition notices. And 
I want to go ahead and attach them to the deposition 
as Exhibits 1 and 2. 
(EXHIBITS-1 AND -2 WERE MARKED.) 
Q. (By Mr. Smith) Mr. Allen, did you bring 
any documents with you today? 
A. I brought my hat and those papers there. 
MR. SMITH: Okay. Counsel, we had asked for 
some documents, and you've already disclosed 
documents, and I'm assuming that we already have all 
of the documents we've requested in the duces tecum; 
is that correct? 
MR. ERICKSON: That's correct. I reviewed my 
file, and there's nothing else that we haven't 
already provided. 
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Q. (By Mr. Smith) 
been deposed before? 
A. No. 
Mr. Allen, have you ever 
Q. Have you had an opportunity to talk to 
anybody about how a deposition functions? 
A. I've talked to Hyrum. 
Q. All right. Today I'll be asking 
questions, and you will get an opportunity to respond 
to those. Do you understand that's how it works? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And I would ask for a couple of things. 
One, please let me finish my question before you give 
a response. And I will likewise extend the same 
courtesy to you and let you finish your response 
before asking another question. Can we do that? 
A. Fair. 
Q. And the reason for that is sometimes 
people anticipate the response or anticipate the 
question, excuse me, and it makes it difficult for 
court reporter to have a nice clean transcript if 
Page 6 
we're talking over each other, okay. The other thing 
I would ask you to is please answer audibly today so ~ 
as I ask a question, like right now you're nodding 
your head and you want to give an affirmative 
response rather than nod your head. I would 
appreciate if you answer with a yes or no could you 
do that? 
A. Okay. 
Q. That way she can get a transcript 
prepared that reflects the testimony as opposed to 
the gestures of the witnesses. 
If I ask you a question today that you 
do not understand, would you tell me you do not 
understand it so I can rephrase it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Otherwise I'm going to assume that you 
understand all of the questions that I ask. Is that 
fair? Can with he proceed that way? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Yes. 
Mr. Allen, where do you currently live? 
253 1st North Rexburg. 
And how long have you lived there? 
Since 1999. 
And did you graduate from high school? 
Yes. 
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A. I needed a job. 
Q. And what year did you get married? 
A. '99. 
Q. How long did you work at united 
PIUlllbing? 
A. About a year. 
Q. From 1993, '94 to 1995? 
A. No. Let's say, while I was going to 
college I worked there. 
Q. Okay. So 1993 and 1994. Then where did 
you go to work? 
A. I went on a mission for two years. 
Q. Okay. C~e back in '96? 
A. Uh-huh. Yes. 
Q. And then what did you do? 
A. Worked for Snake River Heating and Air 
Conditioning 'tail 1999. 
Q. And then that's when you started Rexburg 
PIUlllbing? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then you entered the apprentice 
progr~? 
A. I probably entered the apprentice program 
while I was at Snake Rive Heating and Air 
Condi tioning. 
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Q. Okay. 
A. You try to forget the apprentice prograrr 
as quickly as possible. 
Q. All right. And you say you met Kenton 
Johnson while you were working for United Plumbing? 
A. Right. 
Q. Was he a journeyman plumber there? 
A. HVAC. 
Q. Okay. And what about Dean Moon, when 
did you meet him? 
'94. 
A. Oh, I assume right around there, 1993, 
Q. How did you know him? 
A. He was a plumber also. 
Q. At United Plumbing? 
A. No. 
Q. Where was he working? 
A. For himsel f. 
Q. Okay. Did you know these gentlemen in 
any other capacity besides working? 
) 
Q. Is it fair to say then that in 1999 you 
and Dean Moon and Kent Johnson got together and 
decided to start your own business called - what is 
it called? Rexburg Plumbing? 
A. And Heating. 
Q. And Heating? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, when you started that organization, 
was it a limited liability company from the 
beginning? 
A. I believe so. 
Q. And what were the -- we're going to call 
them "members, because that's what's in a limited 
liability company, and you might also know it as 
"partners," but what was each person's interest in 
the company? 
A. Thirty-three point three. Somebody got 
an extra hundredths of a percent, so. 
Q. 
one-third? 
Somewhere. But was it supposed to be 
A. One-third, yes, sir. 
Q. Is that the way it is today? 
A. Nope. 
Q. What is it today? 
A. Kent Johnson, Nephi Allen 50/50. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
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When did that change? i, 
The fall of '08. ~ 
When you say .. the fall," would have been 11 
in November? 
A. Yes. That works for me. 
(EXHIBIT-3 WAS MARKED.) 
Q. (By Mr. Smith) Let me hand you Exhibit 
3 and tell you that this is a Secretary of State 
filing that I pulled off the Internet. It's the 
filing for December 2007. And it looks like it was 
filed in November 2007. And it shows that as of 
November 9, 2007, it shows the managers of Rexburg 
Plumbing and Heating as Dean Moon, Kent Johnson and 
Nephi Allen. Do you see that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Were you the one that filled out this 
form? 
A. I was. 
Q. And right to the left it says, "Office 
held, Dean Moon, President." Is that what you 
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A. I knew Kent's daughter from high school, understood his position to be? 
so. 
Q. Are you related to Dean Moon or Kent 
Johnson? 
A. No. 
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A. That's what we always said, yeah. 
Q. And then Kent was the vice president? 
A. Yeah, that works. Yes. 
Q. And then you were the secretary? 
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A. Right. 
Q. 
probably? 
That's why you filled out the form 
A. Yeah. I get to do that. 
Q. Okay. And so how long did Dean Moon 
continue as what you termed to be the president of 
Rexburg Plumbing and Heating? 
A. Probably until the end of '08. 
Q. Why did Dean leave the partnership or 
the company. 
A. Retired. 
Q. Did he continue to function as the 
president until the end of '08? 
A. He moved to Arizona. He had gone to 
Q. up to the time Dean Moon left, was he a 
manager of the company? 
A. Yes. 
I Q. And it sounds like he decided to retire 
in the fall of 2008; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is it fair to say that before he left to 
go to Arizona in the fall of 2008 he was still a 
manager of Rexburg Plumbing. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And he functioned that way until he 
left? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Do you know what day it was specifically 
Arizona in the wintertime for -- probably since 'OS, that was his last day? 
somewhere around there. So he took his normal leavel A. It had to be the first week of November. 
of absence and -- when he proceeded with running the I don't know the specific date. 
company. 
Q. Before he left to go to Arizona, did he 
continue to work in the day-to-day operation of the 
Rexburg Plumbing? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So while he was still in Idaho before 
December 2008, was he still functioning as what you 
call the president? 
A. He left in probably the first of 
November. 
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Q. Okay. But before he left, was he still 
functioning as the president? 
A. Now, let's get something straight here. 
Q. Okay. 
A. The thing that you fill out here, they 
want you to put some type of title to, okay. So as a 
matter of ease, I put "president, vice president, and 
secretary." That's not necessarily how the duties 
were divided up among us. 
Q. Well, let's talk then about this since 
you've raised this. Let's talk about the duties. 
What duties did you have before Dean Moon left the 
limited liability company? 
A. Dean Moon ran the plumbing. 
Q. Yes. 
A. Kent Johnson ran the HVAC, and I did 
whatever was necessary. So after Dean left, I 
stepped in as the plumber. Kent runs the HVAC, and 
we both take care of anything else that needs done. 
Q. Okay. Let's just put it this way: 
While you and Dean and Kent were together, did each 
one of you have managerial responsibilities? 
7\ VOC! 
Q. Okay. So then would you agree that as 
of the first week of December 2008, Dean Moon was a 
manager of Rexburg Plumbing? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And he had been a manager since 1999? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And as a manager, he could make 
decisions for the company? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
And you were also a manager? 
Yes. 
And Kent was a manager? 
A. Yes. 
Page 18 
Q. And you two could also make decisions 
for the company? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Okay. I'm going to ask you some general 
questions about what you understand and what Rexburg 
Plumbing's position is with respect to the roadway. 
Let me get an exhibit first so we can 
see what we're talking about. 
(EXHIBIT-4 WAS MARKED.) 
Q. (By Mr. Smith) Let me hand you what's 
been marked as Exhibit 4 and ask you if you've seen 
that before. Do you recall ever seeing this before? 
A. I don't believe I have. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Do you at least recognize what it is? 
I do. 
And tell me what it is. 
It is a survey for, I believe, my 
property and an easement. 
Q. Okay. When you say "my property," what 
are yOU talking about? 
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A. Caution type thing painted on the 
pavement. 
Q. Oh, and you're saying you can't drive 
over that? 
A. Well, you can. 
Q. So you can use the easement where the 
paint is located? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And so is it your position that the 16 
inches for the sign pole and the five inches for two 
bollards are interfering with your use of the 
easement? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And when you say "interfering," do you 
A. Yeah, sure. You can drive over it, but mean that it's an unreasonable interference? 
that senses caution, you know, so. 
Q. But you can use that part? 
A. Sure. 
Q. Okay. So what part of the easement 
can't you use? 
A. The part with the sign on it. 
Q. Okay. And how much property are you 
talking about? Is that a ten-by-ten piece, or how 
big is that? 
A. I would say -- like I said before, the 
painting on the ground is probably about 30 by 6. 
The actual bollards and the pipe coming out 
Q. Yes. 
A. is probably 10 by 2 foot, 3 foot. 
Q. So what you're saying is that you can't 
use the easement where the bollards are located is 
that what you're saying? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. And how big around are those? 
A. I have no idea. 
Q. Are they three feet in diameter? 
A. No. 
Q. So can you give me an estimate on how 
big they are? 
A. Five inches. 
Q. So there's two bollards that are 
approximately five inches in diameter? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you can't use the easement where 
those are located? 
A. Exactly. 
Q. And then there's the sign pole? 
A. Right. 
Q. Does that also occupy space on the 
easement? 
A. Yes, it does. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
And how big is the sign pole? 
It's 16 inches in diameter. 
Okay. So 16 inches of the easement is 
being occupied by the sign pole? 
A. Dh-huh. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Would you please tell me how it is 
unreasonable, how those three items unreasonably 
interfere with your use of the easement? 
A. I believe it's basically 
what I think it is. It's thievery. 
I'll call it 
Q. Okay. 
A. Of that 16 inches and those two pieces of 
five inches, that's what it is. 
Q. Why is that thievery? 
A. Because I paid for an easement to use, 
and I can't use it. Whether it be two inches or 
whether it be three inches or 16 inches --
Q. Okay. 
A. it's still -- I can't use it. 
Q. All right. And so you think that 
because you can't use the 16 inch spot and the two 
Page 26 
five inches spot, that that's thievery? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Because you can't use it? 
A. That's what we paid for is a 
right-of-way, an easement, however it's worded, we 
paid to ingress and egress through that full 25 foo 
area. 
Q. Well, what if somebody has their car 
driving on the easement? 
A. Dh-huh. 
Q. Well, let's back up. You understand 
that you don't have the exclusive right to use the 
easement; is that true? 
A. Yes, sir, I do. 
Q. SO other people get to use it, too? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you don't disagree with that? 
A. I do not. 
Q. All right. And if somebody has their 
car driving across the easement, can you use the 
location of the easement where the car is? 
A. Not at the moment it's there. 
Q. Is that not thievery, also? 
A. It is not. 
Why is that? 
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A. Because that's what it's intended for as 
ingress and egress. 
Q. Well, now you've got an easement for 
ingress and egress, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. But Highway 101 owns the property, 
correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. Are you saying that Highway 101's 
use is limited only to ingress and egress. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Even though they own the property, they 
can't use it for any other purpose? 
A. No. 
MR. ERICKSON: I'm going to object. I think 
you're asking for a legal conclusion and he's not an 
attorney. 
MR. SMITH: Okay. 
Q. (By Mr. Smith) And I'm just asking you 
what you understand. What your understanding is. 
A. That's what I understand. 
Q. Okay. 
A. Because there's three people that have 
that same verbiage on their warranty deeds. So yeah. 
I think we all three have the same rights to ingress 
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and egress. 
Q. And who would those three people be? 
A. I believe it's myself, Highway 101 and 
Leishman. 
Q. Does Dean Moon have an easement, also? 
A. He'S part owner. I think we've 
already yes. 
Q. Well, I just want to be clear. As I 
understand it, Dean Moon, and you, and Kent all have 
an easement, but the Highway 101 actually owns the 
property. Is that how you understand it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. All right. And so --
MR. ERICKSON: For just factual, I think 
that's incorrect. 
MR. SMITH: And how is it incorrect, Counsel. 
MR. ERICKSON: I believe that the deeds are 
in the individual party's names, not in the name of 
the L.L.C. 
MR. SMITH: Oh, and I didn't say the 
"L.L.C.," I said Mr. Moon, and you, Mr. Allen, and 
Kent Johnson, as I understand it, all each have their 
individual deeds. 
THE WITNESS: That's fine. 
Q. (By Mr. Smith) Is that how you 
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understand it? 
MR. ERICKSON: There's one deed with a thirc 
to each one of those. 
MR. SMITH: Right. But they all have a deec 
in their own name. 
Q. (By Mr. Smith) And is that how you 
understand it to be? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And the deed gives each one of you an 
easement for ingress and egress, correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. But Highway 101 doesn't have an 
easement, does it? 
A. I believe it does. 
Q. Okay. I thought you testified earlier 
that Highway 101 owns the property. 
A. 
easement. 
Q. Okay. If they own the property, can you 
tell me why they would need an easement? 
A. That's a good question. 
Q. Do you understand that an easement gives 
a person who does not own the property the right to 
use the property for certain specified purposes? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. So in this case, you would aCknowledge 
that neither you, nor Kent, nor Dean actually own the 
property, but you have an easement to use it for 
ingress and egress, correct? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Correct. 
Whereas the Millers, they just own it. 
Right. 
So they don't need an easement for 
ingress and egress, do they? 
A. 
Q. 
Fair enough. 
Okay. Get back to what your position 
is. As I understand what you're saying, is that you 
. believe that the sign unreasonably interferes with 
your use of the Millers -- of your easement because 
there's a 16-inch pole that occupies space and 
there's two five-inch bollards that occupy space. 
A. 
Q. 
Correct. 
And you're saying that you cannot use 
the exact area where the pole and bollards are 
located? 
A. Correct. 
Q. But you acknowledge that you can go 
around them, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. The poles or those bollards, do they 
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prevent you from accessing your property? 
A. No. 
Q. SO you can still access the property 
where the Rexburg Plumbing and Heating is located? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Let's just talk generally about that. 
In terms of accessing your property, what kind of 
vehicles do you use to access your property? 
In other words, I'm assuming that you've 
got plumbing trucks, and HVAC trucks, and maybe a 
boom truck -- I don't know what you've got. So just 
tell me what do you use to access the property? 
A. We have service trucks, we have a 
forklift, we have delivery trucks, various UPS, 
Federal Express. 
Q. What was that last one? 
A. Federal Express. Just normal everyday 
usage. 
Q. And is there anything about the location 
of the pole and these bollards that prevent any of 
these service trucks, delivery trucks, forklifts, or 
any UPS or Federal Express vehicles from accessing 
your property? 
A. No. 
Q. Over the easement? 
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A. NO. 
Q. Okay. Would you then agree that 
notwithstanding the fact that there's a pole and two 
bol1ards, your equipment, your service vehicles can 
still access your property on the easement using the 
easement? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Would you also agree that you have 
customers that come to Rexburg Plumbing and Heating? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Would you agree that notwithstanding the 
location of the pole and the bollards, that the 
customers of Rexburg Plumbing and Heating can still 
reasonably access your property in that business? 
A. well, that'S one of our major complaints 
about that sign is that many of our customers, as you 
can see by the pictures of the pipe bollards, have 
hit that sign. And I believe our customers are the 
only ones that are in that unique situation because 
how they pull in using the easement, and then when 
they back out, that's where the sign is, so. 
Q. Okay. Well, let's do this. Let's leave 
your customers out for just a second. Let'S start 
with you, yourself. Can you reasonably access your 
business notwithstanding the location of the pipe --
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A. Yes. 
Q. -- and the bollards? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Have you ever hit either one of those 
yourself? 
on it. 
A. I -- not very hard. 
Q. SO have you hit it? 
A. Yes. 
Q.Did you damage my client's property? 
A. Maybe. There might be a little scratch 
Q. Okay. How many times have you hit it? 
A. Probably not more than once. 
Q. Okay. So you hit it one time. 
A. (Nodding head up and down.) 
Q. Is that a yes? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. All right. But as you sit here today, 
is it your testimony that the pole and the two 
bollards, do they unreasonably interfere with your 
ability to use the easement to access the property? 
A. Not to access the property. 
Q. Okay. 
But to use the easement, yes. A. 
Q. To use the easement, yes, but to access 
your property, no? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. Is that a yes? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. All right. Is it your testimony that 
the pipe and the bollards where they're located today 
do not unreasonably interfere with your service 
vehicles from entering or accessing your property, 
but interfere with the use of the easement where the 
pole and the bollards are located? 
A. 
Q. 
I don't understand that question. 
Okay. It was basically the same 
question, but I can say it again. 
Do the pole and the bollards 
unreasonably interfere with your service vehicle's 
ability to access the property. 
A. No. 
Q. Do they interfere with your service 
vehicle's ability to use the easement where they're 
located? 
A. Yes. 
Q. All right. I'm beginning to understand 
what your position is. 
; 
t What about for your customers? Do the I poles and the bollards unreasonably interfere with 
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your customers' ability to access the property. 
A. No. 
Q. Do they interfere with your customers' 
ability to use the easement where the pole and the 
bollards are located? 
A. Certainly. 
Q. So it sounds like what your position is 
that you recognize that the easement is large enough 
so that you, and your customers, or your service 
vehicles can still access Rexburg Plumbing and your 
property; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. But you, and your service vehiCles, and 
your customers can't use the exact location where the 
b011ards and the pole is located? 
A. Correct. Most of us are only dumb enough 
to hit it once. 
Q. Do you know if Kent has hit it? 
A. He's smarter than me. 
Q. Okay. 
A. Or a better driver or something. 
MR. SMITH: What number are we on? 
REPORTER: 5. 
MR. SMITH: Let's keep these so we don't get 
them mixed up. 
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(EXHIBIT-S WAS MARKED.) 
MR. SMITH: Let me hand you what's been 
marked as Exhibit 5. 
You probably haven't seen this before, 
but this is the same as Exhibit 4 except we've added 
some dimensional lines onto this exhibit. 
Q. (By Mr. Smith) Do you recognize 
generally what Exhibit 5 shows. 
A. Generally, yes. 
Q. All right. Can you see where it says 
"EXISTING SIGN" and there's a circle? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Does that appear to be the location of 
where the sign pole is located? 
A. Appears to be, yes. 
Q. All right. And then from the center of 
the pole over to what's been identified on this plat 
as the "Kenton D. Johnson, Ellis Dean Moon, and Nephi 
H. Allen right-of-way," can you tell us how many feet 
this shows on this exhibit exists between those two 
points? 
A. Twenty point six. 
you're looking for? 
Is that the number 
Q. Well, I think it's actually the 19.34. 
A. Nineteen point three four. 
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Q. Okay. Is it your understanding that 
there's approximately, maybe a little more, than 19 
feet between the location of the sign and the edge of 
the Rexburg Plumbing property? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is 19 feet wide enough for two vehic1es 
to pass? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And how wide, for example, is one of 
your service vehicles? 
A. Like, eight feet. 
Q. All right. And so if you had two 
service vehicles on the easement, they could 
easily -- one could be heading one direction and one 
could be heading the other one, correct? 
A. Certainly. 
MS. MILLER: (Inaudible) 
MR. SMITH: Yes. We're getting there. 
Q. (By Mr. Smith) From the edge of the 
easement to your building, and I'll show you some 
pictures in just a minute, but I just want to talk 
about it this way for now, how many feet exists 
between those two points? And that would be from the 
edge of the Rexburg Plumbing property to where the 
building is. 
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A. I don't know exactly. 
Q. Could you estimate for me? 
MR. JOHNSON: Forty. 
THE WITNESS: Forty feet. 
Q. (By Mr. Smith) And does that run all 
along the side of the building that traverses 
parallel with the easement? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And so from the point of the sign to 
your building, you have approximately -- did you say 
40 feet? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. Is that a yes? 
A. Yes. 
Q. 
A. 
So you have about 59 feet? 
(Nodding head up and down) 
Q. Is that correct? 
A. According to your math, yeah. 
Q. Well, do you think my math is accurate? 
A. I don't know. I've never -- I'm trying 
to think. From the edge of our building out -- you 
said 59 feet? 
Q. Yes. I'm saying 40 feet from the edge 
of your building to the edge of the property where it 
abuts the easement, I think you said is 40 feet; is 
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that correct? 
A. think I did, but now that you total it 
all up, I would say it's more like 50 feet from the 
edge of our building out to that sign. 
Q. Okay. Well, now I'm not talking to the 
sign. I'm talking about to the edge of your property 
from the building. 
A. Right. But then you added it all up and 
you said 59 feet, right? 
Q. Well, what I'm saying is is that this 
plat on Exhibit 5 shows 19.34 feet from the middle of 
the pole to the edge of the easement. 
A. And then you said if we added that to the 
40, then we have 59 feet. So what I'm saying is 
maybe my 40 is a little off. 
Q. Okay. So you would then want to 
readjust your number on 
A. Somewhere between 50 and 59 feet. 
Q. Okay. Total? 
A. Total. 
Q. So from the building of Rexburg Plumbing 
to the middle of the pole is somewhere between 50 and 
59 feet? 
A. Correct. 
Q. SO that would mean that between the 
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building and where your property ends and the 
easement begins would be approximately 30 to 40 feet? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Can you, and your customers, and your 
service vehicles use that 30 to 40 feet to access 
your property? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What about the front of the your 
property? Does part of it abut Highway 33? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And how much does? 
A. I don't know. The whole width of it, 
wouldn't it? 
know. 
Q. I think I know, but I'm not under oath. 
I just need to have you tell me what you 
A. Well, I assume the whole width of it. 
Q. And about how wide is that? 
A. I am not exactly sure. I would assume --
I don't know the exact number. 
Q. If you look at Exhibit 5, it looks like 
the easement is about 25 feet wide. Do you see that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you know if the easement is as wide, 
or wider, or less wide than your property that abuts 
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1 
Highway 33? 
A. It's less wide. 
Q. Do you know by how much? 
A. It looks like probably -- if the easement 
is 25 feet, I would assume my property is probably a 
hundred. 
Q. So do you have 100 feet of your property 
that abuts Highway 33? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Can you, and your customers, and your 
service vehicles access your property off of Highway 
33? 
A. I don't believe so. 
Q. And so is there any kind of blacktop 
coming from the front of your property to Highway 33. 
A. Nope. 
Q. And did you put a fence in the front of 
your property? 
A. There is a fence in front of our 
property. 
Q. And if the fence were not there, could 
you, and your customers, and your service vehicles 
access your property from Highway 33? 
A. I do not believe so. 
Q. And why is that? 
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A. City requirements of intersections. 
We're too close to the intersection of 2nd East and 
Highway 33. 
MR. JOHNSON: And the State Highway 
Department has a cement wall along there. 
THE WITNESS: That's correct. The State 
Highway Department has a cement wall barricaded. 
MR. SMITH: Hold on. Let's go off the record t,t 
for a second. 
Q. 
(Off the record.) 
(EXHIBIT-6 WAS MARKED) 
(By Mr. Smith) Mr. Allen, I've got an 
exhibit that we've marked as Exhibit 6. And it's a 
series of photos. And I would like you just to look 
at them, and then just tell me generally as a whole 
group of pictures if you recognize what they show, 
generally. 
A. It appears they show the easement and the 
sign located in the easement. 
Q. Okay. Let's just have you describe some 
of these. I'll come over here. 
On Exhibit 6, the first page, can you 
see that the sign that you are talking about with the 
yellow bollard? 
A. Yes. 
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6.2. Can you show me where the blind spot is around 
the pole? 
A. Maybe if I was in my car I could. 
Q. But you can't show on Exhibit 6.2? 
A. There's no car there. 
Q. So is the blind spot on the car or on 
the pole? 
A. The blind spot would be in the person's 
car, would it not, if you're sitting in the driver's 
seat? So now you're saying that because there's 
blind spots in people's cars, Highway 101 should move 
the sign. Is that what you're saying? 
A. don't believe I'm saying that. 
Q. All right. Can you identify one 
customer who has not engaged in a purchase or has not 
done business with Rexburg Plumbing because the sign 
and the bollards are located where they are? 
A. I cannot. 
Q. So nobody ever came to you and said, 
"Hey, you've got that sign out there, and I think 
it's a nuisance," or "It's a problem,u or "I can't 
drive over that spot, I. or for any reason, "We're not 
going to do business with you." 
Can't find anybody? 
A. I've had lots of people say everything 
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you just said except for the last part. 
Q. They're not going to do business? 
A. Exactly. 
Q. So they may not like it there. They may 
find it irritating there. They may have problems 
with it being there. But you can't identify one 
person who has not done business with you because of 
the sign? 
A. If they didn't do business with me, I 
wouldn't talk with them any more. So I cannot 
identify anyone like that. 
Q. All right. Paragraph 13, "If allowed to 
remain, the sign will result in loss of property to 
the Plaintiff." What property will you lose if the 
sign is allowed to remain where it is? 
A. Well, I believe that if you don't protect 
your investment and your easement, then people are 
going to take it away from you. So we are trying to 
protect our property and our easement. 
Q. Okay. Besides the exact location where 
the pole is and the two bollards, can you identify 
any other property that you or any plaintiff will 
lose if the sign is allowed to remain? 
A. I'm certainly concerned about the 
property that that sign is on. 
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Q. I understand. 
A. I do not know if there's any other 
property that we'll lose. I assume, if we don't 
protect our easement, then they could couple that 
loss and our inability to protect that with the whole 
rest of the easement. 
Now, you know, you always hear horror 
stories a about you didn't protect it so you lost the 
whole thing, you know? 
Q. So has anybody told that to you that if 
you don't get the sign and the bollards --
A. They said 
Q. Let me finish. The sign and the 
bollards removed, that you could lose the rest of 
your easement? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Who told you that? 
A. I've had numerous realtors. 
Q. Okay. And anybody else? 
A. I believe that -- well, I couldn't name, 
I don't know. 
Q. Any of these realtors tell you that who 
were related to you? 
A. Certainly. 
Q. Who? 
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A. My brother. 
Q. So your brother told you that. So let's 
stick with what you know, okay. 
What do you know today that will be as 
opposed to speculation or guess work into the future, 
what do you know as you sit here today that will be a 
property loss to you or any of the plaintiffs if the 
sign is allowed to remain? 
A. The property where the sign is at. 
Q. Okay. So you're talking about the 
five-inch bollard piece of property, right? There'S 
two of those where the bollards are located, five 
inches in diameter, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q . And then you said about 16 inches on the 
pipe? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. 
A. Now, may I continue? 
Q. Sure. 
A. And if Bron ever puts up a fence, we lose 
that extra five feet. We can't ingress and egress by 
trespassing on him. 
Q. Okay. So if Bron puts up a fence, you 
"'on' t have the --
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A. The ability to trespass. 
Q. You wouldn't have the ability to use, 
let's say, the four or five feet to the north of the 
pole? 
A. Unless we're riding a bike. 
Q. Unless you're riding a bike. Okay. 
Any other property? 
A. I don't believe so. 
Q. And then it says, "If allowed to remain, 
the sign will injure plaintiff's business." What 
injury will the business suffer if the sign is 
allowed to remain? 
A. Well, we believe that those customers 
that you alluded to earlier that we can't name, we 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Now? 
Yep. 
But you're saying when the ownership 
changed in November of 2008, before that point, there 
was no lease? 
A. There was a lease, but since the 
ownership was similar for the property and the 
business, it probably could have been an oral 
agreement. 
Q. Let's do it this way. Do you agree that 
Rexburg Plumbing and Heating does not own the 
property where the business is located? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. And do you agree that there is no 
15 believe that they don't come back and visit us ever easement given for the use of the 25-foot 
16 again. right-of-way except to Kent Johnson, Nephi Allen, and 
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Q. Okay. Now, wouldn't you agree that 
that's based on speculation? 
A. Sure. Certainly. 
Q. Do you have any other damages relating 
that you haven't already told me about relating to 
the location of the sign and the bollards? 
A. I can't think of any. 
MRS. MILLER: Is this one an exhibit? 
MR. SMITH: No. 
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Q. (By Mr. Smith) Yes. Before I move on 
-off that complaint, the complaint does also say in 
paragraph 11 "The sign is located near defendant's 
business. " 
Now, haven't we already established that 
the sign is approximately 49 to 59 feet away from 
your business? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, the company is a limited liability 
company, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Don't you agree that the company 
well, let me ask you this. Is there a lease 
agreement between the limited liability company and 
the owners of the property? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is that a written lease agreement? 
A. I believe so. 
Let me clarify that. Since the 
ownership was the same, there might not be. It may 
just be an oral agreement. I would have to go back 
and look through my records. 
Q. Has it changed at some point so there is 
a lease now? 
A. There is a lease. 
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Dean Moon? 
A. 
Q. 
Yep. 
Where is an easement given in any 
paperwork to Rexburg Plumbing and Heating? 
A. By their lease. 
Q. And so you're saying that the owners of 
the property have given use of their easement to 
Rexburg Plumbing and Heating? 
A. Yeah. 
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(EXHIBIT-8 WAS MARKED.) 
Q. (By Mr. Smith) Let me hand you Exhibit 
8, sir, and ask you to take a look at page 2. This 
is a document your attorney filed. It was a motion 
requesting voluntary disqualification. And this is 
what he wrote to the court. 
He says, "At the time Plaintiff's 
counsel first began to work on this matter in August, 
2008, the Honorable Judge Moeller was associated with 
the firm." Do you see that? 
false? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. Is that a yes? 
A. Yes. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Do you understand that to be true or 
I would say that that is true. 
All right. Can you tell me what the 
facts and circumstances were surrounding your 
attorneys beginning to work on this case in August of 
2008? 
A. I would assume it's because we were 
concerned about that sign going in at the time. 
Q. Okay. And who contacted your attorney 
about that? 
A. I would assume it was either myself, 
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identifying something underground? 
A . Exactly. 
Q. All right. Do you ever recall seeing 
any stripes around the location of where the pole was 
installed? 
A. All summer l ong. 
Q. Okay. Now, what do you mean by that ? 
A. Just what I said, "a ll summer l ong." 
The r e was stripes -- in fact, t he gas compa ny came 
probab l y five or six times . The city g u y s c a me f ive 
A. Square. 
Q. And did you recognize that as a 
configuration identifying where a sign would be 
located? 
A. Ye ah . 
Q. And whose sign did you think that was 
going to be? 
A. I wou l d assume i t was Danny's f rom the 
i n f ormation I had just rec e ived. 
Q. And what information had you just 
c. 
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wou l d pa i n t i t aga in, f ade out. Because , l i k e I 
sa i d, t h e r e was construct i on g o i ng on a ll summer 
long. 
Q. All right. So the guys from the city 
would come out and mark the ground with their 
stripes, and then they would get d i sturbed, and they 
would come out and repaint them or whatever they 
would do? 
A . 
Q. 
Exactly. 
Do you ever recall seei ng any stripes 
where the sign was going to be located? 
A. 
Q. 
I ' m sure I did , yes. 
Okay. Now, when you say you ' re sure you 
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d i d, what do you mean by that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So you s aw some stripes . What did tho se 
stripes look like? 
A . What y ou just described, red, blue , 
orange, you know. 
Q. Okay. Did you ever see any stripes in 
the location where the sign was installed identifying 
the sign was going to go there. 
A . We firs t saw the sign, l ike I s aid, 
be f ore t ha t excavator , but i t was farther up to t h e 
road . I t was no t i n the l ocation of the s i gn . 
Q. Okay. Well, I didn't understand what 
you just said . 
A. Okay . We ll , l et me do it again. We 
first saw the painti n g for a s i gn on the pave ment, or 
on t h e dirt, wha t ever it was at the time, wes t of 
where the s i gn l o c ation i s now . 
Q. And--
A. I don 't bel ieve I ever saw any sign 
pain ting where t he s i gn i s l ocated, no . 
Q. What did you see further west? 
A. I probab l y s aw some orange pai n t . 
Q. And in what configuration was it placed 
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excavator came, we were no t ified a s hort time b e fOrE . 
t hat t hat t h ere wa s going to be a sign going in. 
That's when we were a l e r ted t o a s i gn g o ing i n the 
easement . 
Q. Is that when you saw the striping on the 
ground? 
A. Are you referring to the s i gn str ip i n g 
o r the e xcavating st riping ? 
Q. The square striping you saw on the 
ground that you referred to on the west. 
sign? 
A. Yes . 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A . 
Q. 
Now, what color was stripi ng? 
I woul d say o range. 
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And what made you believe that was for a 
It s a id I1 sign . " 
Somebody had written ·sign" on it? 
Uh-huh. 
Is that a yes? 
A . Yes . 
Q. And when you saw that, is that the first 
time that you knew that a sign was going to go in 
somewhere for a Highway 101? 
A. Yes . 
Q. And about how many days before the 
excavation started did you see that square? 
A. I would s p eculat e less tha n a week. 
Q. Yes. And! don ' t want you speculating. 
I would like you to estimate . 
A. What ' s t he difference? 
Q. Well, the difference would be if I ask 
you -- if we were to guess how much money is in your 
wallet today right now, it would be a complete guess 
for me, but you might have an idea how much you're 
packing in your wallet. See the d i fference? 
A. So would I be est i ma ting and you wou l d be 
speculating? 
Q. I would be speculating and you would be 
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Q. What did he tell you? 
A. He told me if that sign didn't go in, 
was going to have to sue the City of Rexburg, he 
going to have to sue me, he was going to have to 
Bron, and he's a lawyer. 
Q. Okay. 
A. Can you think of how that effects a 
plumber? 
Q. Okay. So you were a little intimidated? 
A. Very well. 
Q. Because Danny is a lawyer? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. And he told you during that three-week 
period that if he didn't put that sign in there, he 
was going to sue you? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. That he was going to sue the City of 
Rexburg? 
A. Yeah, which I told him to do. 
Q. All right. 
A. I would agree with that. 
Q. All right. It sounds like Danny didn't 
give you any level of comfort that he was not going 
to put that sign in? 
A. I don't believe so. I mean l I wasn!t 
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looking for comfort, but I certainly made it very 
clear that we didn't want the sign there. 
Q. Well, it sounds like he made it very 
clear he wasn't going to not put it in there. 
A. So we were at an impasse you're saying. 
Q. Well, I'm asking you, is that the way it 
was? 
A. I would say that you could say that, 
probably. 
Q. Okay. And you reached this impasse 
before the sign actually went up? 
A. With Danny, yeah. 
Q. SO why didn't you then contact a lawyer 
and seek legal means to stop it from going up if you 
had reached this impasse? 
A. This is the first time in our business 
that we've ever contacted a lawyer. 
Q. All right. 
A. That's why. 
Q. Would you agree that you had time during 
that three-week period, from when you first learned 
about the sign going in to the time it went up, to 
contact a lawyer and seek legal redress, but you just 
didn't know that was an option to yOU? 
A. You know, if a simil~r ~;t"l1:::lt-ir"n. 
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happens again 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
-- we will be very - more quicker. 
All right. So if you could do this all 
over again, how much time would you let run from the 
time that you saw the "sign" written on the ground to 
the time you contacted the lawyer? 
A. Zero. 
Q. Zero? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. Is that a yes? 
A. That is a yes. 
Q. Why is that? 
A. Because I believe it could have all 
taken care of differently if we had been quicker. 
Q. Okay. And how could it have been taken 
care of differently? 
A. With the city and with that permit. I 
believe that they were led into thinking that Danny 
owned that property, which he did not. 
Q. All right. We'll get to that in just a 
second. 
But if you could do it allover again, 
you're saying immediately after seeing the "sign" 
language written on the ground, you would have 
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contacted a lawyer; is that what you're saying? 
A. No, I would not have contacted a lawyer 
Q. When would you have contacted a lawyer 
if you did it allover again? 
A. If the city told me to cram it, then I 
would have contacted the lawyer or the sheriff. 
I don't go to a lawyer first. And I --
Q. So 
A. appreciate your profession, but it's 
expensive. 
Q. Yes. Well, I'm trying to figure out if 
you could do this allover again if you would still 
wait a year and a half or however long it was after 
the sign went up --
A. 
Q. 
differently? 
A. 
Certainly not. 
Okay. So how would you do it 
Like I said. At zero, I would 
the city and get that permit rescinded. 
Q. Okay. And how long did it take you to 
figure out that you couldn't get the permit rescinded 
in this case? 
A. Well, like I said, there was still a 
little bit of hope as that sign was going up becau 
T made the phone call that very day. 
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Q. But when you talked to the city that 
very day, they told you that it was a civil matter, 
correct? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. And so if you would have placed that 
phone call the very day you saw the "sign" written on 
the ground 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. -- and the city would have told you, 
"Sorry, it's a civil matter," what would you have 
done tha t day? 
A. Then I suppose I would call --
Q. A lawyer? 
A. -- Jerry Rigby and Associates. You 
know, you make the call. 
Q. SO what you're saying is this, okay, 
you're saying as soon as you knew that the city 
wasn't going to help you, you would have contacted 
the lawyer immediately? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. If you could do it over again, that's 
what you would do? 
A. That's what I would do. 
Q. And--
A. Well, I wouldn't. 
Q. Okay. 
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A. I wouldn't. I would still go to my 
neighbor. You're dang straight. still would not 
call the lawyer. I would go to him first and 
foremost and say, 'Look, let's deal with this.' And 
then if we got to an impasse still, then I suppose I 
would do what you're saying. 
Q. 
A. 
different. 
Q. 
All right. 
But, yeah, I would do a lot of things 
well, you went to Danny, and he told you 
that if he couldn't keep the sign there, he was going 
to sue you, right? 
A. Yeah. It was pretty scary. 
Q. And he told you he would have to sue the 
city is that what you said? 
A. That was pretty fun. 
Q. Okay. And you were thinking, at that 
point, you knew that Danny was serious and he wasn't 
going to take the sign out, correct? 
A. don't know if he was serious, or if he 
was - we were all probably a little - you know how 
you get when you are in the middle of something, it 
gets a little emotional. So he was -- and I was, 
too. We were pretty adamant about what we wanted to 
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happen. 
Q. So you were thinking after Danny told 
you that he was either going to put that sign there 
or he was going to sue you, you thought that he was 
just kidding or emotional or what? 
A. I thought he might have a change cf 
heart, yeah. 
Q. How much time were you going to give him 
before you determined he had a change of heart? 
A. A year and a half. 
Q. SO you waited a year and a half? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. And you think that's a reasonable time 
to wait? 
ground. 
A. I shouldn't have. 
Q. When should you have done something? 
A. Zero. 
Q. What does "zero" mean? 
A. When the 'sign' was painted on the 
Q. What should you have done then when the 
"sign" was painted on the ground? What are you 
saying? 
A. Well, what you're alluding to is to call 
a lawyer. So I should have called a lawyer when zero 
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happened. 
Q. 
have done? 
A. 
Is that what you're saying you should 
NO. I already told you what I should 
have done and I stick by that. I would have talked 
to my neighbor. 
Q. Right. 
A. I would have called the city. 
Q. Right. 
A. And then third, I probably would have got 
some legal advice. 
Q. Okay. So if you would have called the 
city the day you saw the "sign" painted on the 
ground, they would have told you it was a civil 
matter, correct. 
A. No I don't believe so. 1--
Q. Oh, wasn't that -- go ahead. 
A. I believe that we probably could have 
showed them those warranty deeds and said, 'Hey look, 
this permit was issued on a false pretense." And I 
almost bet that if the timing was better -- if we had 
done what we should have, then they probably would 
have rescinded the permit. 
Q. So what you're saying you should have 
done was is when you saw the "sign" was painted on 
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A. Go ahead. 
Q. If he thought he owned it or if he knew 
he owned it when he went to go apply for the 
application, then why did he bother to buy it in July 
of 2009? 
A. That is completely bizarre. I have no 
answer for you. 
Q. So your testimony then if you believe 
your testimony, leads to a completely bizarre dead 
end. Is that what you're saying? 
A. It really does. I've wondered why they 
bought that property. 
Q. Okay. Couldn't it possibly be because 
they didn't know they didn't own it. They relied on 
the city of Rexburg. And when they found out they 
didn't own it, they went out and bought it? 
A. It could be. 
Q. Now, if that's what happened then you 
would have to agree that they didn't misrepresent 
anything to the city, did they? 
A. I would have to agree with that. 
MR. ERICKSON: For the record, I want to 
distinguish between misrepresentation and intentional 
misrepresentation or lying. 
MR. SMITH: That an inappropriate objection, 
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Counsel. You can raise that when I file my motion 
for summary judgment. But that's not a proper 
objection. 
You can object as to the form of 
questions, or as to privileges during deposition, but 
you do not get the right to object as to 
misrepresentation being negligent, intentional, or 
otherwise. That's one that's reserved for later. 
Q. (By Mr. Smith) All right. Let's go 
back to Exhibit 11. Here we go. That's 12. All 
right. 
Now, you agree that there was some -- it 
says here "Plaintiffs admit that the conversation 
described in the truck between Mr. Miller and Dean 
Moon occurred." You agree that there was some 
discussion in a truck when Mr. Moon gave Danny a 
lift, a ride back to Highway 101, correct --
A. I agree. 
Q. -- to their building location? 
And do you agree or disagree that Dean 
Moon said that he didn't have any problem with the 
sign being located where it was? 
A. I agree with that. 
Q. Okay. And so you will then acknowledge 
that Dean told Danny that it was okay for Danny and 
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Highway 101 to place the sign where it was being 
placed. 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Did Dean tell you that? That he told 
him that. 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. Is that a yes? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you say, "However, Plaintiffs state 
that Danny Miller's information to Dean included in 
the incorrect information regarding Highway 101's 
interest of the street, the City's approval of the 
sign, and that any statement by Dean was premised on 
that information." Is that what you're saying?" 
A. I agree with that. 
Q. So what you're saying is is that Dean 
gave consent for the sign to be located where it was, 
but it was based on inaccurate information? 
A. Yes. We had to straighten Dean out. 
Q. Okay. And the inaccurate information 
that you're saying that Dean was relying on was he 
believed that Highway 101 owned the underlying 
property? 
A. I don't think that's all the information, 
but yes. 
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Q. Okay. What other information did he 
rely on? 
A. I believe when he came back from that and 
informed us of what he had said, then we informed him 
of easements again, and that we all three had 
easements on that property. I think he was under the 
impression that we didn't even have an easement on 
there, so. 
Q. Well, Dean has a written easement, 
right? 
A. He does. 
Q. So you're saying he doesn't even know 
the easement that's written in his name? 
A. At -- yeah. I think so. 
Q. All right. 
A. Because I think he was convinced 
otherwise. 
Q. But you didn't explain anything about 
this easement in your under oath testimony in 
Responses to Interrogatories, did you? 
A. What does it say at the end of that? 
Q. Here is what you say. "Plaintiffs admit 
that the conversation described in the truck between 
Mr. Miller and Dean occurred. However, Plaintiffs 
state that Danny Miller's information to Dean 
) 
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included the incorrect information regarding Highway 
101's ownership of the street, the City'S approval of 
the sign, and that any statement by Dean was premised 
on that information and to the effect that if that is 
the case, then I guess there is no problem." Right? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. All right. And so what you're saying is 
is that the city approved the permit believing that 
Highway 101 owned the property and that was false at 
the time, correct? 
A. That was false at the time. 
Q. And you're also saying that Dean 
understood that Highway 101 actually owned the 
property, correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And that also was false at the time? 
A. That's false. 
Q. But then it says that -- but if that 
were the case, if Highway 101 did own the property, 
then Dean agreed that it would be okay to locate the 
sign there, correct? 
A. If the other things are correct, as well. 
Q. Well, let's just talk about what you put 
in your under oath responses to discovery, okay? 
A. Uh-huh. 
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Q. This other stuff you're talking about is 
not in your Interrogatory Response, is it? 
A. Probably not. 
Q. Okay. But based on what you've got in 
the Interrogatory Response 
A. Yeah. 
Q. -- if it turned out according to Dean if 
it was true that Highway 101 owned the underlying 
property on the easement, then it would have been 
permissible for Highway 101 to put the sign where it 
is now, correct? 
A. No. What we would be saying there is, in 
effect, if what you're telling me is true, I guess 
there's nothing we can do about it. 
Q. Okay. It's in quotes. It says, "If 
that is the case, then I guess there is no problem." 
A. That's why I put it in different quotes. 
Do you want me to put it in those quotes, I will. 
that's the case, there's no problem. 
Q. All right. And so what you acknowledge 
that what Dean told and communicated to Danny before 
the sign went up was that if you own the property, 
then we don't have an objection to you putting the 
sign where it is. 
If 
A. If you keep singlinq that, ()11~ T' 11 ,----
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chasing my tail. If that's the case, then we have no 
problems. 
Q. Okay. Now, at the time, it turned out 
it was the case that Highway 101 did not own the 
property, correct? 
A. Right. 
Q. But now today we know that they do, 
correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. SO what the premise that Dean gave 
permission on has turned out to be true as of today? 
A. Now, you assume that I agree with that 
premise. I don't agree. Let's read that paragraph 
again. Where are you at? 
Q. Well, wait a minute. The premise was 
for Dean's permission was that Highway 101 needed to 
own the property, correct? 
A. What else is there? That's not the only 
thing there. 
Q. Well, let's take a look at page 4. Here 
is what it says. "Plaintiff's state that Danny 
Miller's information to Dean included the incorrect 
information regarding Highway 101's ownership of the 
street, the City'S approval of the sign, and that any 
statement by Dean was premised on that information." 
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Do you see that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. So if it turns out that the 
premise is true, then Dean would have given 
permission to place the sign where it is located. 
A. 
Q. 
I suppose he would have. 
Okay. And as we sit here today, we now 
know, since you have been given the exhibit, that 
Highway 101 does in fact own the underlying fee, 
correct? 
A. Fair enough. 
Q. And so as we sit here today, the premise 
that Dean relied on to give permission for placement 
of the sign is in fact true, correct? 
A. Yeah, you're -- well, you are pinpointing r 
one thing. And that paragraph does not, in my 
opinion, pinpoint one thing. 
Q. Okay. We can talk about other things 
later, but the premise that Dean relied on to give 
permission for the sign being placed where it is 
today is absolutely true as of today, correct? 
A. NO. 
Q. Okay. 
A. The city is still wrong. 
Q. Okay. Wait a second. The premise 
Page 139 
35 (Pages 136 to 139) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
Q. All right. "Nephi Allen showed Danny 
Miller the deeds including the right-of-way and 
stated 'that sign cannot go there.'" 
Now, that happened on August 2nd, 
correct?1f 
A. Yes. I believe it was a Friday. 
Q. All right. And you're saying you showed 
them the deeds, and you said, "That sign cannot go 
there. " 
A. Yes. 
Q. "Danny Miller indicated that Mr. Millar 
had ok'd the sign and that they were putting it in." 
Now, that happened on August 2nd, right? 
A. Yep. 
Q. "He indicated that he would not have 
bought Highway 101's property if he couldn't put the 
sign in and it was paid for and permitted. The 
conversation was lengthy and Nephi Allen's, and by 
extension, Rexburg Plumbing and Heating's position 
that the sign could not be placed in proposed 
location was made very clear." Correct? 
A. Very. 
Q. And did Danny make his position clear 
that he was going to put the sign there? 
A. I believe so. 
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Q. And that would have been on August 2nd? 
A. I think so. 
Q. Well, that's what your response says 
right here. Look at page 4. 
A. That's what it says. August 2nd. 
Q. SO on August 2nd, you had made your 
position clear that the sign couldn't go there, 
correct? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. Is that a yes? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And Danny had made his position clear 
that he was putting the sign in? 
A. I believe that's clear. 
Q. "On the next Monday, Nephi Allen called 
the city and objected to the placement of the sign. 
that on the 5th you knew that Danny was going to put 
sign in for Highway 101, correct? 
A. 
Q. 
(Nodding head up and down.) 
Is that a yes? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And the city had told you that it was a 
civil matter, and there was nothing the city was 
going to do about it? 
A. Yep. 
Q. Okay. At that point, why didn't you go 
contact a lawyer and sue Highway 101 to prevent the 
sign from being installed? 
A. We're going to do this again, hey? 
Q. Well, now we know what dates we've got, 
why didn't you go do it at that point? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Let me say it differently. At that 
point, could you have gone to a lawyer and filed this 
suit. 
A. We should have a long time before that, I 
suppose. 
Q. All right. "Plaintiffs assert that 
there was an additional meeting after the sign was 
up. The meeting occurred on September 4, 2008. 
Nephi Allen and Kenton Johnson were present as were 
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Bron Leishman and Danny Miller. At that meeting 
Rexburg Plumbing and Heating Leishman Electric again 
expressed their displeasure with the sign and demand 
that it be moved. Danny Miller agreed to move the 
sign if it ever became a nuisance." 
This is what you were talking about 
earlier, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. But that all happened after the sign was 
up? 
A. Yep. 
Q. Did you ever enter into a written 
agreement with Highway 101 with respect to moving the 
sign if it ever became a nuisance or for any other 
reason? 
A. The agreement -- the oral agreement was 
17 After being placed on hold so that Natalie Powell that Danny was going to have us a written agreement 
18 could consult with the city attorney, he was told within a week of that meeting you're speaking of. 
19 that Steve Zollinger had stated "It is a civil matter The written agreement never happened. 
20 now, we have issued the permit and there was nothing Q. Okay. So the oral agreement was simply 
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more we can do." Correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. So what that means is is that that would 
have been on August 4th -- or that's August 5th. 
Okay. Because the 2nd is a Friday. So that means 
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an agreement to agree in writing? 
A. Exactly. 
Q. And the agreement in writing never 
happened? 
A. No. Until I made a phone call to Mrs. 
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A. That's a -- yeah. That's a fair 
statement. 
Q. You heard Mr. Allen testify that there 
was about three weeks from the time that he knew that 
the sign was going in and it would be on the easement 
until the sign was actually put in. 
Is that your recollection, as well? 
if it caused trouble, we thought, well, then if we 
tried to enforce the agreement, we're still going to 
have to pay the money because that's when the fight 
is going to be is then instead of now. 
So it's just like, you know, in a way we 
are doing it sooner rather than later. Because we 
could have signed that and done this ten years from 
A. I would say that's a good recollection. now, so. 
Q. Did you know for about three weeks 
before the sign went in where it was going to be on 
the easement? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And during those three weeks, why is it 
that you didn't file suit before the sign was 
actually installed? 
A. I actually like Danny. 
Q. Well, we can agree on that. I like him, 
too. 
A. And I didn't want to spend the money. 
mean, I really liked the guy. He brought me a doz 
donuts every day for the whole summer. 
Q. Okay. 
A. Look, I've lost 80 pounds since me and 
Danny quit seeing each other. 
Q. All right. So you're saying you thought 
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about suing earlier before the sign went in? 
A. Right. 
Q. But you didn't do it because you didn't 
want to spend the money; is that correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And you really liked Danny. He brought 
you donuts. 
A. Right. 
Q. Any other reasons you didn't sue any 
earlier? 
A. I -- I would hope to believe that two 
people can work things out. And I can appreciate his 
predicament that he had purchased that sign and what 
are you going to do with it? And had the permit. 
You know, I felt sorry for Danny. I did. You know, 
but it's like ... 
Q. The reason I'm asking you those 
questions is that if you would have brought the 
lawsuit before they installed the sign, then we could 
have had the court make a determination of whether it 
could go there before he paid for it? 
A. Well, and that's true. I don't know if 
it would have cost me any less. It might have. But 
one of the reasons we decided not to sign their 
agreement that they brought to us later on that that 
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Q. But can you see what a difference it 
would have made to Highway 101 if you would have 
filed suit before the sign was installed? 
A. I think Danny told me that the sign had 
already been paid for so his mind was made up. 
Q. When did he tell you that? 
A. When we were out there saying the sign 
couldn't go in after you know, after it was 
obvious it was going to go in. And Danny says, "I've 
bought it. I've paid for it. I don't have no 
choice.!! 
Q. So before the sign went in, he made it 
absolutely clear to you that he had no choice he was 
putting it in? 
A. He said that's where the permit was --
that he was going to put it in, so. 
Q. Okay. And my question is then he made 
Page 14 
it clear to you that he had no choice, he expressed 
that you to, he told that to you before the sign had 
went in l correct? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Uh-huh. 
Is that a yes? 
Yes. 
Q. And you still waited until sometime in 
2009 to sue, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, besides liking Danny and besides 
you didn't want to spend your life savings, is there 
any other reason why you couldn't have sued before 
the sign went in? 
A. I didn't know how. 
Q. You didn't know how to sue? 
A. I didn't know how. 
Q. Do you know 
A. This is the first time, and this will 
probably be my last time, I ever sue anybody. This 
is one of the most degrading things I've ever had to 
do in my life. But I still have a building that's --
that is really my truly life savings that I own that 
I have to protect that investment. 
You know, it could stand in the way of 
the sales. I've heard this from people that say 
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theY've seen it before. And it's, like, okay, here I 
go. don't want to do this, but here we go. 
Q. Now, do you know that if you want to sue 
somebody, a good way to do that is to contact a 
lawyer. Did you know to do that? 
A. We figured that out fjnally. 
Q. Okay. You didn't know that when Danny 
was telling you "I've got no choice, I've got to put 
this sign in," you didn't know that you could sue him 
by contacting a lawyer? 
A. Nope. I didn't have enough facts to know 
that could do that with any surety and come out on 
top. 
Q. So you --
A. And I still don't. 
Q. When Danny was telling you that he was 
going to put the sign in, he already bought it, he 
had no choice, you didn't even have enough experience 
or knowledge to know that you could contact a lawyer 
to even talk about filing a suit? 
A. Well, I knew I could call a lawyer and 
talk to him about that. But, you know, you're busy 
doing day-to-day things and, you know. 
Q. Okay. So what you're telling me then is 
is in addition to Danny being a nice guy, brought you 
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donuts, in addition to you not wanting to spend your 
life savings, one of the reasons that you didn't sue 
before the sign went in is because you were busy 
doing day-to-day things. Isn't that what you're 
saying? 
A. Yeah. That's part of it. 
Q. All right. Well, any other parts that 
I've left out that you need to tell me about? 
A. No, I don't think so. think the bigger 
parts was liked Danny and I liked the donuts, but, 
you know, the day-to-day things was probably not the 
bigger part of it. The bigger part of it was I 
wanted to be a human being to another human being. 
You know, that's --
Q. And that's tied to liking Danny? That's 
the same? 
A. I try to like everybody. 
Q. All right. So you wanted to be a human 
being, you liked Danny personally, you were busy 
doing day-to-day things, and you didn't want to spend 
your life savings, correct? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Otherwise, if it wouldn't have been for 
those things, you would have sued earlier before the 
sign wel 
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A. If I was a butt hole, yeah, I suppose I 
would have. I didn't realize that -- didn't 
realize the significance of not suing at that time. 
I didn't realize that my easement could get chewed up 
a little bit by little bit. I didn't even realize 
until you just said that they could put a fence down 
the north side of that thing and chop Bron off that 
that could happen. I didn't know people could do 
things like this to each other. 
Q. Are you mad at me? 
A. I'm just telling you. I just don't get 
it. 
Q. Okay. So besides you liking Danny, 
trying to get along with your neighbor, and treating 
people right, and being busy doing day-to-day things, 
and not wanting to spend your life savings, and 
thinking that you would be a butt hole if you sued 
Danny or Highway 101 
A. Right. 
Q. If it wasn't for those things --
A. Yes. 
Q. -- you would have done it? 
A. The answer is yes. You're trying to get 
me to say yes, so I will say yes, sir. 
Q. All right. So if it wouldn't have been 
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for those things, you would have sued before the sign 
went up? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Let'S talk about how this placement the 
pole and the two bollards interfere with your ability 
to use the easement to access your property. Can we 
do that? 
A. It doesn't interfere with it. 
Q. It doesn't interfere, does it? 
A. HUh-uh. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
IS that a 
No, sir. 
No interference, does it? 
No interference. 
The fact is is that 
A. It doesn't interfere with ability to get 
in and out of there. It doesn't interfere with the 
professional truck driver's ability to get in and out 
of there. But for some reason, some of our customers 
it seems to interfere with them. I had one hit it 
yesterday. And I says, "Can you bring -" and he had 
been there 100 times. It's a contract we work for a 
lot. I says, "Bring me a bid back. want to see 
just what that little bit of damage is." And it was 
$943. 
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don't hit the sign at all? 
A. I agree with that. 
Q. In fact, it's really very few in terms 
of the people who go in and out of that driveway that 
ever hit the sign? 
A. I wouldn't even speculate on the 
percentage. I do know that I've backed into a lot of 
things in my life so I know it happens, so. 
Q. And so notwithstanding the placement the 
pole and the bollards, your customers, and you, and 
your employees still have plenty of room to drive on 
the easement to access your property? 
A. I wouldn't say 25 feet is plenty of room 
in today's world, I guess. 
Q. Okay. How about -- we actually have 
it's 19.34 feet, correct? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Instead of saying plenty of room, would 
you agree that that is sufficient room to access your 
property on the easement? 
way. 
A. We're making it work, let's put it that 
Q. And so it is sufficient? 
A. It is sufficient. 
Q. Can you tell me when it was you tried --
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A. Except -- go ahead. 
Q. Well, can you tell me when it was you 
tried driving a piece of equipment over the easement 
and didn't have enough room, 19.34 feet was not 
enough room to cross the easement --
A. No. 
Q. Let me finish. To cross the easement to 
access your property? 
A. No. I can't tell you when. 
Q. It's never happened, has it? 
A. No. 
Q. In fact, given the Department of 
Transportation specifications on how wide vehicles 
can be, cars are really no much wider than our 
trucks. They're approximately eight, eight and a 
half feet, correct? 
A. True. 
Q. And so you could actually have two 
trucks passing in the 19.34 foot space and still be 
totally on the easement, correct? 
A. 
Q. 
Correct. 
And so there is sufficient room for you, 
and your service people, and delivery people, and 
customers to use the easement to access your 
property? 
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A. 
Q. 
Yes, sir. There is today. 
There is today. Let's talk --
A. But 
Q. Oh, go ahead. 
A. I'm thinking about tomorrow. I'm 
thinking that when we talk about ownership and stuff 
like that, I just hold that ground. I can't take it 
with me when I go. I don't get to keep it if I don't 
pay the taxes on it so I have to take care of it for 
the next guy. 
Q. Is it your understanding that you're 
paying taxes on that easement? 
A. Well, I'm talking about my property, in 
general. My home, my whatever you know, if you -
you know, I'm not - I'm saying ownership is kind of 
ambiguous. It's -- you can't take it with you. 
Eventually I'm going to have to sell it. so if 
don't take care of what I've bought 
Q. Okay. Let's be clear about this. You 
understand that you don't own 
A. Well, I own it. 
Q. let me finish. 
A. I'm sorry. 
Q. You don't own the 25 foot road, do you? 
A. I own a right-of-way on that property. 
Page 26 
Q. Correct. You own an easement, but you 
don't own the underlying road? 
A. Yeah. 
that would be. 
I don't even know what advantage 
Q. I didn't ask you about advantage. I'm 
just making it clear and I want to establish that you 
agree with me that you do not own the underlying 
road, do you? 
A. I don't. I do not. 
Q. Who does? 
A. The Millers. 
Q. Highway 101 owns it, correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And so what you have is an easement, a 
right-of-way, correct? 
A. Right. 
Q. All right. And other people get to use 
it, too, don't they? The right-of-way. 
A. True. 
Q. And the Millers get to use the property 
that they own, don't they? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that may mean that you've all got a 
share the road, correct? 
A. Correct. 
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A. It is in the middle. They better be more 
-- you know that that word, specific than that. 
Q. Well, if they say I want it in the 
middle of the room, that would make it? 
A. Well, I think that they better be more 
specific than that, and they usually are. There's 
usually a blueprint we're going by and --
Q. And so in order for you to understand 
what the middle would be, somebody has to be more 
specific than just take the dimensions and divide it 
into two. That wouldn't be specific enough? 
A. I don't see what the big deal is because 
if it were in the middle at 12.5 feet, then we go 
back to your other argument, a truck could still go 
on either side of it. So we're not talking about 
where - it's just in the right-of-way. 
Q. The big deal is is your attorney is 
telling the court it's in the middle of the 
right-of-way, and you know it's not; isn't that true? 
A. This is true. And if you go to the 
court, you'll be able to show them all of that. Why 
do you need me to tell them that for. I'm not trying 
to be disrespectful, but, you know, what I'm getting 
at? 
Q. Well, I'm trying to see what you know 
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and what you don't know. And apparently 
A. I don't know a lot. 
Q. Apparently you believe. and it's your 
under oath testimony as you're going to appear in 
court, that as long as your 5.7 feet away from a 
25-foot wide right-of-way, for you that's good enough 
to be in the middle? 
A. That's -- if my attorney says that's what 
he thinks we're talking about here, then I'm going 
with what he says. 
Q. Well. I'm not interested in what your 
attorney thinks --
A. You were too. 
Q. I want to know what you think, okay. 
Is that what you think? 
A. I think I'm going with my attorney on 
this one. 
Q. So you're going to say that 5.7 feet 
away from the edge of the 25-foot right-of-way is in 
the middle? 
A. If that's good enough for them, it's good 
enough for me. 
Q. And you don't feel that's unreasonable? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Are there any damages that you're 
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claiming in this case? 
MR. ERICKSON: If you don't understand the 
question, then just stay it. 
THE WITNESS: I don't understand the 
question. 
Q. (By Mr. Smith) Okay. Well, are you 
claiming that the business in this case has been 
damaged because of the sign? Have you lost any 
sales? 
A. I am not claiming that. I have no 
knowledge of that. 
Q. What about you personally. are you 
claiming you have suffered any money damages as a 
result of the sign being placed on my client's 
property. 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Has there been one of you three. meaning 
you. and Nephi, and Dean. who has been primarily, for 
the lack of a better phrase or word. in charge of 
dealing with this whole sign issue? 
A. I think Nephi has dealt with more of it 
than me or Dean. I think he had more conversations 
with Danny. 
Q. Has he been the one who has been 
primarily handling the whole sign issue? 
A. 
It's itts 
Q. 
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We kind of talk about it together. 
we're doing it together. 
Do you know when it was that either you 
or Nephi contacted an attorney in this case regarding I. 
any issue in this case? 
A. I do not know the date. 
Q. In your complaint, you say that "If 
allowed to remain, the sign will result in loss of 
property to the Plaintiff." 
Can you identify what the loss of 
,) 
property is that you will lose if the sign is allowed 
to remain? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
For sure the spot the sign is on. 
All right. Anything else? 
I feel at jeopardy. 
Okay. And let's go back to the spot the 
sign is on, okay? 
A. Okay. 
Q. You don't actually own that property, do 
you? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You just have an easement to be able to 
use it to access your property, correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And you've already admitted that you 
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don't have to drive over that spot to access your 
property, do you? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. So you really don't lose your right to 
access your property if the sign is allowed to 
remain, do you? 
A. Not today. 
Q. And you really can't identify any other 
property that you will lose if the sign is allowed to 
remain? 
told me was hearsay. I don't know. 
Q. Okay. What facts did they give you, 
besides their opinion, that you need to sue in this 
case to protect that 16 inches where the pipe is and 
the five inches each for the bollards or you will, on 
a more probable than not basis, suffer some property 
damage? What facts do you have? 
A. I don't have any facts to that they 
didn't say you will, they said you COUld. 
Q. Okay. So again, they're speculating, 
A. The property that I can identify that I too, because they don't know. 
might lose is the whole right-of-way if I do not 
defend that right-of-way. 
Q. All right. But that would be 
speculation, right? 
A. I think it would be more than 
speculation. It would be just smart on my part to 
A. That's probably true. 
Q. So when it boils down to it, your 
biggest concern in this case is really based on the 
absence of facts, but on speculation. 
A. Yeah. 
Q. And as you sit here, you can't identify 
18 look ahead. We seem to be reluctant in our meeting one customer who has not done business with your 
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here to be able to look ahead, but I've got no 
choice. I've got to look ahead. 
Q. Okay. Well, has anybody shown you any 
facts that you can rely upon so you can say, look, if 
that sign is allowed to remain, this is what will 
likely happen on a more probable than not basis? 
A. No facts on that, no, sir. 
Page 44 
Q. Okay. So in the absence of facts, 
you're just guessing, correct? 
A. I'm just taking care of business, yes, 
sir. 
Q. All right. And you call it "taking care 
of business," but what you're really doing is 
speculating about what might happen because you don't 
have any facts. 
A. Some of the people that have given me 
advice seem pretty smart. 
Q. Okay. But I'm talking about what facts 
you have. You don't have any facts to establish if 
the sign remains, you will lose some property on a 
more probable than not basis. 
A. It is a fact that some people that are 
pretty smart told me I better do this, whether I 
wanted to or not. I mean, that's the answer to 
question. 
Q. Okay. And so the only facts you have is 
what you consider smart people have told you that you 
better do something, correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. All right. So you've relied on hearsay 
as opposed to facts, correct? 
A. You would have to ask them if what 
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business, this Rexburg Plumbing, because of the 
location of the sign? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. In fact, your business is not even a 
retail outlet, is it? 
A. It is, sir. 
Q. You sell some retail? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. Is that what it primarily does? 
A. Primarily, no. 
Q. What do you do primarily? 
A. Construction. 
Q. So it does some retail, but that's 
because people will stop by to pick up stuff, but 
primarily, you don't do retail sales? 
A. We're a blaze game dealer so we sell a 
lot of stuff like that. 
Q. And do people come and get it there? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is it your contention that my clients 
misrepresented to the City of Rexburg that they owned 
the property underlying your easement? 
A. I'm not going to contend that because I 
don't know what happened between the city and Danny 
And I -- I honestly like Danny better than I do the 
city, so. 
Q. So as you sit here today, you don't 
have, any facts any information whatsoever to 
establish that Danny or Barbara or Highway 101 
misrepresented that they owned the property? 
A. No, sir. I do not. 
Q. Based on what you've seen today, is a 
Page 47 
12 (Pages 44 to 47) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
) 
~------------~--------------
MR. SMITH: I've only got a few more 
questions, sir, and then we're done. Unless your 
attorney wants to ask you hours of questions. 
Q. (By Mr. Smith) I want to go to 
something we talked about earlier with Mr. Allen. At 
some point, you must be aware that Dean Moon had a 
conversation with Danny Miller about the location of 
the sign. Are you aware of that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Were you aware that Dean Moon gave his 
approval to Highway 101 for the location of the sign? 
A. No. 
Q. What is your understanding as to what 
happened with that? 
A. Dean - and I've known Dean since 1976, 
and he didn't he couldn't even understand the 
description. He looked at them and goes, "I don't 
understand this, you guys. You know, I'm just going 
to have to trust you. And you guys go with it." And 
he agreed that we didn't want the sign there - that. 
Q. SO you're saying that Dean never gave 
any kind of approval at all for the sign to be there? 
A. Well, he told Danny in their 
conversation, "If the city is right and you own the 
property, I guess I've got no problem with it." But 
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he didn't even acknowledge the right-of-way. I mean, 
when you tell him to read it, he would go, "I don't 
know how to read this stuff." 
Q. Okay. Let's focus on what you just said 
there. You said you acknowledge that Dean told Danny 
that if the city was right and that if Danny or 
Highway 101 actually owned the property where the 
easement is located, then Dean did not have a problem 
with the sign being there. You acknowledge that. 
A. I acknowledge that. 
Q. Now, that conversation happened before 
Highway 101 installed the sign, correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And as it turns out, Highway 101 
ultimately does own the property, correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. SO wouldn't you agree then that Dean 
Moon gave permiSSion for Highway 101 to install the 
sign in its current location based on a fact that 
turned out today to be true? 
A. I think that's a play on words when you 
say he gave them permission. I think he just -- he 
just said, II I don 1 t know. II 
MR. SMITH: Would you please read my question 
back and we'll have l'1r. Johnson answer the question I 
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asked? 
THE WITNESS: Oh, okay. 
(Previous question was read back by reporter.) 
THE WITNESS: Today -- yes, today to be true. 
MR. SMITH: Okay. I don't have any other 
further questions. 
MR. ERICKSON; Just one. 
EXAl'1INATION 
BY MR. ERICKSON; 
Q. Kenton, as you understand the 
conversation between Dean Moon and Mr. Miller, did 
Dean Moon give permission for the sign to be 
installed? 
A. Basically, known Dean as long as I've 
known Dean, he chose not to be confrontational right 
this far away if a pickUp truck was with another 
individual. He wasn't giving him permission. He was 
just stating, "well, if that's what you're saying, 
Danny, that's all right with me, but that's a can of 
worms that will be dealt with, I suppose." And I'm 
sure that's probably the case. 
I don't know why they didn't get him on 
the phone and ask him that question. But it seemed 
to be pretty important to him to know the answer. 
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I'm guessing. They had the opportunity to, 
l'1R. ERICKSON; Okay. 
further questions. 
I don't have any other 
MR. SMITH; I do. 
FURTHER EXAMINATION 
BY MR. Sl'1ITH; 
Q. Mr. Allen testified earlier that you and 
Mr. Allen had to straighten out Dean Moon later. 
Remember him saying that? 
A. I remember him saying that. 
Q. What does that mean, you guys had to 
straighten him out? 
A. Because he would look at the descriptions 
and that and he would just say, "Well, looking at 
this, I don't know who is doing what." 
Q. SO when you say "straighten him out," 
what you're really saying is is that you and Nephi, 
Mr. Allen, knew that Dean had given Highway 101 
permission based on ownership. And you two disagreed 
with Dean, didn't you? 
A. No. 
Q. SO you agree then that and ratify, you 
support, Dean Moon's statement to Danny Miller that 
Highway 101 could place the sign where it is 
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currently placed based on Highway 101'5 ownership of 
the property? 
A. Is there anyway we can get Dean to answer 
his own question here. Because I feel like I'm 
trying to answer a question for Dean and I don't 
really want to. 
Q. Well, here is what I'm trying to figure 
out. It sounds like you agree that Dean Moon did 
tell Danny Miller that based on the City's conclusion 
that Highway 101 owns the property, Highway 101 could 
place the sign in the location it currently is at. I 
mean, you agree that that conversation took place, 
correct? 
A. agree that that conversation -- I don't 
disagree that that conversation took place. I don't 
have any reason to doubt it took place. I can very 
well see where Dean did not even understand he 
understood this is my property and it ain't yours no 
more. So Dean is just like, !'Well, if it ain't mine 
no more,11 not realizing that there is still this 
right-of-way issue, that this thing is all about 
anywaYr you know, it's just that -- and I know Dean 
bettor than anybody in this roo~. 
saying what I'~ saying. 
So that's why I'm 
Q. It sounds like what you're saying is is 
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you don't doubt that Dean said that, you just believe 
that Dean said it prematurely without all of the 
evidence and the facts. Is that what you're saying? 
A. True. 
Q. And that when Nephi Allen this morning 
said, "We had to straighten him out," what you're 
really saying is is that after he made that 
representation to Danny Miller, you and Nephi had to 
give Dean some of the additional facts that you 
believe he should have considered before he made that 
representation to Mr. Miller. 
A. That may be fair to say. 
Q. Now, did you or Nephi ever go to Danny 
Miller after you had apprised Dean Moon of additional 
facts and say, "Hold it. Wait just a second. Danny, 
before you put the sign in, we know what Dean Moon 
told you, but we've now gotten additional facts. And 
so you can't rely on the promise he gave." Did you 
ever do that? 
A. never did do that. 
Q. Did Nephi ever do that? 
A. know Nephi told Danny that sign can't 
go there, but whether he told them that "Dean is 
retiring. Dean is old. Dean can't read a 
i 
i detail. Q. But after Dean gave permission for the 
I
I sign to be placed where it is, did either you, Nephi, 
or Dean ever go tell --
A. Dean never give pecmission for that sign 
I 
to be there. And I don't know if I'm backing up from 
what I just said, but 
I Q. You are. 
A. He never did. 
Q. Okay. So here is what we've got to do, 
okay. Now you've testified as to a couple of 
I different things so you've just changed your 
I testimony. And I just want to know what your story 
is, okay. 
A. I'm saying that -- you're taking it out 
of context. 
Q. Well --
A. And you need to ask Dean that question. 
Q. Well, here is the deal Okay. Danny 
Miller can testify as to what Dean said because Danny 
Miller heard it. I just want to know what you 
understand he said? 
A. Well, you're asking me to come to a 
conclusion on a conversation between two guys that I 
wasn't even there, and then use my conclusion against 
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me. And I'm saying, you're going to have to go to 
the other guy that was in that pickup. 
Q. Did 
A. You had the opportunity to bring him 
here. And I'm surprised that he's not here at leas 
in telephone. How convenient now. 
MR. SMITH: There we go. It's right hece. 
Q. (By Mr. Smith) Okay. Let me tell you 
what your partner stated under oath. Okay. Your 
. partner, in one of our interrogatory questions, he I says this: "Plaintiff admits that the conversation I described in the truck between Mr. Miller and Dean I occurred." Okay. "However, Plaintiffs state that 
I Danny Miller's information to Dean included the 
I incorrect information regarding Highway 101's 
ownership of the street, the City's approval of the 
sign, and that any statement by Dean was premised on 
that information. And to the effect that if that is 
the case, then I guess there is no problem." 
So have you read this under oath 
response before? 
A. I have. 
Q. Okay. So are you disputing and denying 
that Dean told Danny Miller that he could put the 
25 description." I don't guess he went into that much sign where it is currently located if Highway 101 
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owned the property? 
A. No, I don't dispute that. 
Q. All right. I 
A. Well, we admitted it because 
Q. Because it happened? 
A. Yeah. 
A. The part I dispute is the fact that Dea1 
tave the facts. And now you're saying all of' didn't 
Q. Correct. It happened, right? 
A. That's what Danny said. This is all -- I 
the facts have come to be true later on. What a mean, I don't know if I've ever talked to Dean about 
miracle. We can cure bli~dness here. You can't do this. would like I guess you know what, 1'm 
it. 
Q. Okay. Well, are you saying that Highway 
101 couldn't buy the property and become owners of 
it? 
A. WeIll they weren't at the time. 
But they are now, correct? 
They are now. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. So the premise that Dean relied on in 
giving permission to Highway 101 has, in fact, turned 
out to be true as of today? 
A. It's true. And you know, I would 
never -- I'm not going to say thievery, but I will 
say trickery. This is all trickery. 
Q. 
A. 
Where is the trickery coming in at? 
Well, if we can get our hands on that 
property, we can make this problem go away. And 
give Bren Leishman $3,000. Cohersed him into it 
according to Bron because if you don't sell this to 
Page 64 
me, you're responsible to that water and sewer line 
down there and that can be thousands and thousands of 
dollars. 
Q. But in any event, you agree that my 
clients do own the underlying fee today? 
A. Today, but they didn't then. 
Q. And so what happened was is at some 
point you learned that Dean had made this 
representation to Danny Miller, correct? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. And that's when you and Nephi had to 
straighten him out, saying, "Hey, listen. There's 
more to it than what you just said." Whatever you 
guys talked about. Correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And after Dean made that representation, 
can you identify either you, or Nephi or Dean that 
then went back to Danny and said, "Don't rely on 
Dean's promise because we're revoking it." 
Did you guys ever do that? 
A. No, but this is all based on the fact 
that that was a true story that happened in the 
pickup truck, so. 
Q. Well, yeah, but you guys have already 
admitted that he's had the discussion. 
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going to have to talk to Dean about that one because 
I --
Q. So you --
A. Because I don't know. 
Q. Well, then why didn't Nephi testify that 
you and Nephi had to go straighten out Dean if you 
didn't know what he said? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Doesn't make any sense, does it? 
A. We had to straighten out Dean on a lot of 
stuff and he had to straighten us out en a lot of 
stuff. It wasn't all to do with this sign. And some 
days it was ugly. 
Q. The reason you had to straighten Dean 
out on what he told Danny is because Dean told you 
what he said and you disagreed, right? 
A. Is that speculation or? 
Q. That's a fact. He told you, didn't he? 
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A. I kind of wasn't listening to you because 
I was preparing my smart ass answer. 
Q. All right. Here is what we need to do. 
We're almost done with this, okay. No smart ass 
answers. We just need to finish the deposition. The 
reason 
A. Mr. 
Q. Let me finish. The reason that you and 
Nephi had to straighten out Dean is because he told 
you what he had told Danny and you guys disagreed, 
correct? Because he didn't have all the facts, 
I right? A. That's what I'm going to go along with 
I that assumption, I guess, but --Q. All right. 
I A. -- I really do need to talk to Dean 
I 
because Dean might straighten me out. 
Q. Well--
A. Could happen. 
Q. Could happen. I don't have anything 
A. And I'm going to talk to Dean 
Q. Okay. 
A. -- about that one. 
MR. SMITH: I don't have any further 
questions. 
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THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man ) 
dealing with his sole and separate ) 
property and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a ) 
married man dealing with his sole and ) 
separate property, and REXBURG ) 
PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an ) 
Idaho limited liability company, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
) 
) 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, ) 
) 
Counterclaimant, ) 
) 
v. ) 
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KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man ) 
dealing with his sole and separate ) 
property and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a ) 
married man dealing with his sole and ) 
separate property, and REXBURG ) 
PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an ) 
Idaho limited liability company, ) 
) 
Counterdefendants. ) 
) 
COME NOW Plaintiffs, and through their attorney of record, Hyrum Erickson of 
Rigby, Andrus, & Rigby, Chtd. and submit the following brief in opposition to Defendant 
Highway 101 's motion for summary judgment. 
INTRODUCTION 
This is a case involving Highway 10 1 's placement of a sign within an express right of way 
easement held by Plaintiffs Kenton Johnson and Nephi Allen. Plaintiffs filed their complaint on 
February 19, 2010 and Highway 101 answered April 1, 2010. On November 11,2010, Plaintiffs 
filed for summary judgment. A hearing on Plaintiffs' motion was set for February 3,2011. 
Highway 101 filed a 56(f) motion seeking additional time for discovery on the grounds that 
depositions of Plaintiffs were necessary for Highway 101 to defend the summary judgment 
motion. Plaintiffs objected to the motion. The Court granted Highway 101's motion and reset 
Plaintiffs' summary judgment motion [or April 14, 2011. On March 9,2011, Highway 101 
moved the court for summary judgment. Highway 101's motion for summary has been set for 
April 14, 2011 - essentially creating cross-motions for summary judgment. Plaintiffs now file 
this brief opposing Highway 101's motion for summary judgment. 
In support of its motion for summary judgment, Highway 101 filed a document entitled 
"Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment." 
Although many of the facts stated therein are undisputed, some are not. For example, number 33 
asserts that it is undisputed that Plaintiffs have sustained no damage from the placement of the 
sign and bollards. Obviously, Plaintiffs dispute that statement. Plaintiffs state that number 5, 
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may be disputed if a trial were necessary but, for the purposes of this summary judgment motion 
the Court should assume it to be true. Plaintiffs assert that the wording of numbers 12, 13, and 
15 does not accurately reflect the entirety of the statements of the parties in their depositions and 
affidavits and believes the Court would be better served by reading the affidavits and depositions 
themselves. Numbers 22, 23, 24, and 25 of the "undisputed facts" are statements taken out of 
context from Plaintiff's depositions that Highway 101 identifies as admissions of error on the 
part of Plaintiffs. When read in context, the depositions indicate that if Plaintiffs had it to do 
over again they would behave differently, but they cannot be construed admissions of error for 
purposes of laches or quasi-estoppel as asserted by Highway 101. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c) Where the 
parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment relying on the same facts, issues and 
theories, the parties effectively stipulate that there is no genuine issue of material fact that would 
preclude the Court from entering summary judgment. lv1cFadden v. Sein, 139 Idaho 921, 923, 88 
P.3d 740,742 (2004) (Citing Intermountain Forest Management, Inc. v. Louisiana Pacific Corp., 
136 Idaho 233, 235, 31 P.3d 921,923 (2001). However, the mere fact that both parties move for 
summary judgment does not in and of itself establish that there is no genuine issue of material 
fact. /d. The fact that the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment does not 
change the applicable standard of review, and the Court must evaluate each party's motion on its 
own merits. Id. 
ARGUMENT 
1. The Court should deny Highway 101's request for summary judgment based on the 
assertion that the sign does not "unreasonably interfere" with Plaintiff's easement 
IV,-,.,-a,~"", in case express easements, the easement is entitled to the use of 
the entire easement. 
Plaintiffs Kenton Johnson and Nephi Allen own the following expressed easement: 
ALSO A right-of-way to used in common with others described as follows: 
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Beginning at the Southwest corner of Section 17, Township 6 NOlth, Range 40 
East, Boise Meridian, Madison County, Idaho; thence East 140.90 feet; thence 
North 565.74 feet to the true point of beginning; and running thence North 
89°49'50" East 378.37 feet; thence South 25.00 feet; thence South 89°49'50" West 
394.40 feet; thence North 32°37'44" East 29.74 feet to the point of begilming. 
(Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex. E. 16.) 
Highway 101 seeks summary judgment based on its assertion that a sign placed within the above 
easement does not "unreasonably interfere" with Plaintiff's enjoyment of their easement. Brief in 
Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 4-10. However, Highway 101's 
request is based on a misunderstanding of the law of easements - in particular the law as it 
relates to express casements. Where an easement is expressed, the owner of that easement is 
entitled to use all of the property described within the express easement for the purpose of the 
easement. 
Plaintiff's do not dispute that the owner of the servient estate is entitled to make uses of 
the property that do not unreasonably interfere with the dominant estate owner's enjoyment of the 
easement. See Carson v. Elliott, 111 Idaho 889, 890, 728 P.2d 778, 779 (Ct.App.1986); Boydstun 
Beach Ass'n v. Allen, 111 Idaho 370, 377, 723 P.2d 914,921 (Ct.App.1986). However, the 
placing of a permanent obstruction within an express right of way easement is always an 
unreasonable interference with the dominant estate which is entitled to the use of the entire 
express easement. American Jurisprudence describes the rule as follows: 
A permanent physical obstruction placed in an express easement created by grant, 
in the absence of an agreement or surrounding circumstances to the contrary, 
interferes as a matter of law with the dominant tenement's right to the use of all of 
the express easement. 
AMJUR EASEMENTS § 86. By placing a sign within the limits of an unambiguous express 
easement, Highway 101 has interfered with the Plaintiffs right to use the entirety of their 
easement. 
When faced with an identical argument, that an express easement could be reduced based 
on a "reasonableness" analysis, Hawaii's Supreme Court stated the applicable law as follows: 
ANSWERING BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO HIGHWAY 101 'S MOTION FOR 
ANSWERING BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO HIGHWAY lOl'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
PAGE 341 
The general rule ... is as follows: Where the width, length and location of an 
easement for ingress and egress have been expressly set forth in the instrument the 
easement is specific and definite. The expressed terms of the grant or reservation 
are controlling in such case and considerations of what may be necessary or 
reasonable to a present use of the dominant estate are not controlling. If, however, 
the width, length and location of an easement for ingress and egress are not fixed 
by the terms of the grant or reservation the dominant estate is ordinarily entitled to 
a way of such width, length, and location as is sufficient to afford necessary or 
reasonable ingress and egress. 
Clog Holdings, N. V. v. Bailey, 92 Hawai'i 374, 394, 992 P.2d 69, 89 (Hawai'i,2000) (citing 
Consolidated Amusement Company, Ltd. v. Waikiki Business Plaza, Inc., 6 Haw.App. 312, 719 
P.2d 1119 (1986). As explained by the Hawaii Supreme Court, because the dimensions of the 
easement in this case are expressly laid out in the parties deeds, no analysis of what is reasonable 
is required. 
Other jurisdictions that have addressed this precise question have found that any 
diminution in an expressed easement is an interference. For example, after a Maryland trial court 
declined to order the removal of a fence that reduced a 20 foot easement to 12 feet on the basis 
that because the holder of the servient easement was still able to access the property, there was no 
"unreasonable interference", the Maryland Court of Appeals reversed the decision stating, in part, 
as follows: 
The trial judge's conclusion of no unreasonable interference with the express 
easement was premised on an incorrect legal analysis. He should not have 
considered the reasonableness of the established interference and physical 
obstruction. Rather, any interference of a permanent nature within a right-of-way 
that obstructs an express easement, created by reservation, for ingress and egress 
is unlawful as a matter of law and should be ordered removed. Bump v. Sanner, 37 
Md. 621, 627-28 (1873) (the grant of a right to use a piece of property includes 
"the last inch as well as the first inch" and a fence or obstruction placed upon it by 
the servient tenement is an invasion of the dominant tenement's rights); Brooks, 
224 Md. 47,166 A.2d 737 (1961) (the grant of the fifteen foot easement in the 
original conveyance can not be narrowed unilaterally by the servient tenement). 
* * * 
When an easement has been located by mutual agreement of the parties and 
granted by deed, the express easement cannot thereafter be obstructed physically 
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by one party acting unilaterally. Waldschmidt v. Vito, 228 Md. 328, 330, 179 A.2d 
884, 885 (1962) (ordering removal of a fence barring access to an express 
easement by grant that gave waterfront owners the rights of ingress and egress 
across the right-of-way to the water). Just as we have found fences and gates 
restricting access to rights-of-way to be impermissible obstructions, so also we 
conclude that a permanent physical obstruction placed in an express easement 
created by grant-in the absence of an agreement or surrounding circumstances to 
the contrary-interferes as a matter of law with the dominant tenement's right to the 
use of all the express easement. It is axiomatic that an express easement for 
ingress and egress includes the right to unfettered physical access up to the 
boundaries of the easement. 
Millerv. Kirkpatrick, 833 A.2d 536, 547-548 (Md. 2003) (emphasis added). 
Similarly, in Alabama a trial court ruled that an express easement for parking could be 
reduced because "the parking area available on the property subject to [the] easement is many 
times greater than the amount of parking needed or used by [the easement holder]." Magna, Inc. 
v. Catranis, 512 So.2d 912,913-914 (Ala.,1987). On appeal the Alabama Supreme Court 
reversed and in its decision stated as follows: 
An easement is property, 2 Thompson on Real Property 3, § 315 (1980); 2 
American Law of Property 236, §§ 8, 10 (1952); and it comes within the 
constitutional provision that no person shall be deprived of his property without 
due process. Thompson v. Andrews, 39 S.D. 477, 165 N.W. 9 (1917). 
The owner of a servient estate must abstain from acts interfering with or 
inconsistent with the proper enjoyment of the easement by the owner of the 
dominant estate. Snider v. Alabama Power Co., 346 So.2d 946 (Ala. 1977); 
Alabama Power Co. v. Martin, 341 So.2d 695 (Ala.1977). The fact that an 
obstruction to an easement is of a minor degree furnishes no standard for 
justification if the obstruction clearly interferes with the enjoyment of the 
easement. Brown v. Alabama Power Co., 275 Ala. 467, 471, 156 So.2d 153, 157 
(1963). 
Magna and its licensees, invitees, tenants, successors, and assigns, have the 
non-exclusive right to use each square foot of the property on which it has an 
easement for ingress and egress and parking of vehicles. This is a property right. 
Our respect for property rights will not permit us to diminish or reduce Magna's 
rights simply because neither Magna nor its tenant needs all the property to which 
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it has property rights. Certainly, our federal and state constitutions protect such 
rights and would prohibit judicial deprivation or diminution of such rights based 
solely upon a judicial determination of an owner's lack of need for such property. 
The implications of a contrary result would be frightening. 
[d. (emphasis added).! 
Highway 10 1 assel1s that the area on which the sign is located is unnecessary to 
Plaintiff's enjoyment of their easement. However, the fact that a particular portion of an express 
easement is not necessary for its use does not allow the owner of the servient property to erect 
buildings or structures on it. As the 3rd Circuit has explained while analyzing Pennsylvania law, 
"the fact that the purpose of an casement can be accomplished in less than the whole area 
dedicated to the easement does not give the servient estate the right to deny access to the 
unnecessary portion of the property." Louis HI. Epstein F amity Partnership v. Kmart Corp., 13 
F.3d 762, 767 (3rd Cir. 1994). South Dakota's Supreme Court has expressed the rule as follows: 
Where the way over the surface of the ground is one of expressly defined width, it 
is held that the owner of the easement has the right, free of interference by the 
owner of the servient estate, to use the land to the limits of the defined width even 
if the result is to give him a wider way than necessary. 
Salmon v. Bradshaw, 173 N.W.2d 281, 285 (S.D. 1969) (citing Tarr v. Watkins, 180 Cal.App.2d 
362,4 Cal.Rptr. 293 and Brooks v. Voight, 224 Md. 47, 166 A.2d 737). Although Highway lOl's 
"reasonable interference" argument would be applicable to an easement not clearly defined or an 
easement by prescription, it has no place in a situation such as this where the limits of the 
easement are precisely laid out in the parties deeds. 
The same rule has been expressed in different ways at different times and places. POl' 
example, some courts have described it as a rule of evidence preventing the use of extrinsic 
evidence when the terms of an express easement are specific and unambiguous. The Supreme 
Court of New Mexico stated the rule as follows: 
!Por other cases reaching the same conclusion see Wilson v. Johnston, 990 S.W.2d 554 
(Ark.App. 1999); Salmon v. Bradshaw, 84 S.D. 500, 173 N.W.2d 281 (S.D. 1969); Brooks v. 
Voigt, 166 A.2d 737 (Md. 1961); Dyer v. Compere, 73 P.2d 1356 (N.M. 1937). 
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The terms of the easement reservation to Seller are specific and unambiguous. 
There is no need for reference to extrinsic evidence; the terms of the reservation 
are decisive of the limits of the easement. See Dyer v. Compere, 41 N.M. 716, 73 
P.2d 1356 (1937). 
Brooks v. Tanner, 207, 680 P.2d 343,347 (N.M.,1984). Regardless of how the rule is expressed, 
the result is the same, because the Plaintiffs' easement is specific and unambiguous, the 
reasonableness of Highway 101 's interference with that easement is not relevant and the limits of 
the easement are those set out in the parties deeds. 
Unfortunately, it does not appear that Idaho has addressed the issue of whether an 
expressed easement may be diminished based on a "reasonable interference" analysis possibly 
because the case law is sufficiently clear that no one has brought the argument to the Supreme 
Court. However, Idaho decisions indicate that the certainty of the privileges granted is related to 
the specificity of the description of the easement. 
It is well established in this jurisdiction that an easement is the right to use the 
land of another for a specific purpose. Abbott v. Nampa School Dist. No. 131, 119 
Idaho 544,548,808 P.2d 1289, 1293 (1991). The easement owner is entitled to 
full enjoyment of the easement. Carson v. Elliott, 111 Idaho 889, 890, 728 P.2d 
778, 779 (Ct.App.1986). To the degree privileges are expressly granted, the 
easement owner's rights are paramount to those of the servient owner. Boydstun 
Beach Assoc. v. Allen, 111 Idaho 370, 376-77, 723 P.2d 914,920-21 
(Ct.App.1986). Every easement is a particular easement, privileging the owner 
thereof to make particular uses of a servient estate. The more precise the express 
language of the easement, the more certainty there is regarding the specific 
privileges granted. Id. 
McKay v. Boise Project Bd. of Control, 141 Idaho 463,471, 111 P.3d 148, 156 (2005) (emphasis 
added). In this case, the area of the easement is precisely described. Additionally, the Idaho 
Supreme Court has adopted the rule that unambiguous deeds, including deeds granting 
easements, must be interpreted based on the language of the deeds. 
Because we conclude that the instrument unambiguously excludes the gravel lot, 
we will not look to extrinsic evidence to ascertain the parties' intent on that issue. 
We must construe their intent from the unambiguous terms of the instrument. 
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Phillips Industries, Inc. v. Firkins, 121 Idaho 693, 697, 827 P.2d 706,710 (Ct. App. 1992); 
Coward v. Hadley, 246 P.3d 391, 396 (Idaho,201O). Because the instrument creating the 
easement is unambiguous, there is no basis for the Court to consider extrinsic evidence relating 
to the "reasonableness" of Highway 10 1 's encroachment. Instead, the easement should be 
enforced on its terms. 
In support of its contention that the Court should engage in an analysis of the 
reasonableness of Highway 101 's encroachment of the easement, Highway 101 cites to two cases 
from North Dakota. Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 9. 
However, neither case involves an unambiguous private right of way easement. Burleigh County 
Water Resource Dist. v. Burleigh County, 510 N.W.2d 624 (N.D.,1994) involves a statutorily 
created right of the public to use section lines for travel and Hjelle v. J. C. Snyder and Sons, 133 
N.W.2d 625 (N.D. 1965) involves a statutorily created right of way for the construction of 
highways. Both cases revolve around the interpretation of North Dakota statutes creating the 
easements and offer no justification for the position that a private unambiguous right of way 
easement can be diminished unilaterally by the owner of the servient property. 
The Court should deny Highway WI's motion for summary judgment because there is no 
legal basis for the assertion that it can unilaterally diminish a private unambiguous express right 
of way easement. 
2. The Court should deny Highway 101's motion for summary judgment based on 
laches because Plaintiff's have not delayed in asserting their rights, Highway was on 
notice that Plaintiffs objected to the placement of the sign, and Highway 101 has not 
been prejudiced by any alleged delay. 
Highway 101 has asserted that the Plaintiffs are barred from seeking the removal of the 
sign by the doctrine of laches. Laches is an affirmative defense and Highway 101 has the burden 
of proving the elements of laches. Thomas v. Arkoosh Produce, Inc., 137 Idaho 352, 359, 48 
P.3d 1241, 1248 (2002). The elements of laches, as currently applied by the Idaho Supreme 
Court, originated from the Court's citing the following from Am. JUL in a 1955 case: 
'A suit is held to be barred on the ground of laches or stale demand where and 
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only where the following facts are disclosed: (1) Conduct on the part of the 
defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which 
complaint is made and for which the complainant seeks a remedy, * * *; (2) delay 
in asserting the complainant's rights, the complainant having had knowledge or 
notice of the defendant's conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to 
institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that 
the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and (4) injury 
or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant or 
the suit is not held to be barred.' 
Flora v. Gusman, 76 Idaho 188,279 P.2d 1067 (1955). In recent years the Court has varied the 
description of the elements slightly. 
(1) defendant's invasion of plaintiffs rights; (2) delay in asserting plaintiffs rights, 
the plaintiff having had notice and an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of 
knowledge by the defendant that plaintiff would assert his rights; and (4) injury or 
prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to plaintiff or the suit is 
not held to be barred. 
Thomas v. Arkoosh Produce, Inc., 137 Idaho 352, 359,48 P.3d 1241, 1248 (2002) (citing 
Henderson v. Smith, 128 Idaho 444, 449, 915 P.2d 6, 11 (1996). Because the doctrine of laches is 
founded in equity, in determining whether the doctrine applies, the Court must consider all 
surrounding circumstances and acts of the parties. Ie!. 
a. Highway 101 has not shown that Plaintiffs delayed in asserting their rights. 
Highway 101 asserts that Plaintiffs were required to bring an action prior to August 5, 
2008 - a mere three days after informing Danny Miller of their objection to the placement of the 
sign and his informing them that he intended to place it in spite of their objections and the day 
after being told by the City that it would take no action to prevent the placement of the sign. 
Brief in Support of Defedant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 15. This argument reverses the 
responsibilities of the parties and attempts to make the Plaintiffs responsible for Highway WI's 
failure to accurately determine the status of the property. Highway 101 is attempting to make the 
Plaintiff's responsible for Highway 101 's failure to get a title report and its decision to rely on the 
City's GIS maps rather than checking the recorded deeds. Plaintiffs brought their concerns to 
Highway 101 in an expeditious manner, not once, but twice. Affidavit of Counsel in Support of 
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Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit D, pg. 3-4. Highway 101 elected not to 
investigate the matter and proceed with the placement of the sign even after being shown the 
deeds containing the easement. Once the sign was up, Plaintiffs attempted to be good neighbors 
and live with the sign to avoid problems. Affidavit of Counsel in Opposition to Defendant'S 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Depo. of Nephi Allen, pg. 95-96; Affidavit of Counsel in 
Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit D, pg. 5. However, as Highway 
has noted, once the sign was up, the cost was incurred. Any delay subsequent to the installation 
of the sign is irrelevant. Plaintiffs continued to address the matter with Highway 101. Affidavit 
of Counsel in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit D, pg. 5. Eventually, 
Plaintiffs determined that they needed to have the sign removed and the present action was filed. 
The Plaintiffs have not delayed in asserting their rights and they are not responsible for the 
expenses incurred by Highway 10 1 in this matter. The record shows that Plaintiffs have behaved 
reasonably at each step of the process. 
b. Highway 101 has not shown a lack of knowledge that Plaintiffs would assert 
their rights. 
Regarding the third element of laches, a lack of knowledge by defendant that plaintiff 
would assert his rights, Danny Miller, a member of Highway 101 affirms as follows: 
At no time before August 26,2008 (when the sign and bollards were installed) did 
the plaintiffs ever give notice to Highway 101 that the plaintiffs would assert the 
claims in this lawsuit. 
Affidavit of Danny Miller in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 3. 
Highway 101 asserts that the Plaintiff's failure to "give notice" that they would "assert the claims 
in this lawsuit" is sufficient to satisfy the third element of laches. However, Plaintiff's are not 
required to "give notice" that they will take legal action to enforce their rights. Highway 101's 
assertion would require the Plaintiffs to make a statement such as "don't do this or we will sue" -
instead the Plaintiffs merely showed Highway 101 the deeds and said "that sign can't go there." 
Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit D, pg. 4-5. 
In any event, the most that Highway 101 has asserted is that the Plaintiffs were silent regarding 
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their intention to enforce their rights. The Idaho Supreme Court has determined that "silence 
alone on the part of the plaintiff [is] not sufficient to lead the defendant to the conclusion that the 
plaintiff [will] not assert his rights. Thomas v. Arkoosh Produce, Inc., 137 Idaho at 360, 48 P.3d 
at 249. 
Additionally, the record shows that the Plaintiffs were not silent regarding their rights, but 
made it clear to Highway 10 1 that they objected to the placement of the sign within the easement. 
On August 2, 2008, Plaintiffs advised Danny Miller that they did not want the sign to be placed 
within the easement. On or about August 2, 2008, Nephi Allen had an extended conversation 
with Danny Miller in which showed Mr. Miller the deeds containing the easements and stated 
"that sign cannot go there". Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Plaintiffs' Motionfor Summary 
Judgnzent, Exhibit D, pg. 4. Given the objections from the Plaintiffs, Highway 101 had no reason 
to expect that Plaintiffs would not enforce their rights. 
c. Highway 101 has failed to show that it will be injured if Plaintiffs' action is 
not barred by laches. 
Highway 101 alleges that if Plaintiffs' action is not barred it will suffer harm from 1) 
having paid for the sign, 2) expenses from moving the sign, and 3) not being able relocate the 
sign near the main roadway. The first two alleged harms are entirely dependent on Plaintiffs 
having instituted this action prior to August 5,2008. Once that date had past Highway 101 had 
incurred the cost of the sign and would have to pay for the expense of moving the sign regardless 
of when it was required to move it. Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment at 20. The final allegation of harm, that there is no equally favorable location in which 
to place the sign is not the result of the alleged delay, it results from the location of the property 
owned by Highway 101 - nothing about the timing of this action has affected the location of the 
property owned by Highway 101 in relation to the main roadway. 
Highway 10 1 allegations of harm are entirely dependent on its assertion that Plaintiffs 
were required to bring their action prior to August 5,2008. Three days may be the shortest 
statute of limitations/laches period in history and Highway 101 has produced no case law in 
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support of its contention that Plaintiffs were required not only to object to the placement of the 
sign, but to affirmatively stop the placement of the sign by court action or else be forever barred 
from seeking its removal. 
3. The Court should deny Highway 101's motion for summary judgment based on 
quasi-estoppel because Highway 101 failed to plead it as an affirmative defense. If 
the Court allows Highway 101 to assert quasi-estoppel, it should deny summary 
judgment because Plaintiffs' current position is not inconsistent with their prior 
position, Highway 101 was not induced to change its position based on a previous 
position, the individual defendants are not estopped, and equity does not support a 
finding of quasi-estoppel. 
Highway WI's raises quasi-estoppel for the first time in its brief in support of summary 
judgment. It did not plead quasi-estoppel as an affirmative defense. Pursuant to Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 8(c), a party must set forth in his or her pleading any affirmative defenses to the 
other party's pleading. The failure to do so normally results in a waiver of the defense. Nguyen v. 
Bui, 146 Idaho 187, 191, 191 P.3d 1107,1111 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing Cole v. State, 135 Idaho 
107, 110, 15 P.3d 820, 823 (2000». The purpose of this rule requiring that affirmative defenses 
be pleaded is to alert the parties about the issues of fact that will be tried and to afford them an 
opportunity to present evidence to meet those defenses. Id. (citing Williams v. Pa.xton, 98 Idaho 
155,163-64 n. 1,559 P.2d 1123,1131-32 n. 1 (1976». In this case Highway 101 pled estoppel 
as an affirmative defense and Plaintiffs engaged in discovery directed at estoppel. See ii.ff/davit 
of Counsel in Support of Plaint(ffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit B, Interrogatory No. 
2. However, quasi-estoppel is distinct affirmative defense with elements that differ from 
estoppel. 2 Plaintiffs were not able to address the doctrine of quasi-estoppel in discovery - for 
example quasi-estoppel emphasizes the unconscionable behavior of the allegedly estopped party 
- Thomas v. Arkoosh Produce, Inc., 137 Idaho at 357, 48 P.3d at 1246; Hall v. Glenn's Ferry 
Grazing Ass'n., 2006 WL 2711849,11 (unreported) (D.Idaho,2006) - Plaintiffs were not able to 
inquire regarding what behavior of the parties, if any, Highway 10 1 asserts was unconscionable. 
2 See the explanation in Thomas v. Arkoosh Produce, Inc., 137 Idaho at 358,48 P.3d at 
1247, quoted below. 
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Highway 101 may not, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 8(c) raise quasi-estoppel for the first time in its 
motion for summary judgment. 
In the event the Court permits Highway 101 to assert the affirmative defense of quasi-
estoppel, it should deny Highway 101 's motion for summary judgment bascd on quasi-estoppel 
because Highway 101 has failed to establish the elements of quasi-estoppel, Nephi Allen and 
Kenton Johnson as individuals would not be estopped form enforcing the easemcnt, and a finding 
of equitable estoppel would be inequitable. 
On or about August 6, 2008, Danny Miller of Highway 101, Bron Leishman, and 
representatives from the City met at the city offices.3 When Danny Miller was returning from 
that meeting Dean Moon, who was at the time a member of Rexburg Plumbing and Hcating, 
gave Danny Miller a ride back from the city offices. During that ride Danny Miller represented 
to Dean Moon that Highway 101 owned the property on which the sign was located and that the 
City had approvcd the location of the sign. Highway 101 did not own the property on which the 
sign was erected and there is no indication that any mention was made of existence of the 
casements. During that conversation Dean Moon statcd something to the effect of "If that is the 
case, there is no problem." Highway 101 asserts that it actions in relation to the sign were made 
in reliance of that statement and that on the basis of that statement Plaintiffs are barred from 
bring the present action. This assertion is made in spite of the fact that the statement was made 
based on facts that were incorrect and was in direct conflict with conversations between members 
of Highway 101 and other members of Rexburg Plumbing and Heating. 
As an affirmative defense, the burden is on Highway 101 to prove the elements of 
quasi-estoppel. Thomas v. Arkoosh Produce, Inc., 137 Idaho at 358, 48 P.3d at 1247. The Idaho 
Supreme Court has described the elements quasi-estoppel as follows: 
"[T]he doctrine of quasi-estoppel requires that the offending party must have 
gained some advantage or caused a disadvantage to the party seeking estoppel; 
3See Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit 
D, pg. 4 and Depo. of Kenton Johnson, pp. 56-67, for the parties statements regarding this 
conversation. 
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induced the party seeking estoppel to change its position to its detriment; and, it 
must be unconscionable to allow the offending party to maintain a position which 
is inconsistent from a position from which it has already derived a benefit." City 
of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Independent Highway Dist., 126 Idaho 145, 151, 879 
P.2d 1078, 1084 (1994) (citing Tommerup v. Albertson's, Inc., 101 Idaho 1,6,607 
P.2d 1055, 1060 (1980». This Court has also written that "[q]uasi-estoppel is 
essentially a last-gasp theory under which a defendant who can point to no 
specific detrimental reliance due to plaintiffs' conduct may still assert that 
plaintiffs are estopped from asserting allegedly contrary positions where it would 
be unconscionable for them to do so." Schoonover v. Bonner County, 113 Idaho 
916,919,750 P.2d 95, 99 (1988). "The doctrine classified as quasi-estoppel has 
its basis in election, ratification, affirmance, acquiescence, or acceptance of 
benefits; and the principle precludes a party from asserting to another's 
disadvantage, a right inconsistent with a position previously taken by him." Id. 
Quasi-estoppel, however, is a broadly remedial doctrine, often applied ad hoc to 
specific fact patterns. Keesee v. Fetzek, 111 Idaho 360, 362, 723 P.2d 904, 906 
(Ct.App.1986). Quasi-estoppel, unlike equitable estoppel, does not require 
misrepresentation by one party or actual reliance by the other. Id. (citing Evans v. 
Idaho State Tax Commission, 97 Idaho 148,540 P.2d 810 (1975»; see also 
Schiewe v. Farwell, 125 Idaho 46,49,867 P.2d 920, 923 (1995) ("The doctrine of 
quasi-estoppel is distinguishable from equitable estoppel in that no concealment 
or misrepresentation of existing facts on the one side, nor ignorance or reliance on 
the other, is a necessary ingredient."). 
Thomas v. Arkoosh Produce, Inc., 137 Idaho at 357, 48 P.3d at 1246. There is no indication that 
this conversation resulted in any advantage to Plaintiffs or caused a disadvantage to Highway 
101. 
There is no reason to believe that Highway 101's decision to place the sign was based on 
Dean Moon's statements in the car. The testimony available indicates that Highway 101 had 
already determined to erect the sign in spite of Plaintiffs' objections. Affidavit of Bryan D. Smith 
In Support of Defendant's Motionfor Summary Judgment, Exhibit B, Depo. Of Kenton Johnson, 
p. 14-15; Affidavit of Counsel in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Exhibit A, Depo. of Nephi Allen, p. 93-94. In fact, this conversation occurred on August 6,2008, 
the day after the date given by Highway 10 1 as the date on which it incurred the costs of the sign 
and the day by which Plaintiffs were required to file a lawsuit. The Affidavit of Danny Miller 
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indicates that for Highway 101 to avoid incurring the costs of the sign, Plaintiffs needed to have 
filed suit by August 5, 2008. Affidavit of Danny Miller, paragraph 9. However, the conversation 
between Dean Moon and Mr. Miller did not occur until August 6, 2008. Defendant's Separate 
Statement of Facts, No. 13. 
Highway 101 asserts that Plaintiffs never "advised Highway 101 it could not rely on" the 
conversation between Dean Moon and Danny Miller. However Plaintiffs made clear their 
objection to the placement of the sign. Nephi Allen asked him not to put the sign up and Danny 
Miller responded that if he couldn't put the sign in he would have to sue Nephi Allen, Bron 
Leishman, and the City of Rexburg. Affidavit of Counsel in Opposition to Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment, Exhibit A, Depo. of Nephi Allen, pg. 93-94. They showed Highway 101 
copies of the deeds and stated "that sign cannot go there." 
Idaho law requires a finding of unconscionable conduct to support the application of 
quasi-estoppel. Thomas v. Arkoosh Produce, Inc., 137 Idaho at 357, 48 P.3d at 1246; Hall v. 
Glenn's Ferry Grazing Ass'n., 2006 WL 2711849, 11 (unreported) (D.Idaho,2006). Nothing in 
Plaintiff's conduct has been unconscionable. 
Additionally, even if the Court were to find that Rexburg Plumbing & Heating was bound 
by quasi-estoppel based on the conversation of Dean Moon, the same cannot be said of Nephi 
Allen and Kenton Johnson individually. Neither of them made any such statements regarding the 
sign and they are each entitled to enforce their easement as individuals. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons the Court should deny Highway 101's motion for summary 
judgment. Additionally, for the reasons set out in Plaintiffs' Brief in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment, the Court should award Plaintiffs their costs and fees pursuant to I.e. § 12-
121 and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l). 
DATED this 31 st day of March, 2011. 
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I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was on this date 
served upon the persons named below, at the addresses set out below their name, either by mail-
ing, hand delivery or by telecopying to them a true and correct copy of said document in a 
properly addressed envelope in the United States mail, postage prepaid; by hand delivery to 
them; or by facsimile transmission. 
DATED this 31't day of March, 2011. 
Bryan D. Smith, Esq. 
B. J. Driscoll, Esq. 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
P. O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
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RIGBY ANDRUS & RIGBY, Chartered 
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] Hand Delivery 
[ X ] Facsimile 
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Hyrum D. Erickson, ISBN 7688 
RIGBY, ANDRUS & RIGBY, Chartered 
Attorneys at Law 
25 North Second East 
Rexburg, Idaho 83440 
Telephone: 208-356-3633 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man ) 
dealing with his sole and separate ) 
property and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a ) 
married man dealing with his sole and ) 
separate property, and REXBURG ) 
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HYRUM ERICKSON, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I am the attorney for Plaintiffs. 
2. Attached is a true and correct copy of pages 93-100 of the deposition of Nephi Allen. 
DATED this 31 5t day of March, 2011. 
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1 to -- this is bloody America. You should be able to 1 the city myself again. And I talked with Natalie 
2 do whatever you want with your property, right? 2 Powell. And she put me on hold and said, "I've got 
3 All of these th ings come up in a 3 to talk to the city attorney." She came back and 
4 conversation with my partners, with Bron, and with 4 said, "You're on your own. We've already issued a 
5 Danny. So there are many reasons why we didn't call 5 permit. The sign is going in. We've already been 
6 the sheriff and say, "Get that stinking sign out of 6 out there once. This is a civil matter now." 
7 the cement and cover the hole in," you know? And 7 Q. Okay. The day the sign was going in, 
8 what I told you before, this is my very first 8 thafs when the pole was going in? 
9 deposition. I did not want to call a lawyer. I 9 A. No. Well, I believe it was when the top 
10 don't want to call the sheriff. I don't have any 10 was going in - when the top was going on. 
11 desire at a/l to do that. 11 Q. Okay. Any other reasons? 
12 So what we did do is talked to Danny. I 12 A. Why we didn't? 
13 talked to Danny personally. I know Bron talked with 13 Q. Yes. What I'm trying to figure out is 
14 him. I know Dean talked with him. And some of the 14 is why did you wait until after the sign was 
15 problem with us not getting somebody with more 15 installed to sue Highway 101? Why didn't you file a 
16 authority involved at the beginning was we were led 16 lawsuit before the sign was installed during that 
17 to believe that Danny already owned that piece of 17 three week period, and try to prevent them legally 
18 property. And that's when we decided to go get the 18 from installing it? 
19 warranty deeds and see exactly what happened. And 19 A. You know, right after the sign went in, 
20 exactly what we did and what we didn't. 20 we had a big sit down with Danny. Bron was there, I 
21 Those are some of the issues that we ran 21 was there, Dean was there, Kent was there, Danny was 
22 up against at the beginning of this. And you have to 22 there. And we discussed the things I just discussed. 
23 sort all of those out before you go spending 23 We discussed that a guy should be able to advertise 
24 thousands of dollars on lawyers, you know? I have no 24 his property. He has every bit of right on that 
25 idea why we didn't do it at the beginning, but those 25 easement as we do. Danny does. Bron has every bit 
Page 93 Page 95 
PAGE 94 ~~~=========~==jJ r==' PAGE 96 ~~=====_==~_~==;; ~ are some of the reasons that led us not to do that. 1 of right on that easement as we do. 2 Q. Well, can you tell me any other reasons? 2 Those things were discussed. And we 3 A. Any other reasons? 3 came up with a - for - we came up with an 4 Q. Yes. 4 agreement. We says, "Okay. If you agree to put this 
- A. For one, the city. They said - we did 5 in writing, Danny, then we won't --I mean, let's 
contact them, and we requested for them to come 6 make an agreement so that we can all live with it. 
review all of this, and to make it go away. They had 7 Because we've drove around this sign for a few days 
already issued a permit at this point, and so they 8 now. Maybe we can live with this." 
did not want to rescind that permit. And to move the 9 So we sit down and we make this 
sign locations, when we had conversations with Danny, 10 agreement. We say, "Number one, if that sign ever 
he would have to go through the permit process again 11 becomes an issue, we've got to have it moved." 
which was substantial, apparently. So that wasn't an 12 "Okay. So what would be an issue?" You know? 
option for him, either. To move the sign to a 13 "If the building sells, that is an 
different location because he would have to 14 issue. If that hampers the sale of our building." 
re-permit. 15 "Okay. Everyone can agree on that." 
Q. Okay. But that happened after the sign 16 "If that sign hampers the sale of our 
was installed, correct? 17 building, it will come down. Number two, if we just 
A. Oh, no. 18 can't live with it, if it becomes such a nuisance 
Q. Okay. So you're saying you talked to 19 that we can't handle it, we'll take it down. We'll 
him before the sign was installed about moving it and 20 move it." 
he said he would have to get a different permit? 21 So we agree on these things and Danny 
A. Definitely. 22 says, "I'll have it written up for you in a week." 
Q. Okay. 23 Never happened, you know. So in that time, obviously 
A. So that's definitely a reason. When the 24 we have an agreement. We're not going to call a 
sign was - the day that sign was going up, I called 25 lawyer, are we? 
Page 94 Page 96 
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1 Q. So you're saying that that discussion 1 three weeks because the discussion -
2 took place before the sign went up? 2 A. No. He did not make me comfortable 
3 A. That discussion took place after. 3 during those three weeks, at all. 
4 a. Okay. So Jet's go back to my question, 4 Q. Did you want to have some comfort level 
5 okay, because after the sign is up, then that's 5 that Danny would do something with the sign before it 
6 outside of the time frame that my question is aimed 6 went in? 
7 a~ okay? 7 A. I would have hoped so and I tried, but it 
8 A. All right. 8 didn't happen. 
9 a. I'm trying to figure out during the 9 a. Is that what you wanted? 
10 three-week period, from the time you saw the language 10 A. What? What did I want? 
11 "sign" written on the ground, where you said you knew 11 Q. Did you want to be comfortable during 
12 it was going to be a sign, it was going to be in your 12 that three-week period that Danny would have some 
13 easemen~ okay, and you didn't want i~ why didn't 13 sort of an agreement with you that would make you 
14 you get ahold of the lawyer during that three-week. 14 happy with respect to what they might do with the 
15 period and seek some sort of legal means to stop the 15 sign? 
16 sign from growing up? Why did you wait until a year 16 A. I don't think I was worried about my 
17 and a half later to file a suit? 17 comfort. 
18 A. Because I got ahold of my neighbor. 18 Q. Okay. Did you ever get a commitment 
19 a. Okay. Bron? 19 from Danny during those three weeks that the sign 
20 A. Danny. 20 wouldn't go in? 
21 Q. Okay. What happened? 21 A. No. 
22 A. Obviously nothing. 22 a. Is that what you wanted? 
23 Q. So you're saying that during the three 23 A. Yeah. 
24 weeks you got ahold of him, but nothing happened? 24 Q. Did you ever ask him not to put it in? 
25 A. Exactly. 25 A. Yeah. 
Page 97 Page 99 
PAGE 98 ______ =========j r-= PAGE 100 ==============;] ~ Q. Okay. So he wasn't being cooperative is 1 Q. What did he tell you? 2 what you're telling me? 2 A. He told me if that sign didn't go in, he 3 A. That's what I'm telling you. 3 was going to have to sue the City of Rexburg, he was 4 a. Wasn't Danny trying to work with me? 4 going to have to sue me, he was going to have to sue 
- A. Wasn't Danny trying to work with us? 5 Bron, and he's a lawyer. 
a. Yes. 6 Q. Okay. 
A. It appeared to be that he was. 7 A. Can you think of how that effects a 
a. You thought he was trying to work with 8 plumber? 
you? 9 Q. Okay. So you were a little intimidated? 
A. I thought he was. 10 A. Very well. 
a. When did you figure out he wasn't 11 Q. Because Danny is a lawyer? 
working with you? 12 A. Yeah. 
A. When the sign went up anyway. 13 a. And he told you during that three-week 
a. And so what happened during those three 14 period that if he didn't put that sign in there, he 
weeks to make you think that Danny was going to 15 was going to sue you? 
somehow do something to make you happy about the 16 A. Uh-huh. 
sign? 17 Q. That he was going to sue the City of 
A. Well, I wouldn't say he did make me 18 Rexburg? 
happy. 19 A. Yeah, which I told him to do. 
a. He never made you happy. Did he ever 20 Q. All right 
make you comfortable so you figured out you guys had 21 A. I would agree with that. 
some sort of an agreement? 22 a. All right It sounds like Danny didn't 
A. Yeah, he said - well, that's before the 23 give you any level of comfort that he was not going 
time period. 24 to put that sign in? 
a. Right I'm talking about during those 25 A. I don't believe so. I mean, I wasn't 
Page 98 Page 100 
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I. INTRODUCTION. 
Defendant, Highway 101 Investments, LLC ("Highway 101"), files this brief in support of 
its Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment. Highway 101 has filed its own 
motion for summary judgment together with supporting documents including its brief in 
support of summary judgment, separate statement of undisputed facts, affidavit of Danny 
Miller, and affidavit of Bryan D. Smith. Highway 101 expressly incorporates these documents 
by this reference as if fully set forth herein. 
As for the "facts" the plaintiffs rely on for their summary judgment, the plaintiffs assert 
one "fact" that Highway 101 must correct. The plaintiffs assert that "In its application, Highway 
101 misrepresented its ownership of the street. Highway 101 represented to the City that it 
owned not only the property that it owned it fee simple, but it also represented to the city that 
it owned the street. (Ex. E. 84.).,,1 However, it was the other way around: The City of Rexburg 
represented to Highway 101 that the property Highway 101 purchased included the property 
underlying the right of way easement. 
Both Nephi Allen and Kenton Johnson have admitted that the map the City of Rexburg 
prepared showed that the property Highway 101 purchased included the property underlying 
the right of way easement. Specifically, Nephi Allen testified as follows: 
16 Q. (By Mr. Smith) Let me show you Exhibit 
17 7. This is actually a map from Madison County City 
18 of Rexburg, GIS. Do you see that? 
19 A. Yeah. 
20 Q. And the city has got Highway 101's 
21 property identified in what color? Can you tell? 
22 A. Green. 
23 Q. Green. And the green would include 
1 See Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judg 
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24 American Street, correct? 
25 A. The easement. 
1 Q. Okay. And so what you're saying is is 
2 that the map from the city actually shows that 
3 Highway 101 owns the easement? 
4 A. That's what the map shows. 
5 Q. All right. 
6 MR. ERICKSON: Does that map have a date on 
7 it? 
8 THE WITNESS: I was just going to look for 
9 it. See on -- this map is incorrect. 
10 MRS. MILLER: What's the date on it. 
11 THE WITNESS: 8/25/06. 
12 MRS. MILLER: August of 2006. 
13 MR. SMITH: All right. That's okay. 
14 Q. (By Mr. Smith) So the date on the map 
15 is August of 2006. So it would appear as of the time 
16 that Highway 101 went in to get its permit that the 
17 city had an incorrect identification on the easement 
18 showing that Highway 101 actually owned the property, 
19 correct? 
20 A. That's correct. 2 
* * * 
24 Q. Well then maybe you can answer this 
25 question for me, Mr. Allen. 
1 A. Go ahead. 
2 Q. If he thought he owned it or if he knew 
3 he owned it when he went to go apply for the 
4 application, then why did he bother to buy it in July 
5 of 2009? 
6 A. That is completely bizarre. I have no 
7 answer for you. 
8 Q. So your testimony then if you believe 
9 your testimony, leads to a completely bizarre dead 
10 end. Is that what you're saying? 
11 A. It really does. I've wondered why they 
12 bought that property. 
13 Q. Okay. Couldn't it possibly be because 
14 they didn't know they didn't own it. They relied on 
ee Allen Depo., 122:16-123:20. 
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15 the city of Rexburg. And when they found out they 
16 didn't own it, they went out and bought it? 
17 A. It could be. 
18 Q. Now, if that's what happened then you 
19 would have to agree that they didn't misrepresent 
20 anything to the city, did they? 
21 A. I would have to agree with that.3 
Kenton Johnson testified similarly as follows: 
13 Q. Is it your contention that my clients 
14 misrepresented to the City of Rexburg that they owned 
15 the property underlying your easement? 
16 A. I'm not going to contend that because I 
17 don't know what happened between the city and Danny. 
18 And I -- I honestly like Danny better than I do the 
19 city, so. 
20 Q. SO as you sit here today, you don't 
21 have, any facts any information whatsoever to 
22 establish that Danny or Barbara or Highway 101 
23 misrepresented that they owned the property? 
24 A. No, sir. I do not. 
25 Q. Based on what you've seen today, is a 
1 reasonable alternative explanation simply that the 
2 city looked at their GIS map and told Highway 101, 
3 and Danny, and Barbara that they did own it, isn't 
4 that reasonable to believe? 
5 A. I don't think the city did it that way. 
6 Q. Do you know? 
7 A. I would be speculating again. 
8 Q. Okay. I don't want you to speculate. 
9 want to know about what you know. 
10 A. That -- oh, you don't want me to 
11 speculate? 
12 Q. No. I want to know what you know 
13 because otherwise we could testify all day about what 
14 people speculate. So what do you know? 
15 A. Yeah. I would go back to Nick Baldwin 
16 telling them. He owned it. And that's how they put 
17 it on their map. And I don't know that. I'm--
18 Q. I understand. But as you look as the 
See Allen Depo., 131:24-132:21. 
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19 documents today, specifically I believe it's Exhibit 
20 7. 
21 Okay. On Exhibit 7, do you see the 
22 green there? 
23 A. Yes. 
24 Q. Okay. Doesn't it appear from looking at 
25 that -- now what's the date of that? August, 2006? 
1 A. Yeah. 
2 Q. Were you aware that Highway 101, Danny, 
3 they didn't even buy the property until some time 
4 after August 2006, did you know that? 
5 A. Right. 
6 Q. So that looks like Danny didn't have 
7 anything to do with the city identifying that road as 
8 belonging to Danny, does it? 
9 A. No. But that doesn't relieve Danny from 
10 the responsibility of knowing what he really owns and 
11 what he really doesn't own. 
12 Q. Okay. But the fact is is that when it 
13 comes to whether Danny misrepresented to the city, it 
14 looks like the city was misrepresenting that Danny, 
15 when he bought the property, actually owned the 
16 underlying property to the easement, true? 
17 A. True. But again, I don't know what went 
18 on in that meeting. I can -- I buy property and the 
19 very first thing I do is have it surveyed. Sometimes 
20 even before. 
21 Q. And it wouldn't make sense for Danny or 
22 Highway 101 to put improvements on the property that 
23 they didn't think they even owned, would it? Would 
24 that make sense? 
25 A. I don't know. 
1 Q. Would you do that? Would you improve 
2 property that you didn't own? 
3 A. I would not, but I'm not an attorney. 
4 Sometimes these guys think, "Well, I've got the one 
5 up on them, so." 
6 Q. Okay. But the fact is is you don't know 
7 what Danny represented to the city or what the city 
8 represented to him? 
9 A. I don't. 
10 Q. But based on that Exhibit 7, it would 
11 appear, even though we don't know for sure, that the 
12 city was showing that the owner of the underlying 
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13 easement was the person who owned all of that 
14 property in green, correct? On the map. 
15 A. Right. 
16 Q. And so if the city relied on that to 
17 tell Danny he owned the property, or to make a 
18 determination that he owned it for purposes of giving 
19 Danny the permit, then the city would have been 
20 mistaken about that before Danny even bought the 
21 property? 
22 A. The city wouldn't have given him a 
23 permit without this little green line, I'm guessing, 
24 which is wrong. 
25 Q. Okay. And who put the green line on 
1 there? 
2 A. I'm guessing the city. 
3 Q. All right. And since they did it in 
4 2006, that would have happened before Danny even 
5 bought the property if he bought it afterwards, 
6 correct? 
7 A. Right. 
S Q. So Danny would have had absolutely 
9 nothing to do with the city putting the green line in 
10 there, right? 
11 A. Correct. 
12 Q. Which would show then that Danny didn't 
13 misrepresent his ownership of that to the city, 
14 correct? 
15 A. Correct. 
16 Q. And so if your attorney represents --
17 A. According to that, yeah. 
18 Q. According to that. So based on that map 
19 at least, which is facts in evidence, if your 
20 attorney represents to the court in this case that 
21 Highway 101 misrepresented his ownership interest in 
22 owning the underlying fee for that easement, that 
23 would be false, wouldn't it? 
24 A. Well, he may not have intentionally 
25 misrepresented it, but he did misrepresent it. He 
1 didn't get a survey. That's like number one when you 
2 buy a piece of property. 
3 The other thing is Danny knows how to 
4 read a description. That's what he did for the 
5 Southern Pacific -- or whatever it is. Union Pacific 
6 Railroad for years. That's the story he told us --
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7 or told Dean that story. That they had these 
8 right-of-ways that they had to disperse or whatever, 
9 and that was one of his jobs that he did. So he 
10 certainly knows how to read a description. 
11 Q. But if it turns out that the city relied 
12 on its wrong information on the GIS map and not 
13 anything Danny told to the city, then wouldn't it be 
14 true that Danny didn't misrepresent his ownership 
15 interest? 
16 A. The only way that he might have 
17 misrepresented his ownership is if he knew different 
18 and went in there and didn't straighten it out. And 
19 that very well could have happened. 
20 Q. And you don't know that, do you? 
21 A. I don't know that. 
22 Q. And all your attorney can know about 
23 this is what you or Nephi give him, correct? 
24 A. Correct. 
25 Q. Correct. Do you know any facts to prove 
1 that Danny misrepresented the ownership interest on 
2 that--
3 A. No.4 
Highway 101 submits that the plaintiffs have simply "thrown" in the baseless assertion 
that Highway 101 "misrepresented" to the City of Rexburg Highway 101's ownership of the 
property underlying the right of way easement to smear Highway 101. As it turns out, the City 
of Rexburg's development map incorrectly identified that the property Highway 101 purchased 
included the right of way easement as well as the property underlying the right of way 
easement. Thus, although Highway 101 applied for its permit thinking in good faith it owned 
fee simple title to the right of way easement, Highway 101 did not own the fee simple title to 
the easement but rectified this situation by subsequently acquiring fee simple title to such 
easement after installing the sign and bollards. 
4 See Johnson Depo., 47:13-53:3; emphasis added. 
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II. HIGHWAY 101 HAS NOT UNREASONABLY INTERFERED WITH THE PLAINTIFFS RIGHT OF 
WAY EASEMENT. 
The plaintiffs assert that "placing a large sign in the middle of the 25 foot wide right of 
way is ... an unreasonable interference with Plaintiff's use of their easement." However, as set 
forth in detail in Highway 101's brief in support of its motion for summary judgment, the sign 
post and bollards do not unreasonably interfere with access to and from the plaintiffs' 
property. Moreover, while the sign post and bollards may be in the middle ofthe properties 
designated as "American Street/' they are not in the middle of the right of way easement and 
do not unreasonably interfere with the plaintiffs' access to and from the plaintiffs' property. 
Accordingly, the court should deny the plaintiffs summary judgment on this issue. 
III. THE DEFENSES OF LACHES AND ESTOPPEL APPLY TO BAR THE PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS. 
The plaintiffs claim that they are entitled to summary judgment on the defenses of 
laches and estoppel. However, as set forth in detail in Highway 101's brief in support of its 
motion for summary judgment, the defenses of laches and estoppel apply to bar the plaintiffs' 
claims. At a minimum, issues of fact exist that preclude the court from granting the plaintiffs' 
motion for summary judgment on the laches and estoppel issues. 
IV. THE DEFENSE OF UNCLEANS HANDS APPLIES TO BAR THE PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS. 
The plaintiffs assert that it is Highway 101 that has unclean hands since Highway 101 
"repeatedly submitted inaccurate applications to the City of Rexburg asserting that they owned 
the property in question and failing to recognize the other property owners easements. /I 
However, as noted above, Highway 101 mistakenly believed in good faith that it owned the 
property over which the easement at issue runs based upon information provided to Highway 
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101 from the City of Rexburg and from Highway 101's seller. In any event, Highway 101 did in 
fact subsequently acquire fee simple title to the right of way easement. 
Moreover, as noted in Highway 101's brief in support of its motion for summary 
judgment, Highway 101 did in fact recognize the other property owners' easements because 
Highway 101 located the sign post and bollards in the farthest corner of the right of way 
easement so as not to unreasonably interfere with the plaintiffs' use of the easement, a fact the 
plaintiffs themselves admit. 
"The doctrine of 'unclean hands' is based on the maxim that, (he who comes into equity 
must come with clean hands.' It allows a court to deny equitable relief to a litigant on the 
ground that his or her conduct has been (inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent and 
deceitful as to the controversy at issue."' Sword v. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242,251 (2004). 
Here, as Highway 101 explains in its brief in support of its motion for summary 
judgment, the plaintiffs had notice and an opportunity to file the instant law suit to seek an 
injunction before Highway 101 incurred substantial costs installing the sign and bollards but did 
not do it. Moreover, Dean Moon, the avowed "president" of Plaintiff Rexburg Plumbing, LLC, 
told Danny Miller of Highway 101 that there was no problem with the sign or its placement. 
Highway 101 relied on this representation in installing the sign and the bollards. Given these 
facts, at the very least a material issue of fact exists on whether Highway 101 can prevail on a 
clean hands defense. Accordingly, the court should deny the plaintiffs' motion for summary 
judgment on the clean hands defense issue. 
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V. PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIGHWAY 101'S DEFENSE 
OF MERGER. 
The plaintiffs claim that if the land subject to the easement is a public street, then 
Highway 101 has placed its sign and bollards in the middle of a public street. Therefore, the 
doctrine of merger does not apply. However, the plaintiffs completely miss the point on 
Highway 101's defense of merger. 
Highway 101 submits that if the City of Rexburg has constructively taken "American 
Street" for public use by marking it as "American Street" and placing it on city maps, then the 
City of Rexburg would own the street and as the owner could "permit" a sign to be placed upon 
it. More important, any private use of the easement would "merge" into the public use and 
thereby be terminated or suspended. The issue is whether there has been a dedication and 
acceptance of the street by the City of Rexburg. See, Fugate v. Nettleton, 213 Va. 26, 189 
S.E.2d 377 (VA 1972); Yager Pontiac, Inc. v. Fred A. Danker & Sons, Inc., 69 Misc.2d 546, 330 
N.Y.S.2d 409 (NY Sup. 1972); Schweitzer v. Adami, 12 Backes 46, 113 N.J.Eq. 46, 166 A. 124 (NJ 
1933); and Rexroat v. Thorell, 90 III.App.3d 311,413 N.E.2d 1 (IL 1980). However, the plaintiffs 
have not met their burden of demonstrating that there has been no dedication and no 
acceptance of the street by the City of Rexburg. Accordingly, the court should deny the 
plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on the merger issue. 
VI. THE PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIGHWAY 101'5 
DEFENSE OF FORFEITURE. 
"[E]xtinguishing an easement is appropriate when the additional burden imposed on the 
servient estate is so violative ofthe terms ofthe express easement that 'continued use ofthe 
easement is precluded as a matter of law."' Grygiel v. Monches Fish & Game Club, Inc., 787 
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N.W.2d 6 (Wis. 2010). Here, the plaintiffs' easement was expressly granted only to plaintiffs 
Nephi Allen and Kenton Johnson. Yet, Allen and Johnson are allowing plaintiff Rexburg 
Plumbing & Heating, LLC's customers and suppliers to use the easement as well. Thus, issues of 
fact exist whether the additional burden imposed on the servient estate is so violative ofthe 
terms of the express easement that any continued use of the easement is precluded as a 
matter of law. Accordingly, the court should deny the plaintiffs' summary judgment on the 
forfeiture issue. 
VII. THE PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE DEFENSE OF SET 
OFF. 
In State v. Shama Resources Ltd. Partnership, 127 Idaho 267, 270 (1995), the Idaho 
Supreme Court explained when the court should grant summary judgment: 
Summary judgment is proper "ifthe pleadings, depositions, admissions 
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact and that the moving part is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law." i.R.C.P.56{c). The party moving for summary judgment bears the 
burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Tingley v. 
Harrison, 125 Idaho 86, 89, 867 P.2d 960, 963 (1994); Harris v. Department of 
Health & Welfare, 123 Idaho 295, 298, 847 P.2d 1156, 1159 (1992). Once the 
moving party establishes the absence of a genuine issue, the burden shifts to the 
nonmoving party to make a showing of the existence of a genuine issue of 
material fact on the elements challenged by the moving party. Thomson v. Idaho 
Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527, 530-31, 887 P.2d 1034, 1037-38 (1994). i.R.C.P. 
56{c) requires the entry of summary judgment against a nonmoving party who 
"fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element 
essential to that party's case and in which that party will bear the burden of 
proof at triaL" Olsen v. J. A. Freeman, 117 Idaho 706, 720-21, 791 P.2d 1285, 
1299-1300 (1990) (citing Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 
2552,91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). See Hecla Mining Co. v. Star-Morning Mining Co., 
122 Idaho 778, 784, 839 P.2d 1192, 1198 (1992). 
Here, the plaintiffs assert without any analysis of the facts that they are entitled 
to summary judgment on Highway 101's defense and counterclaim of set-off. However, 
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the plaintiffs have failed to support this assertion by showing that there are no set of 
facts under which Highway 101 can prevail on its set-off defense. To the contrary, 
Highway 101 has made extensive improvements to the property over which the 
easement runs, i.e. installing and paying for water lines, sewer lines, power lines, phone 
lines, fire hydrants, etc. The plaintiffs have received benefits from such improvements. 
Therefore, Highway 101 is entitled to a set-off for the plaintiffs' portion of these 
benefits. 
VIII. PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE COUNTERCLAIM OF 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT. 
As noted above, Highway 101 made extensive improvements to the property over which 
the easement runs and adjoining properties. Such improvements include but are not limited to 
installing and paying for water lines, sewer lines, power lines, phone lines, fire hydrants, etc. 
The plaintiffs have received and accepted these benefits that Highway 101 has conferred on the 
plaintiffs such that the plaintiffs should in good conscience be required to pay their fair share of 
them. Therefore, the plaintiffs are not entitled to summary judgment on the counterclaim of 
unjust enrichment. 
IX. THE PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE DEFENSE OF 
TRESPASS. 
Without any analysis, the plaintiffs assert that they are entitled to summary judgment 
on Highway 101's defense of trespass. However, the plaintiffs have failed to support this 
assertion with any demonstration of an absence of any genuine issue of material fact. The 
plaintiffs are required to show that there are no facts under which Highway 101 can recover on 
a claim for trespass. Instead, the plaintiffs merely say that the trespass claim is "based on a 
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mistaken reading of the boundary lines in question" without ever providing any evidence or 
discussion ofthe facts.s Therefore, the court should deny the plaintiffs' motion for summary 
judgment on the trespass issue. 
X. THE PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS. 
It is premature to address the issue of attorney's fees or costs. The court should wait 
until the court has entered judgment to determine the identity of the prevailing party before 
addressing any issue of attorney's fees or costs. 
XI. CONCLUSION. 
For all the reasons stated above, the court should deny the plaintiffs' motion for 
summary judgment. 5t-
DATED this ~ day of March, 2011. 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
BryanD~ -.<Z~ By: 
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Highway 101 Investments, LLC 
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STATE OF IDAHO 
ss. 
County of Bonneville 
BRYAN D. SMITH, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
(1) I am one of the attorneys for the defendant, Highway 101 Investments in 
the above-referenced matter. 
(2) I make this affidavit based on my own personal knowledge. 
(3) Attached hereto and marked as Exhibit IIA" is a true and correct copy of 
the cover page and pages 122-123, and 131-132 ofthe deposition transcript of Plaintiff 
Nephi Allen, on his own behalf and as the 30(b)(6) designee for Plaintiff Rexburg 
Plumbing & Heating, LLC, taken on January 28, 2011. 
(4) Attached hereto and marked as Exhibit liB" is a true and correct copy of 
the cover page and pages 47-53 of the deposition transcript of Plaintiff Kenton D. 
Johnson taken on January 28, 2011. 
(5) Attached hereto and marked as Exhibit 11(" is a true and correct copy of 
Deposition Exhibit 7 (photograph) produced during the deposition of Plaintiff Nephi 
Allen on January 28, 2011. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man 
dealing with his sole and separate 
property and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a 
married man dealing with his sole 
and separate property, and REXBURG 
PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 
CV-10-115 
30(b) (6) DEPOSITION OF NEPHI H. ALLEN 
Friday, January 28, 2011, 9:05 p.m. 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 
Shantae Miller, 
RPR, CSR 
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101 made misrepresentations to the city about whether 
they owned the property when you weren't even at the 
meeting? 
A. Because I can't imagine the city giving a 
permit without notifying 
notifying, on an easement. 
I shouldn't say without 
Q. Do you think the city of Rexburg was 
always competent? Do you? 
A. Is this on the record? 
Q. This is on the record. 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. So basically what you're saying 
is the city of Rexburg can be known to be 
incompetent? 
A. Right. 
Q. Okay. And you've had that experience? 
A. Well-
Q. I'm not going to rat you out to the 
city, but --
A. That's neither here nor there. 
Q. Well, I would still like you to answer 
the question. Have you had experience with the city 
not 
right. 
A. I ain't going to answer it. 
Q. You don't want to answer that one. All 
Page 120 
Well, could you imagine that happening? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Could you imagine -- well, let's it do 
it this way. I want you to assume for a second that 
Highway 101 went into the city and said, "We want a 
permit.- And the city pulled up their map to see the 
property, and their map showed that Highway 101 
actually owned the property. Could you see that 
happening? 
A. That's what did happen. 
Q. Okay. So now that you know that's what 
happened, why do you say that Highway 101 
misrepresented their ownership of the property to the 
city. 
A. Because I believe know that Danny knew 
that that was not the case. 
Q. And what makes you believe that? 
A. Because unless he didn't know that that 
easement was there until I told him, he already would 
have known it. So if he didn't know the easement was 
Maybe he really thought that he did own it, but I 
doubt that. 
Q. All right. So what you're saying is is 
you do not dispute as you sit here today, that the 
city of Rexburg told Highway 101 that they actually 
owned the easement property? 
A. Oh, I'm sure on their little GSI maps 
they have all kind of stuff. 
Q. Well, let's take a look at Exhibit --
where is that one map we had 
A. Sure. with the green one. I've seen it. 
Q. The green one. You've seen it? 
A. Seen exhibit -- whatever that was. 
Let's take a break real quick. 
(A break was taken.) 
Q. (By Mr. Smith) Let me show you Exhibit 
7. This is actually a map from Madison County City 
of Rexburg, GIS. Po you see that? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. And the city has got Highway 101's 
property identified in what color? Can you tell? 
A. Green. 
Q. Green. And the green would include 
American Street, correct? 
A. The easement. 
Page 122 
Q. Okay. And so what you're saying is is 
that the map from the city actually shows that 
Highway 101 owns the easement? 
A. That's what the map shows. 
Q. A1l right. 
MR. ERICKSON: Does that map have a date on 
it? 
THE WITNESS: I was just going to look for 
it. See on -- this map is incorrect. 
MRS. MILLER: What's the date on it. 
THE WITNESS: 8/25/06. 
MRS. MILLER: August of 2006. 
MR. SMITH: All right. That's okay. 
Q. (By Mr. Smith) So the date on the map 
is August of 2006. So it would appear as of the time 
that Highway 101 went in to get its permit that the 
city had an incorrect identification on the easement 
showing that Highway 101 actually owned the property, 
correct? 
A. That's correct. 
21 there until I showed him all three deeds, he would Q. But now that you know there's been a 
22 have known that that map that the city of Rexburg had mistake by the city, you still believe that Highway 
23 
24 
25 
was incorrect. And at that point in time, he should 
have been honorable and said, "This is not the right 
way. II It could be as simple as that, you know. 
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A. Only because -
Q. Wait a minute. Is that right? You 
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(EXHIBIT-12 WAS MARKED.) 
Q. (By Mr. Smith) Take a look at exhibit 
12. You may not have seen this before, but I'll tell 
you what it is. This is the agreement between 
Highway 101 and Leishman Electric containing a deed 
for the underlying fee, is what we called it, to the 
easement that you have. Okay? 
A. Okay. 
Q. What date is that? 
A. 21st of March '09. 
Q. How about -- if you look at the deed, 
the deed is dated July 28, 2009. 
A. Okay. 
Q. All right. So if that's accurate, if 
property, would that be true or false in August of 
2006? 
A. It would be false. 
Q. 
with that? 
A. 
Q. 
It would be false. Okay. You agree 
I agree with that. 
So in fact the city would be saying 
something false for Highway 101, as opposed to 
Highway 101 saying something false with the city with 
respect to the ownership of the property? 
A. That would be true. 
Q. Okay. 
A. Now, if in fact someone gives you false 
information and you know that it's false and you 
15 that's what this is, and I just want you to assume it don't do anything with it, now where does the shoe 
16 is for a second, then Highway 101 didn't actually own fit? 
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the underlying fee to the easement in August of 2006, 
did they? 
wrong. 
A. No. 
Q. SO that means the map on Exhibit 7 is 
A. Okay. 
Q. Do you agree with that? 
A. Fine. 
Q. Okay. And so if it's wrong, that would 
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actually in fact mean that the city of Rexburg 
misrepresented the ownership, the true ownership, of 
the underlying fee to the easement, correct? 
A. Look, sometimes 
Q. Well, you can explain your answer. Just 
answer my question first. And then you can explain 
what you want to? 
A. No. 
Q. You're saying no. So you're saying even 
though the city of Rexburg has got the identification 
wrong, that's not a misrepresentation? 
A. No. 
Q. Why is that? 
A. Because a survey does what a GIS can't. 
Q. So if the city of Rexburg told Highway 
101, after reading the map that you now admit is 
wrong, that in fact that they told Highway 101 
that they owned the property where the sign is 
located, you're saying that's not a 
misrepresentation? 
A. No. They will tell you straight up --
well, ask them. That is not a survey. 
Q. Okay. I didn't ask you if it was a 
surveyor not. I'm just asking you if the city of 
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Q. Let me ask you this. Do you have any 
facts to show --
A. I do not. 
Q. -- that Highway 101 gave the city the 
GIS map? 
A. I don't. 
Q. Where did they get the map? 
A. A survey tells ownership of property. 
Q. Okay. But I'm asking where did --
A. They get it off of Google. 
Q. They got it off Google? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. So that'S got -
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A. They paint green markings on it. 
Q. Okay. Let me finish. That's got 
nothing to do with Highway 101, does it? 
A. No, or the city of Rexburg. 
Q. So the information that the city used to 
rely on with respect to ownership of that property as 
contained in Exhibit 7 didn't even come from Highway 
101, did it? 
A. Right. 
Q. But as you sit here today, you still 
think, notwithstanding all of the testimony you've 
given, that Highway 101 misrepresented their 
ownership interest of the underlying fee? 
A. Only because of the occupation of Highway 
101's ownership. 
Q. Well, what does that mean? 
A. Lawyers, and he's a real estate lawyer. 
I assume that he read through his warranty deed 
backwards and forwards. 
Q. Well then maybe you can answer this 
question for me, Mr. Allen. 
Page 131 
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A. Go ahead. 
Q. If he thought he owned it or if he knew 
he owned it when he went to go apply for the 
application, then why did he bother to buy it in July 
of 2009? 
A. That is completely bizarre. I have no 
answer for you. 
Q. So your testimony then if you believe 
your testimony, leads to a completely bizarre dead 
end. Is that what you're saying? 
A. It really does. I've wondered why they 
bought that property. 
Q. Okay. Couldn't it possibly be because 
they didn't know they didn't own it. They relied on 
the city of Rexburg. And when they found out they 
didn't own it, they went out and bought it? 
A. It could be. 
Q. Now, if that's what happened then you 
would have to agree that they didn't misrepresent 
anything to the city, did they? 
A. I would have to agree with that. 
MR. ERICKSON: For the record, I want to 
distinguish between misrepresentation and intentional 
misrepresentation or lying. 
MR. SMITH: That an inappropriate objection, 
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Counsel. You can raise that when I file my motion 
for summary judgment. But that's not a proper 
objection. 
You can object as to the form of 
questions, or as to privileges during deposition, but 
you do not get the right to object as to 
misrepresentation being negligent, intentional, or 
otherwise. That's one that's reserved for later. 
Q. (By Mr. Smith) All right. Let's go 
back to Exhibit 11. Here we go. That's 12. All 
right. 
Now, you agree that there was some -- it 
says here "Plaintiffs admit that the conversation 
described in the truck between Mr. Miller and Dean 
Moon occurred." You agree that there was some 
discussion in a truck when Mr. Moon gave Danny a 
lift, a ride back to Highway 101, correct --
A. I agree. 
Q. -- to their building location? 
And do you agree or disagree that Dean 
Moon said that he didn't have any problem with the 
sign being located where it was? 
A. I agree with that. 
Q. Okay. And so you will then acknowledge 
that Dean told Danny that it was okay for Danny and 
Highway 101 to place the sign where it was being 
placed. 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Did Dean tell you that? That he told 
him that. 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. Is that a yes? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you say, "However, Plaintiffs state 
that Danny Miller's information to Dean included in 
the incorrect information regarding Highway 101's 
interest of the street, the City's approval of the 
sign, and that any statement by Dean was premised on 
that information." Is that what you're saying?" 
A. I agree with that. 
Q. So what you're saying is is that Dean 
gave consent for the sign to be located where it was, 
but it was based on inaccurate information? 
A. Yes. We had to straighten Dean out. 
Q. Okay. And the inaccurate information 
that you're saying that Dean was relying on was he 
believed that Highway 101 owned the underlying 
property? 
A. I don't think that's all the information, 
but yes. 
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Q. Okay. What other information did he 
rely on? 
A. I believe when he carne back from that and 
informed us of what he had said, then we informed him 
of easements again, and that we all three had 
easements on that property. I think he was under the 
impression that we didn't even have an easement on 
there, so. 
Q. Well, Dean has a written easement, 
right? 
A. He does. 
Q. So you're saying he doesn't even know 
the easement that's written in his name? 
A. At -- yeah. I think so. 
Q. 
A. 
otherwise. 
Q. 
All right. 
Because I think he was convinced 
But you didn't explain anything about 
this easement in your under oath testimony in 
Responses to Interrogatories, did you? 
A. What does it say at the end of that? 
Q. Here is what you say. "Plaintiffs admit 
that the conversation described in the truck between 
Mr. Miller and Dean occurred. However, Plaintiffs 
state that Danny Miller's information to Dean 
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don't have to drive over that spot to access your 
property, do you? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. SO you really don't lose your right to 
access your property if the sign is allowed to 
remain, do you? 
A. Not today. 
Q. And you really can't identify any other 
property that you will lose if the sign is allowed to 
remain? 
told me was hearsay. I don't know. 
Q. Okay. What facts did they give you, 
besides their opinion, that you need to sue in this 
case to protect that 16 inches where the pipe is and 
the five inches each for the bollards or you will, on 
a more probable than not basis, suffer some property 
damage? What facts do you have? 
A. I don't have any facts to that they 
didn't say you will, they said you COUld. 
Q. Okay. So again, they're speculating, 
A. The property that I can identify that I too, because they don't know. 
might lose is the whole right-of-way if I do not 
defend that right-of-way. 
Q. All right. But that would be 
speculation, right? 
A. I think it would be more than 
speculation. It would be just smart on my part to 
look ahead. We seem to be reluctant in our meeting 
here to be able to look ahead, but I've got no 
choice. I've got to look ahead. 
Q. Okay. Well, has anybody shown you any 
facts that you can rely upon so you can say, look, if 
that sign is allowed to remain, this is what will 
likely happen on a more probable than not basis? 
A. No facts on that, no, sir. 
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Q. Okay. So in the absence of facts, 
you're just guessing, correct? 
A. I'm just taking care of business, yes, 
sir. 
Q. All right. And you call it "taking care 
of business," but what you're really doing is 
speCUlating about what might happen because you don't 
have any facts. 
A. Some of the people that have given me 
advice seem pretty smart. 
Q. Okay. But I'm talking about what facts 
you have. You don't have any facts to establish if 
the sign remains, you will lose some property on a 
more probable than not basis. 
A. It is a fact that some people that are 
pretty smart told me I better do this, whether I 
A. That's probably true. 
Q. So when it boils down to it, your 
biggest concern in this case is really based on the 
absence of facts, but on speculation. 
A. Yeah. 
Q. And as you sit here, you can't identify 
one customer who has not done business with your 
business, this Rexburg Plumbing, because of the 
location of the sign? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. In fact, your business is not even a 
retail outlet, is it? 
A. It is, sir. 
Q. You sell some retail? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. Is that what it primarily does? 
A. Primarily, no. 
Q. What do you do primarily? 
A. Construction. 
Q. So it does some retail, but that's 
because people will stop by to pick up stuff, but 
primarily, you don't do retail sales? 
A. We're a blaze game dealer so we sell a 
lot of stuff like that. 
Q. And do people come and get it there? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is it your contention that my clients 
misrepresented to the City of Rexburg that they owned 
the property underlying your easement? 
A. I'm not going to contend that because I 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
wanted to or not. I mean, that's the answer to that don't know what happened between the city and Danny. 
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question. 
Q. Okay. And so the only facts you have is 
what you consider smart people have told you that you 
better do something, correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. All right. So you've relied on hearsay 
A. You would have to ask them if what the 
And I -- I honestly like Danny better than I do the 
city, so. 
Q. So as you sit here today, you don't 
have, any facts any information whatsoever to 
establish that Danny or Barbara or Highway 101 
misrepresented that they owned the property? 
A. NOt sir. I do not. 
Q. Based on what you've seen today, is a 
as opposed to facts, correct? 1 
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reasonable alternative explanation simply that the 
city looked at their GIS map and told Highway 101, 
and Danny, and Barbara that they did own it, isn't 
that reasonable to believe? 
Q. Would you do that? Would you improve 
property that you didn't own? 
A. I would not, but I'm not an attorney. 
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Q. Do you know? 
A. I would be speculating again. 
Q. Okay. I don't want you to speculate. I 
want to know about what you know. 
A. That -- oh, you don't want me to 
speculate? 
Q. No. I want to know what you know 
because otherwise we could testify all day about what 
people speculate. So what do you know? 
A. Yeah. I would go back to Nick Baldwin 
telling them. He owned it. And that's how they put 
it on their map. And I don't know that. I'm --
Q. I understand. But as you look as the 
documents today, specifically I believe it's Exhibit 
7. 
Okay. On Exhibit 7, do you see the 
green there? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. Doesn't it appear from looking at 
that -- now what's the date of that? August, 2006? 
Page 48 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Were you aware that Highway 101, Danny, 
they didn't even buy the property until some time 
after August 2006, did you know that? 
A. Right. 
Q. SO that looks like Danny didn't have 
anything to do with the city identifying that road as 
belonging to Danny, does it? 
A. No. But that doesn't relieve Danny from 
the responsibility of knowing what he really owns and 
what he really doesn't own. 
Q. Okay. But the fact is is that when it 
comes to whether Danny misrepresented to the city, it 
looks like the city was misrepresenting that Danny, 
when he bought the property, actually owned the 
underlying property to the easement, true? 
A. True. But again, I don't know what went 
on in that meeting. I can - I buy property and the 
very first thing I do is have it surveyed. Sometimes 
even before. 
Q. And it wouldn't make sense for Danny or 
Highway 101 to put improvements on the property that 
they didn't think they even owned, would it? Would 
that make sense? 
25 A. I don't know. 
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Q. Okay. But the fact is is you don't know 
what Danny represented to the city or what the city 
represented to him? 
A. I don't. 
Q. But based on that Exhibit 7, it would 
appear, even though we don't know for sure, that the 
city was showing that the owner of the underlying 
easement was the person who owned all of that 
property in green, correct? On the map. 
A. Right. 
Q. And so if the city relied on that to 
tell Danny he owned the property, or to make a 
determination that he owned it for purposes of giving 
Danny the permit, then the city would have been 
I mistaken about that before Danny even bought the . property? 
A. The city wouldn't have given him a 
permit without this little green line, I'm guessing, I which 
, 
is wrong. 
there? 
Q. Okay. And who put the green line on 
Page 50 
A. I'm guessing the city. 
Q. All right. And since they did it in 
2006, that would have happened before Danny even 
bought the property if he bought it afterwards, 
I correct? 
! A. Right. 
Q. So Danny would have had absolutely 
nothing to do with the city putting the green line in 
there, right? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Which would show then that Danny didn't 
misrepresent his ownership of that to the city, 
correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And so if your attorney represents 
A. According to that, yeah. 
Q. According to that. So based on that map 
at least, which is facts in evidence, if your 
attorney represents to the court in this case that 
Highway 101 misrepresented his ownership interest in 
owning the underlying fee for that easement, that 
would be false, wouldn't it? 
A. Well, he may not have intentionally 
misrepresented it, but he did misrepresent it. He 
Page 51 ~', 
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didn't get a survey. That's like number one when you 
buy a piece of property. 
The other thing is Danny knows how to 
read a description. That's what he did for the 
Southern Pacific - or whatever it is. Union Pacific 
Railroad for years. That's the story he told us --
or told Dean that story. That they had these 
right-of-ways that they had to disperse or whatever, 
and that was one of his jobs that he did. So he 
certainly knows how to read a description. 
Q. But if it turns out that the city relied 
on its wrong information on the GIS map and not 
anything Danny told to the city, then wouldn't it be 
true that Danny didn't misrepresent his ownership 
interest? 
A. The only way that he might have 
misrepresented his ownership is if he knew different 
and went in there and didn't straighten it out. And 
that very well could have happened. 
Q. And you don't know that, do you? 
A. I don't know that. 
Q. And all your attorney can know about 
this is what you or Nephi give him, correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Correct. Do you know any facts to prove 
Page 52 
that Danny misrepresented the ownership interest on 
that 
A. No. 
besides the application to the city, that your 
attorney relies on? 
A. Besides the application to the city, I 
don't have. But I think that's good enough. 
Q. Okay. So you haven't even looked at the 
application? 
A. No, but I know to get a permit, you've 
got to fill out an application. You've got to state 
that you own the property. And that's his 
responsibility to know whether he really owns it or 
not and not look at a green line on a map. I would 
never do that. 
Q. And then it says, "Highway 101 made the 
same misrepresentation multiple times over the next 
few years to the city. And the city seems to have 
accepted the misrepresentation as true." 
What evidence do you have to support 
What facts do you have as you sit here? 
A. The city thought it was true to the point I 
that? 
that they told us that they gave them a permit when 
I they were having that meeting out there, and the city attorney was there, and everything was okay. And 
then the day that somebody took them the proof that 
Bran actually owned the property under the 
right-of-way, we called them up and says, "What are 
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you going to do about this?" And they said, "Civil 
matter. It's out of our hands." 
Q. So you would not dispute, though, that 
Q. - - underlying 
A. But he had the opportunity to 
today Danny, or we'll say Highway 101, does own the 
It en underlying fee to the easement? 
it out. 
Q. Can you explain why your attorney 
represents to the court that Danny misrepresented 
that if you don't have any facts at all to establish 
that? 
You see, Kent, I'm just looking for 
evidence and facts. 
A. Right, I know. 
Q. And do you have any facts to establish 
that? 
A. I don't really have any. 
Q. Well, let me find it here. Here it is. 
Right here. "Highway 101 provided the City of 
Rexburg an application for a conditional use permit. 
In its application, Highway 101 misrepresented its 
ownership of the street. Highway 101 represented to 
the city that it owned not only the property that it 
owned in fee simple, but also represented to the city 
that it owned the street." 
A. I wouldn't dispute that. I think he 
bought it after the fact to gain some sort of 
advantage. 
Q. Did you know that at that time the 
lawsuit was filed, that he had bought that property? 
Highway 101 had bought it? 
A. I don't think I did. I think Bran was 
pretty tightlipped about that. 
Q. Would it be fair to say that at the time 
you filed this lawsuit, you believed that Highway 101 
did not own the underlying fee? 
A. It could be one way or the other. It was 
-- you know, that timeline is pretty close to me 
finding out they bought it and us filing 
that was within days, if not a week or so. 
I mean, 
Q. Okay. Let's just take a break for about 
five minutes and see how many more questions I've 
got. 
(A recess was taken from 2:21 to 2:32 
All right. What facts do von h,,""" - -.} 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MADISON 
KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man ) 
dealing with his sole and separate ) 
property and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a ) 
married man dealing with his sole and ) 
separate property, and REXBURG ) 
PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an ) 
Idaho limited liability company, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
) 
) 
HIGHWAY 101 INVESTMENTS, LLC, ) 
) 
Counterclaimant, ) 
) 
v. ) 
Case No. CV-1O-115 
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KENTON D. JOHNSON, a married man ) 
dealing with his sole and separate ) 
property and NEPHI H. ALLEN, a ) 
married man dealing with his sole and ) 
separate property, and REXBURG ) 
PLUMBING & HEATING LLC, an ) 
Idaho limited liability company, ) 
) 
Counterdefendants. ) 
) 
COME NOW Plaintiffs, through their attorney of record, Hyrum Erickson of 
Rigby, Andrus, & Rigby, Chtd. and submit the following reply brief in support of Plaintiffs' 
motion for summary judgment. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When a motion for summary judgment has been properly supported with evidence 
indicating the absence of material factual issues, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to 
make a showing of the existence of a genuine issue of material fact that would preclude summary 
judgment. Treasure Valley Gastroenterology Specialists, P.A. v. Woods, 135 Idaho 485,20 P.3d 
21 (Ct. App. 2001); State v. Shama Resources Ltd. P'ship, 127 Idaho 267, 270, 899 P.2d 977, 
980 (1995). A party against whom summary judgment is sought may not merely rest on 
allegations contained in his pleadings, but must come forward and produce admissible evidence 
to contradict the assertions of the moving party and establish a genuine issue of material fact. 
McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765,820 P.2d 360 (1991); Olsen v. 1.A. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 
706, 791 P.2d 1285 (1990). See Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208, 211, 868 P.2d 1224, 1227 
(1994). 
ARGUMENT 
1. Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment as to Highway 101 counter claim of 
estoppel. Highway 101 has failed to present any evidence that any Plaintiff has 
made a false representation or concealed a material fact. 
Plaintiffs have shown by affidavit that they raised their concerns regarding the placement 
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of the signs to Highway 10 1. Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Exhibits C-D; Deposition of Nephi Allen p. 100-101. Additionally, the existence of 
their easement was a matter of record - the deeds were recorded with Madison County. Plaintiffs 
in discovery sought information regarding Highway 101 's claim of estoppel. Defendant failed to 
allege or identify any false representation or concealment of a material fact on the part of any 
Plaintiff. Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment Ex. B., 
Ans. to Inter. No. 11. As Highway 101 has failed to provide any evidence or even argument 
regarding a false representation or the concealment of a material fact on the part of Plaintiffs, 
Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment as to the counterclaim of estoppel. 
2. Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment on Highway 101's affirmative defense 
of unclean hands. Highway 101 has failed to present any evidence that the behavior 
of the Plaintiffs has been "inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent and 
deceitful" regarding the placement of the sign. 
Plaintiffs have provided the Court substantial admissible evidence regarding the behavior 
of Plaintiffs and Highway 101 in relation to the sign. Highway 101 has failed to present any 
evidence Plaintiffs conduct has been inequitable or unfair. Plaintiff has alleged that the remedy 
sought by Plaintiffs would be unfair or inequitable, but that is not the standard for unclean hands. 
The Court should look to the behavior of the Plaintiffs and determine if there is anything in their 
behavior that is sufficiently egregious that it should bar them from receiving their remedy. 
Additionally, the Court may compare the relative conduct of the two parties. 
In determining if [the clean hands] doctrine applies a court has discretion to 
evaluate the relative conduct of both parties and to determine whether the conduct 
of the party seeking an equitable remedy should, in the light of all the 
circumstances, preclude such relief. 
Sword v. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242, 251, 92 P.3d 492,501 (2004) (internal citations omitted). In this 
case Highway 101 points to Plaintiffs' alleged delay in bringing the lawsuit and the conversation 
between Dean Moon and Danny Miller as the basis for its allegation that Plaintiffs come to this 
action with unclean hands. Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment at 9. 
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However, neither of those occurrences amount to the type of conduct to which the doctrine of 
unclean hands would apply. 
The clean hands doctrine "is not a judicial straight jacket; it does not require that 
those who invoke equity should have led blameless lives, or operate so as to repel 
all sinners from a court of equity, nor does it apply to every unconscientious act of 
a party." Gilbert, 104 Idaho at 145-46,657 P.2d at 9-10 quoting 30 C.J.S. Equity § 
98 (1965). 
Hoopes v. Hoopes, 124 Idaho 518, 522, 861 P.2d 88, 92 (Ct. App. 1993). Here the Plaintiffs acts 
were at worst, unintentional mistakes. Even Highway 101 has not alleged that Plaintiffs were in 
any way trying to take advantage of Highway 101 or sought to profit from its placement of the 
sign. The inapplicability of the doctrine of clean hands is especially evident when Highway 101 's 
conduct in this matter is taken into account. Highway 101 placed a large and expensive sign on 
property without first ascertaining whether it owned the property. When shown a deed 
containing the easement prior to the placement of the sign, it elected to placed the sign in spite of 
the easement. 
Highway 101 asserts that there are facts in dispute regarding the doctrine of unclean 
hands. Opposition to Plaint(ffs Motionfor Summary Judgement at 9. However, it does not 
identify the material facts in dispute. It asserts "given these facts, at the very least a material 
issue of fact exists on whether Highway 101 can prevail on a clean hands defense." Id. 
However, whether or not Highway 101 can prevail on a clean hands defense is not a fact that is in 
dispute. The facts regarding Plaintiffs behavior surrounding the placement of the sign are before 
the Court and undisputed. Based on those facts, the Court should grant Plaintiffs' motion for 
summary judgment on Highway 101 's affirmative defense of unclean hands. 
3. Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment on Highway 101's defense of merger. 
Highway 101 asserts that it owns the property subject to the easement which it obtained 
by warranty deed dated July 28,2009, from Leishman Electric. Affidavit of Danny Miller in 
Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex. A; Separate Statement of Facts, No. 
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5. The Minutes from the August 16, 2007, planning and zoning meeting contain the following: 
Chairman Dyer asked about signage. Gary Likeness said commission can dictate 
signage location. The applicant would like a street sign which says "American 
Street", which he believes is a private street. 
Chairman Dyer asked if the street privately held by applicant. Danny Miller said 
it is listed in his deed. 
Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex. E, Bate no. 64. 
This is sufficient admissible evidence to show that there is no issue of material fact as to the 
ownership of the property subject to the easement - prior to July 28,2009, it was owned by 
Leishman Electric, and subsequent to July 28, 2009, it has been owned by Highway 101. When a 
motion for summary judgment has been properly supported with evidence indicating the absence 
of material factual issues, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to make a showing of the 
existence of a genuine issue of material fact that would preclude summary judgment. Treasure 
Valley Gastroenterology Specialists, P.A. v. Woods, 135 Idaho 485, 20 P.3d 21 (Ct. App. 2001); 
State v. Shama Resources Ltd. P'ship, 127 Idaho 267, 270, 899 P.2d 977, 980 (1995). Although 
Highway 101 claims to believe that the property has been "constructively taken" by the City of 
Rexburg, it has presented no admissible evidence in support of that claim. Because Highway 10 1 
has failed to produce any evidence in support of its claim of "merger" Plaintiffs are entitled to 
summary judgment on that defense. 1 
4. Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment on Highway 101 's defense of forfeiture. 
Highway 101 has asserted that the Plaintiffs, by permitting the property subject to the 
easement to be used for business purposes, have overburdened and thus forfeited the easement. 
IHighway 101 asserts that if the property is owned by the City, the City may permit the 
sign to placed on the street. Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment at 10. This 
is not correct. If the property subject to the easement is a city street, the City "may not make a 
valid contract permanently alienating a part of [it] or permitting a permanent encroachment and 
obstruction thereon limiting the use of the street by the public." Infanger v. City of Salmon, 137 
Idaho 45, 49, 44 P.3d 1100, 1104 (2002). 
REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
l1TnCMT?.NT _ P~OP" 
REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PLANTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
PAGE 392 
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment at 10. This is contrary to the general 
rule which is summarized by an ALR article directly on point as follows: 
[C]ourts have held that forfeiture of an easement was available in certain limited 
circumstances, but most courts have recognized that forfeiture is not available. 
What Constitutes, and Remedies for, Misuse of Easement, 111 A.L.R.5th 313, §2(a); See also 
Gray v. Gore, 119 Idaho 425,807 P.2d 643 (1991) ("As a matter ofIdaho history, most forfeiture 
provisions, even those incorporated in written agreements, signed and acknowledged by all of the 
involved parties, will not be honored in order to avoid unconscionable results." (Citation 
ommitted)). 
Even if forfeiture were an appropriate remedy for the alleged overburdening, Plaintiffs 
have not overburdened the easement. Rather they have used it in a manner consistent with the 
historical use of the easement. It is undisputed that the casement in question serves three 
businesses Leishman Electric, Rexburg Plumbing and Heating, and Highway 101 dba 
American Self Storage. Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Plaintiff's Motionfor Summary 
Judgment Ex. A (ariel photograph). It serves no one else. [d. Prior to July 28,2009, Highway 
101 had run its self-storage business, including providing access to the business and storage units 
to its clients, solely on the basis of an easement identical to Plaintiffs' easement. Highway WI's, 
and its predecessor in interest's deeds, and the easement contained therein, were in the name of 
the business - not the individuals. Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Ex. E, bate no. 20, 21, 26. Leishman Electric was given an easement 
identical to Plaintiff's easement in 1986. Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion 
for Summary Judgment, Ex. E, bate no. 5. Plaintiffs received the property from which Rexburg 
Plumbing and Heating operates from United States Welding, Inc., by way of warranty deed dated 
October 23, 2000. [d. bate no. 16. 
Although Highway 101 seems to imply otherwise, the deed creating the easement is silent 
as to who the easement owners may invite to use the easement. The deed states: 
ALSO A right-of-way to used in common with others described as follows: 
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Beginning at the Southwest corner of Section 17, Township 6 North, Range 40 
East, Boise Meridian, Madison County, Idaho; thence East 140.90 feet; thence 
North 565.74 feet to the true point of beginning; and running thence North 
89°49'50" East 378.37 feet; thence South 25.00 feet; thence South 89°49'50" West 
394.40 feet; thence North 32°37'44" East 29.74 feet to the point of beginning. 
Id. bate no. 16. It does not indicate that the use of the right of the way is to be exercised solely by 
the easement holder. Admissible evidence shows that holders of the easement have always been 
the businesses located in the present businesses respective premises and the easement has always 
been utilized by the businesses and their guests. Because forfeiture is not an appropriate remedy 
and because the Plaintiffs have not overburdened the easement, Plaintiffs are entitled to summary 
judgment on Highway 10 l's affirmative defense of forfeiture. 
5. The Court should grant Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment regarding 
Highway 101's affirmative defense of lack of "unreasonable interference" because 
Highway 101 may not unilaterally reduce the width of the express easement. 
In their Answering Brief in Opposition to Highway 101's Motion for Summary Judgment 
Plaintiffs have made their argument regarding Highway 101's assertion that it may place a sign 
within the area of the express easement if it does not "unreasonably interfere" with the use of the 
easement. It seems impractical to repeat the case law and argument here. However, as set out in 
more detail there, Highway 101's assertion that the Court must examine evidence beyond the 
terms of the easement and rule based on the reasonableness of Highway 101's interference is 
without support. When the physical dimensions of an easement are expressly set out in the 
instrument creating the easement, the instrument is controlling and there is no need to consider 
the reasonableness of the interference. Clog Holdings, N. V. v. Bailey, 394,992 P.2d 69, 89 
(Hawai'i, 2000) (citing Consolidated Amusement Company, Ltd. v. Waikiki Business Plaza, Inc., 
719 P.2d 1119 (Haw. App. 1986). This is entirely consistent with the rule in Idaho and 
elsewhere that if a deed is clear, there is no need to look to extrinsic evidence to determine the 
parties intent. Phillips Industries, Inc. v. Firkins, 121 Idaho 693,697,827 P.2d 706,710 (Ct. 
App. 1992); Coward v. Hadley, 246 P.3d 391, 396 (ldaho,201O). 
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The Plaintiffs' deeds precisely describe an easement that is 25 feet in width. The 
Affidavit of Danny Miller in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment states "The 
easement is 25 feet wide, and the sign post and bollards are within five feet of the northern 
boundary line leaving 19 feet of space for use of the easement." Paragraph 13. Highway 101 
may not unilaterally reduce the width of Plaintiffs' casements and Plaintiffs are entitled to 
summary judgment on Highway 101's affirmative defense of lack of "unreasonable interference." 
6. The Court should grant Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on Highway 101 's 
defense of laches because Plaintiffs have not delayed in asserting their rights, 
Highway was on notice that Plaintiffs objected to the placement of the sign, and 
Highway 101 has not been prejudiced by any alleged delay. 
Plaintiffs have responded to Highway 101's affirmative defense oflaches in their 
Answering Brief in Opposition to Highway 101's Motion for Summary Judgment. As set out in 
more detail there, the elements of laches have not been met and Plaintiffs are entitled to summary 
judgment as to laches. 
Highway 10 1 asserts that there are issues of fact that preclude the Court from granting 
summary judgment as to estoppel or laches - however it fails to identify what they might be. 
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment at 8. Plaintiffs are aware of no issues of 
fact outstanding. The affidavits and depositions before the Court regarding the behavior of the 
parties are consistent as to the behavior of the parties both before and after the sign was put in 
place. It is undisputed that the Plaintiffs complained about the sign and that Nephi Allen showed 
Danny Miller the deeds containing the easement and stated "that sign cannot go there." Affidavit 
of Counsel in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex. D at 4. Plaintiffs do not 
perceive a material dispute regarding the facts relevant to the issues of laches. Because the 
parties have filed for summary judgment relying on substantially the same facts and the case will 
be tried by the Court, the Court is entitled to draw reasonable inferences from that evidence in 
making its ruling. Riverside Development Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 519, 650 P.2d 657,661 
(1982). As set out in the Plaintiffs' Answering Brief in Opposition to Highway 101's Motion for 
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Summary Judgment, there is no basis for Highway 101's affirmative defense of laches and 
therefore, the Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment as to laches. 
7. Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment regarding Highway 101's counterclaim 
of unjust enrichment because Highway 101 has failed to provide any evidence or 
argument in support of the contention that Plaintiffs have enjoyed a benefit or that 
it would be inequitable not to require them to pay Highway 101 for its costs of 
paving the right of way. 
Plaintiff's presented competent and admissible evidence that the paving of the right of 
way did not benefit them, but actually harmed them. Affidavit of Counsel in Support of 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex. c., pg. 4-5. Highway 101 has failed to provide 
any admissible evidence in support of its assertion that Plaintiffs should be required to pay a 
portion of Highway 101 IS expenses for paving the right of way. McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 
820 P.2d 360 (1991). As such, Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment on the issue of unjust 
enrichment. 
8. Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment on Highway 101's claim of trespass 
because Plaintiffs have introduced admissible evidence that there is no issue of fact 
and Highway 101 has failed to present any evidence in rebuttal. 
Plaintiffs specifically inquired regarding the facts supporting Highway 101 IS claim of 
trespass. Plaintiffs' interrogatory, and Highway 101's response were as follows: 
INTERROGATORY NO.9: Please list each fact that supports Count III 
of the Counterclaim (Trespass) as well as who has knowledge of that fact and who 
will testify to that fact at trial. 
RESPONSE: Hwy 101 had a plat that showed a small strip of land 
between plaintiffs' property and property belonging to Hwy 101 situated on nearly 
the same "footprint" as the right of way. This strip appeared on the plat to belong 
to Hwy 101 and not plaintiffs. Hwy 101 has since obtained an updated plat that 
shows this strip as a "deed overlap." See attached plat. Hwy 101 is continuing to 
conduct discovery on this issue and will supplement its discovery as discovery 
progresses. The following people are persons who have knowledge of all or some 
of the relevant facts: Danny Miller, Barbara Miller, plaintiffs, Madison County 
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Recorder, and Schiess & Associates, Consulting Engineers. 
Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex. B., Int. 9. 
Highway 101's response to interrogatory number 9 was subscribed and sworn and is admissible 
evidence that there is no basis in fact for Highway 10 l's counterclaim of trespass - it was based 
on an incorrect plat that Highway 101 recognizes as inaccurate. When presented with admissible 
evidence demonstrating the lack of an issue of fact, the party opposing summary judgment is 
required to present admissible evidence showing the existence of an issue of fact. McCoy v. 
Lyons, 120 Idaho 765,820 P.2d 360 (1991). Highway 101 has failed to do so and Plaintiffs are 
entitled to summary judgment on Highway WI's counterclaim of trespass. 
9. Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment regarding Highway 101 's defense of 
"set off' if Highway 101's is not successful on its counterclaim. 
As stated in Plaintiffs brief in support of summary judgment, the defense of set off is 
dependent on the success of Highway 10 l's counterclaim. If Highway 10 l's counterclaim is 
dismissed, their defense of set off must also be dismissed as there would be nothing to set off 
against any award made to the Plaintiffs. 
10. The Court should deny all of Highway 101 's equitable defenses and counterclaims 
because equity does not favor Highway 101. 
Highway 101 has objected to the removal of the sign based on a number of equitable 
defenses and counterclaims -laches, estoppel, quasi-estoppel, and unclean hands. Each of these 
is premised on the argument that Plaintiffs' behavior regarding the placement of the sign is 
somehow improper and that as a result, Plaintiffs as a matter of equity, should not now be able to 
assert their right regarding the easement. Highway 101's arguments have revolved around two 
claims - first, that Plaintiffs did not sue Highway 101 sufficiently rapidly to prevent it from 
incurring the costs of the sign, and second, a comment made by Dean Moon, then a member of 
Rexburg Plumbing and Heating, to Danny Miller. However, at all times relevant to this case, 
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Highway 101 had constructive knowledge of the easements in question. Plaintiffs' easement was 
recorded with the County and identical language appeared in Highway 101's deed. Plaintiffs 
cannot be held responsible for Highway 101's failure to correctly read its own deeds or to 
properly investigate the ownership of the property. Further, prior to the placement of the sign, 
Highway 101 had actual knowledge of the Plaintiffs' easement - Nephi Allen showed Danny 
Miller the deed with the easement. Highway 101 elected to place the sign regardless. 
Highway 101 takes exception to the use of the term "misrepresentation" in Plaintiffs' 
brief in support of their motion for summary judgment. Opposition to Plaintiff' s Motion for 
Summary Judgment at 2-7. However, the Minutes from the August 16, 2007, planning and 
zoning meeting contain the following: 
Chairman Dyer asked about signage. Gary Likeness said commission can dictate 
signage location. The applicant would like a street sign which says "American 
Street", which he believes is a private street. 
Chairman Dyer asked if the street privately held by applicant. Danny Miller said 
it is listed in his deed. 
Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex. E, bate no. 64. 
Additionally, Highway 101's conditional use permit application presented to the City by Highway 
101 represents that Highway 101 owned the property subject to the easement. Id. bate no. 84? 
The sign permit completed by Highway 101 and provided to the City under the signature of 
Danny Miller represents that Highway 10 1 owned the property subject to the easement. /d. bate 
no. 90-93. 
At the deposition of the parties, Highway 101 introduced a Madison County/City of 
Rexburg GIS map that is dated 8/25/2006. It shows the property subject to the easement marked 
in green and connected with the property owned by Highway 101. Affidavit of Bryan D. Smith, 
Ex. C. Highway 101 represented through counsel at the deposition and in its briefing that the 
2The copy provided to Plaintiffs in discovery contains a signature line for Danny Miller 
but is unsigned. Presumably a signed copy was delivered to the City. 
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City of Rexburg represented to it that Highway 101 owned the property. However, that does not 
remove from Highway 101 the obligation to look at its deed to verify that the City's 
representation is correct. Printed in large type at the bottom of the GIS map are the words 
"DISCLAIMER: This map is intended for display purposes only and is not intended for 
any legal representations." If Highway 10 1 choose to rely on the representations of the City or 
its GIS map in place of examining its own deed or doing some type of title search, that is 
unfortunate and may give Highway 101 some type of claim against the City. However, it does 
not affect Plaintiffs' rights to require an obstruction placed within their right of way be removed. 
Highway 10 1 is responsible for the placement of the sign within the easement and the attempt to 
pass the blame to Plaintiffs is misplaced. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons the COUlt should grant Plaintiffs' motion for summary 
judgment on all counts. Additionally, for the reasons set out in Plaintiffs' Brief in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court should award Plaintiffs their costs and fees pursuant to 
I.e. § 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l). 
DATED this 7th day of April, 2011. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL, HAND DELIVERY 
OR FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was on this date 
served upon the persons named below, at the addresses set out below their name, either by mail-
ing, hand delivery or by telecopying to them a true and correct copy of said document in a 
properly addressed envelope in the United States mail, postage prepaid; by hand delivery to 
them; or by facsimile transmission. 
DATED this 7th day of April, 2011. 
Bryan D. Smith, Esq. 
B. J. Driscoll, Esq. 
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
P. O. Box 50731 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
RIGBY ANDRUS & RIGBY, Chartered 
] Mail 
] Hand Delivery 
[ X ] Facsimile 
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